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ABSTRACT 
 
WILDLIFE CRIME AND OTHER CHALLENGES TO RESOURCE SYSTEM 
RESILIENCE 
 
Patricia A. Raxter 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Director: Dr. David Earnest 
 
 
Although wildlife crime has exploded in Africa over the past decade —“commercial 
poaching” now kills an estimated eight percent of the continent’s elephant population 
each year—some governments have proven more successful than others at protecting 
wildlife and preserving habitats. To explain this variation, this study examines how the 
policies of three states (Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana) have enhanced or 
undermined the resilience of the continent’s elephant ecosystem. Using the social-
ecological system framework, the study illustrates how each state’s changing practices 
have either exacerbated the stresses wrought by wildlife crime or successfully protected 
local populations from poaching. The study finds that monocausal explanations cannot 
explain social-ecological systems outcomes. Cross-level and cross-scale dynamics, 
including temporal, geospatial, epistemological, and institutional linkages, explain 
variation in system functionality. These dynamics include colonial policies, governance 
practices, the international conservation community, and resource use decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND INTRODUCTION 
 
The African elephant, once numbering in the tens of millions, teeters on 
the edge of extinction due to a massive increase in demand for ivory and a 
corresponding commercial poaching crisis.  The most current estimates place the 
surviving number of African elephants between 200,000- 400,000 across the 
continent.  Historically populations stood at over ten of million.  The current wave 
of poaching is focused on Central and East Africa, though as elephants are 
poached out in those areas poachers are turning their attention to herds across 
southern Africa where an “avalanche” of poaching is expected to occur in the 
next several years.  As many as 50,000 African elephants are illegally killed each 
year.1 
Transnational organized crime [TOC] controls the illicit international trade 
in ivory.  The legal trade was banned in 1989 by the Convention on the Trade in 
Endangered Species [CITES].  The monetary and organizational resources 
required to direct large scale poaching, consolidate large amounts of ivory, 
containerize and ship these massive quantities of ivory, and the complex 
shipping routes involved, all point to the involvement of TOC.  These organized 
crime groups are Asian-run and Africa based, directly connecting end markets in 
China, and to a lesser extent other states in Asia, with the illegal killing of African 
                                            
1
 Daniel Cressey, "Nations Fight Back on Ivory: Politicians Take Action on Poaching in Africa as 
Tusk Seizures Approach Record Numbers," Nature 503, no. 452 (2013). 
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elephants.2 China emerged over the last decade as the primary market for ivory, 
with the illicit market increasing ten-fold since 2005.  Poaching levels in Africa 
directly correlate with the price of ivory in China.3  
Ivory poaching, when viewed within the context of transnational 
environmental crime, threatens both immediate and long term stability in African 
states.  In the immediate term poaching, when carried out by non-state armed 
groups, threatens both populations at the site of poaching and populations 
targeted by extremists.  Poaching is comorbid with other illicit activities which 
include recruitment of child soldiers, human trafficking, mass rapes/sexual 
exploitation, and murder.4 Poached ivory finances terrorist and violent 
organizations, while increasingly brutal poaching operations create war zones 
between poachers and park rangers. Poaching directly threatens the economic 
security of rural communities, often heavily reliant on tourism.5 Poachers are 
known to torture and kill anti-poaching personnel.6  Rangers in particular are 
under threat, with over 1,000 across 35 countries killed in the last decade.7  
                                            
2
 Jeffrey Gettleman, "Elephants Dying in Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars and Profits," in New 
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/africa/africas-elephants-are-being-
slaughtered-in-poaching-frenzy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. Varun Vira, Thomas Ewing, and 
Jackson Miller, "Out of Africa: Mapping the Global Trade in Illicit Elephant Ivory,"  (2014), 
http://www.bornfree.org.uk/news/news-article/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1660. 
3
 Yufang Gao and Susan G. Clark, "Elephant Ivory Trade in China: Trends and Drivers," 
Biological Conservation 180 (2014). 
4
 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the United 
Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and on the Lord's Resistance Army-Affected Areas, 
(New York: United Nations, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/297. 
5
 IFAW, Criminal Nature: The Global Security Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade, 
(International Fund for Animal Welfare, 2013), http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/resource-
centre/criminal-nature-global-security-implications-illegal-wildlife-tra-0. 
6
 Christopher Jasparro, Environmental Threats to Security, Stability, and Us Interests in Southern 
Africa: Opportunity Knocks- Time for a Comprehensive Regional Defense Environmental 
International Cooperation and Environmental Security Assistance Strategy, (Naval War College, 
2009). 
7
 IFAW. 
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Environmental crime can spur displacement, either temporary or permanent, 
depending on the ecological damage sustained.    Wildlife crimes such as 
overfishing, or dumping toxic waste, negatively impact food security, disrupt local 
economies, reduce revenues from state coffers, and severely impact health.8  
The illicit wildlife trade also helps spread animal-borne diseases. Ivory is 
considered by many experts to be the new “conflict diamonds,” hunted and 
traded by militants for weapons, ammunition, food, and other material required to 
sew instability. 
In the long term poaching, conceptualized as a major transnational 
environmental crime and as part of a transnational organized crime 
establishment, contributes to the erosion of the state across the continent, 
highlighting the ability of countries to control their own borders, resources, and 
government policies.  As illicit economies grow and political power is looted by 
transnational criminal organizations states will weaken further in a viscous cycle 
of state degradation accompanied by increased foreign illicit trade.  
While TOC clearly plays a role in commercial ivory poaching, it is less 
clear how other factors interact to either undermine or bolster wildlife protection 
measures in areas where African elephants live, or as a resource managed at 
the international level.  How TOC combines with other key variables including 
governance systems, socio-economic calculations of users, law enforcement, 
norms of wildlife conservation, land use practices, expectations of development, 
levels of security, and infrastructure development, among other factors, to impact 
                                            
8
 Andre Le Sage, "Non-State Security Threats in Africa: Challenges for Us Engagement," Prism 
2, no. 1 (2010). 
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elephant populations are key questions with implications for the survival of the 
species.  
Currently far more resources are devoted to supply side approaches to 
fighting wildlife crime than demand reduction strategies.9 The supply side 
approach to illegal trades essentially argues that if no illegal goods are moving 
from one country to another, than no consumption can take place.  This assumes 
curtailing supplies is the best way to curb consumption.  From the standpoint of 
the consumer country, policies focused on restricting supply are far easier, in part 
because it allows blame for weak enforcement and increased rates of illegal 
killing to be shifted from consumers to suppliers.  Because of the emphasis on 
supply reduction strategies within policy circles, this study primarily focuses on 
challenges related to wildlife management on the supply side, while 
acknowledging in multiple instances the key to understanding dynamics 
operating across the resource system. 
The exponential growth of wildlife crime and the increased penetration of 
TOC into the global wildlife sector raise important questions about the future 
sustainability of wildlife resources. What conditions exist which allow some states 
to better protect their wildlife than other states? How can states in the developing 
world withstand the pressures of rising global demand for limited wildlife 
resources?  This project employs a case study analysis to compare three African 
states- Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania- and their relative success or failure 
protecting wildlife. The primary research question revolves around Botswana and 
                                            
9
 Todd Reubold, "Peter Knights: Curbing the Demand for Wildlife," in Ensia.com (29 May 2014), 
http://ensia.com/interviews/peter-knights-curbing-the-demand-for-wildlife/. 
  
5 
its success battling poachers.  What group of factors operate together to protect 
wildlife and maintain sustainability? Multiple goals animate this research 
including, first, to explicate and describe the potential causal factors degrading or 
improving SES resilience related to poaching; second, to identify and explain 
cross scale and cross level challenges to SES performance; third, to describe 
and compare specific case studies utilizing the SESF; and fourth, to contribute to 
a critique of present conservation strategies related to social components of the 
SES.10   
Lacking effective institutional protection at the state and international level, 
elephant populations are declining in most of their range beyond reasonable 
expectations of viability.   For any hope to remain for saving endangered species 
researchers and policymakers must understand the complex local/global 
interlinkages between the governance systems and resource users making 
decisions that impact animals and habitats and the multitude of outcomes flowing 
from those decisions.  In a world characterized by globalization proximity to a 
resource is not required to produce impacts, either positive or negative.  When 
extinction is so closely related to human activity simple solutions focused 
primarily on the natural sciences are bound to fail.  To chart a path towards a 
sustainable future for African elephants and other species an interdisciplinary 
approach is required to identify all of the relevant variables and factors at play to 
diagnose which background conditions impact outcomes, and how they can be 
altered. 
                                            
10
 Firkhart Berkes, Johan Colding, and Carl Folke, "Introduction," in Navigating Social-Ecological 
Systems, ed. Firkhart Berkes, Johan Colding, and Carl Folke (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008).  
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Ostrom et al  points out six concerns particular to the international management 
of global common pool resources such as the African elephant, illustrating again 
the complexity of both diagnosing problems with resource management and 
finding and applying effective solutions.11  First, Ostrom et al  notes a scaling up 
problem related to the number of participants necessary to agree on and enforce 
rules for the use and management of a resource.12  Who gets a say in a world 
with billions of CPR users?   The second issue relates to the “cultural diversity 
challenge” which captures the difficulty of identifying and solving problems across 
cultures, in particular when a paternalistic or economic “north-south” conflict 
impacts issue areas. Third are problems associated with the simultaneous 
interconnectedness of communities across the global linked through shared 
global problems like acid rain, deforestation, and climate change, and the 
disconnectedness of people within their own communities, with each other, and 
with the environment.  Fourth, significant changes, even those on a global scale, 
can occur far more quickly than in the past. Environmental thresholds are passed 
before enough people to make a difference even recognize, or agree that, a 
problem exists.  Fifth, Ostrom notes the difficulty in achieving unanimity amongst 
international actors for collective choice actions.  And lastly, CPRs at the global 
level are limited and finite.  Some decisions and actions are permanent, and 
mistakes made by international regimes monitoring resources, whether based on 
                                            
11
 Elinor Ostrom et al., "Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges," Science's 
Compass 284 (1999). 
12
 Ibid. 
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politics or science, have real, and sometimes irreversible, impacts on 
resources.13 
As a global CPR the African elephant SES faces all of these challenges. 
At the international level agreement of the scope, scale, or drivers of poaching 
has not been achieved within CITES, the primary resource manager. With 
culturally diverse resource users, normative concerns and priorities differ 
significantly.  Global markets link wealthy users and commodities, yet exclude 
impoverished locals who cannot affect change or access economic benefit from 
use of the CPR. The speed of the assault on wildlife, and the scale over which it 
has occurred, decreased the ability of resource managers at any level to stop the 
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of elephants.  And lastly, the African 
elephant is a finite resource being exploited by an almost infinite pool of users.  
The so far ineffective response to the current poaching crisis could result in the 
irreversible transformation of a valued global common pool resource- the African 
elephant- and its eradication across most of its range within the next decade. 
In brief, the study finds multiple interactions and factors contributed to the 
resilience or degradation of elephant habitats in Africa, and that while some 
factors impacted each case study in a similar way, generalizing across cases 
may not be effective due to the heterogeneous nature of social-ecological 
systems operating over time and in specific geographic, political, and economic 
contexts. Key interactions policymakers should consider when diagnosing 
challenges to resource systems are between resource users and governance 
                                            
13
 Marco A. Janssen, John M. Anderies, and Elinor Ostrom, "Robustness of Social-Ecological 
Systems to Spatial and Temporal Variability," Society & Natural Resources 20, no. 4 (2007). 
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authorities both in the present and in the past.  Questions to explain current 
outcomes could include how resource users traditionally utilized and interacted 
within the system; how norms have been degraded or strengthened by 
interactions with governing authorities; how policies either strengthen or weaken 
norms; and how policies encourage or discourage, intentionally or not, certain 
resource usage strategies.  Other key interactions important to understanding 
resource use in a system transntiaonl involve the aggregated actions of 
geographically removed resource users; their understanding of resource use 
impacts on the system, and their role in bringing about those impacts; and 
cultural framing of resource challenges across levels.  
This study increases understanding of illicit traffics occurring as part of the 
illicit global economy, defined by Friman and Andreas as “the system of 
transnational economic activities that are criminalized by states in importing or 
exporting countries.”14 The growth of illicit economies, in particular that 
embedded in transitoanl criminal organizaitons, and entrenched in local, national, 
and regional political economies, is impacting states in multiple ways. 
As Williams notes, the corrosive influence of transnational criminal 
organizations can lead to the capture or criminalization of the state.15  According 
to Williams, state capture occurs when “at least some criminal organizations 
cloak their power in the mantle of state authority… (and) states continue to carry 
                                            
14
 Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, "Introduction: International Relations and the Illicit Global 
Economy," in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, ed. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas 
(Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 1999). 
15
 Phil Williams, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering," in Managing Global Issues, ed. 
P.J. Simmons and C. de Jnnge Oudrat (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2003). 
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out some traditional functions while simultaneously allowing criminal enterprise to 
continue unhindered.”16  Criminalization occurs when “government personnel are 
deeply involved in commission and orchestration of transnational crime… 
criminal activities are endorsed or organized by officials … (within a) seamless 
web between the state and entrepreneurs in both licit and illicit economies.” 17   
Shelley argues the links between transnational crime and terrorism occur 
to the greatest extent in areas with high levels of corruption.18  Corruption is one 
of the most effective and pernicious weapons of organized crime.  Organized 
crime, non-state armed actors, and to some extent armed groups affiliated with 
the state, benefit when the state is weakened by corruption. 19  Government 
complicity in organized crime undermines the confidence of local populations in 
their government.  For example, as a result of government complicity in 
transntiaonl crime, in Kenya less than 10% of people expressed any trust in 
parliament, the police, or the judiciary.20  Rule of law is undermined through 
corruption of law enforcement and the judiciary.  Government officials, when 
implicated in transntiaonl crime, are rarely prosecuted, further undermining 
government legitimacy.21   
Illicit economies impact state revenues in at least two ways.  First, transnational 
crime robs governments of the funds required to perform primary functions 
                                            
16
 Ibid., 139. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Louise Shelley, "Unraveling the New Criminal Nexus," Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs 6, no. 1 (2005). 
19
 Williams, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering." 
20
 Peter Gastrow, Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya, 
(New York: International Peace Institute, 2011).  
21
 Marc Shaw and Tuesday  Reitano, "The Evolution of Organized Crime in Africa: Towards a 
New Response," Institute for Security Studies 244 (2013). 
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related to fighting corruption, guarding borders, and developing the economy, 
among other things.   The second affect of revenue loss relates to the distorting 
affect of the large amount of illicit dollars floating economies. Criminal groups 
inject resources into communities, undermining efforts at local government 
capacity building and legitimacy creation. 22  Lesage points out that African 
citizens, beset by insecurity and criminality on a day-today basis exhibit what he 
terms a “retreat from the state.”  Individuals seek security and welfare from 
“nonstatatory arrangements” instead of looking to the state for welfare and the 
provision of security.  This contributes to the undermining of the connection 
between states and societies- individuals look elsewhere for economic and 
physical security.23  Illicit econimiers and traffics provide a source of employment 
and represent a large part of developing economies’ income and can sometimes 
be the most accessible means to accumulation for impoverished communities.24  
Profits can benefit local communities, which suffer from poverty, unemployment, 
and a general lack of opportunity.  Allowed to flourish, illicit markets can develop 
local institutions and control the narrative around their enterprises to embed in 
communities. They can exploit grievances against government policies and 
resentment towards lack of development and lack of opportunity.25 
Non-state armed groups challenge a state’s ability to control its borders by 
corrupting officials and institutions to work around border control measures. 26 
The ability of states to monopolize the use of coercive force is increasingly under 
                                            
22
 Ibid., 244. 
23
 Le Sage, "Non-State Security Threats in Africa: Challenges for Us Engagement." 
24
 Williams, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering." 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
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question as organized crime actors and armed groups impose their will on 
communities in areas with weak state institutions.  Non-state actors include 
militias, vigilantes, terrorists, and insurgents.  These groups may work in 
conjunction with the state or with local communities to provide security, or can be 
groups operating outside of state control.  Either way, the proliferation of such 
groups suggests a loss of the state monopoly on coercion.27   Increasingly, states 
cannot protect their citizens or their territory from transnational threats of either a 
criminal, terrorist, or other non-state armed group.28 Local and transnational non-
state actors have been successful in wresting control away from the state, 
presenting a new challenge to local, national, and international security.  These 
threats exist above and below the state, and cross boundaries locally and 
transcontinentally. 29  
The next chapter reviews the literature on explanations for poaching to 
identify areas of further investigation, and to explain why a focus on any one 
variable alone cannot explain the complex interactions which are required to 
facilitate the commercial exploitation of protected species across levels of 
analysis.  The following chapter discusses the study’s research design, 
describing the social ecological systems framework it adopts as a model; six 
hypotheses; and relevant measurement tools. Chapter 4 examines how human 
action is shaping the African elephant ecosystem through over-harvesting of 
                                            
27
 Diane Davis, "Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communites, and Shifting Patterns of 
Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern Worl," Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 2 (2009).  
28
 Louise Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism," in The Global 
Economy and State Power, ed. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1999). 
29
 Davis, "Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communites, and Shifting Patterns of 
Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern Worl." 
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finite resources at the international level and range state level, nested 
immediately below. Chapters 5 and 6 provide case studies for two countries, 
Kenya and Tanzania that have struggled to protect elephants from transnational 
organized crime. Chapter 7 examines Botswana, a country that so far has 
successfully protected elephants from over-harvesting. The final chapter 
illustrates how the social-ecological systems framework explained outcomes in 
the international resource system and the three case studies, Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Botswana; review’s the study’s principle findings; and identifies areas for 
further research.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review examines common explanations for poaching to 
identify areas of further investigation, and to explain why a focus on any one 
variable alone cannot explain the complex interactions which are required to 
facilitate the commercial exploitation of protected species across levels of 
analysis.  At the individual level relative wealth, whether presented as poverty at 
the production end or as extreme wealth at the consumption end, focuses on 
aggregated individual choices as key factors. The role of conservation norms, 
expressed through active decisions on resource use by locals living near wildlife 
areas, provide insights on how both background conditions and normative shifts 
impact wildlife usage choices.  At the state level of analysis failures in 
governance of wildlife resources- including ineffective wildlife law enforcement, 
corruption, and unclear authority structures- contribute to explanations for 
overexploitation of resources.  Explanations which focus on the international level 
examine the failure of international regimes to adequately police the trade in 
African elephant ivory both from pro- and anti- sales perspectives. Other 
explanations at this level consider how liberalization impacts wildlife resources, 
again considering both positive and negative implications for sustainability. 
Neoliberal models of development promote commodification, market competition, 
and diversification and competitive marketing, ignoring externalities that 
undermine the resilience of social-ecological systems. 
  
14 
All of these factors contribute to the challenges associated with protecting 
wildlife resources, and understanding each factor separately provides important 
insights. However the majority of analysis on poaching tends to favor one simple 
set of variables- such as the rise in demand, or weak conservation norms- 
ignoring the interaction of sets of variables across levels and scales in favor of 
mono-causal, reductive, and uncomplicated variables.  The preference for simple 
diagnostics lead to simple solutions, ignoring key variables and temporal and 
spatial differences in resources and utilization practices, limiting the opportunity 
for policy success for what are generally deeply complex issues.1    
The literature review highlights three important findings.  First, scale 
dynamics across individual, community, national, and international levels of 
analysis impact resource management decisions. Wildlife resource systems are 
closely linked into the global political economy.  Second, ignoring scale dynamics 
impedes the ability of policymakers to assess and diagnose challenges to 
resource systems at all levels.  For example, an explanation reliant only on the 
rise in demand for wildlife products ignores the role of weak conservation norms, 
or the politics of land management and its impacts on communities’ perceptions 
of wildlife.  Moreover, it is important to understand how the interactions between 
levels and scales, and the resource users and governance systems embedded in 
them, operate together to determine certain outcomes. Third, there is not one 
single set of solutions or single correct articulation of a system’s challenges, 
                                            
1
 Elinor Ostrom, "A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas," Proceedings of the 
Naitonal Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104, no. 39 (2007). Diana 
Liverman, "Who Governs, at What Scale and at What Price? Geography, Environmental 
Governance, and the Commodification of Nature," Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 94, no. 4 (2004). 
  
15 
which can be applied at every scale or level.2 Systems evolve through 
interactions between and among actors and institutions “and resources 
constrained and shaped by a given social-ecological setting.”3 They are 
heterogeneous by nature, and are unlikely to respond uniformly to the application 
of generic policies.  Successful policy solutions in North America may lack 
relevance in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The literature review does not seek to refute any of the identified factors, 
but rather to highlight the necessity of a more inclusive analysis, which accounts 
for a multitude of factors across levels and scales. The key questions to consider 
at each juncture include what other conditions exist which create an opening for 
resource users and governance systems to operate as a force to either conserve, 
or exploit, species? 
 
Individual Level Factors 
Poaching and Relative Wealth 
 
One set of explanations for the rise in poaching looks at the relative wealth 
of poachers and consumers to explain both decisions to poach and decisions to 
purchase wildlife products.  In origin countries poverty is assumed to be 
associated with high levels of poaching, though the actual connection between 
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poverty and poaching is unclear. The CITES’ monitoring program, Monitoring the 
Illegal Killing of Elephants [MIKE], finds poverty correlates with high levels of 
poaching, though demand plays a larger role.4  
The people often blamed for poaching, those living near wild animals or 
those working with them, typically live in marginal landscapes and enjoy few 
opportunities for economic success or enrichment.5  For individuals with short 
time horizons, incentive calculations may likely favor immediate use of a 
resource.6 Even where powerful norms exist for preservation, such as in Baka 
Pygmy communities, people will often make decisions with the current generation 
in mind, even when resources cannot be sustained or managed by such decision 
making.7  
However analysis conducted by TRAFFIC found that improving the 
livelihood of harvester communities often failed to reduce their participation in 
illicit wildlife trades.8 Similarly the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Develop finds poverty is not a cause of the illegal trade in wildlife.9 In some 
communities large percentages of the population, the impoverished and the 
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slightly better off, utilize wildlife products to generate income, suggesting the 
interaction between poverty and poaching is more complex than a simple 
equation of poverty as a cause of poaching.10   
Moreover, the trope of the impoverished poacher merely feeding his family 
clouds the relationship between organized crime and poaching, and implies a 
simplicity related to the decision to poach.  Whether fully recognized or not, 
poachers are tied to networks of transnational organized criminals. Poachers 
may come from security forces, park staff and guards, the conservation 
community, professionals, politicians, militia groups, insurgents, terrorists, and 
poor farmers and herders. Interestingly in Africa elephant carcasses are typically 
discovered with only the tusks taken, indicating that food and other subsistence 
requirements are not being satisfied through elephant hunting.  The organized 
nature of hunts, the massive scale of kill sites, and the failure of poachers to take 
the meat of elephants or even all of an elephant’s marketable body parts, further 
points to other factors aside from poverty as playing a role.11 While poverty does 
not necessarily compel individuals to poach conditions exist in poor areas- lack of 
economic opportunity, weak law enforcement, the penetration of transnational 
criminal networks, easy access to weaponry, and lack of environmental 
education or awareness of laws protecting wildlife, which contribute to poaching.  
The type of poaching- commercial or subsistence- must be differentiated 
from the outset to determine the appropriate governance reaction.  Poverty and 
want clearly play a role in the later, but the latter is far rarer when referring to 
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large species such as elephants.  This is an important distinction because 
policies aimed at deterring one type of poaching lack relevance or effectiveness 
for deterring the other type of poaching.12   
 
Increased Demand 
 
The rising wealth, and accompanying increase in demand, in ivory 
consuming countries, in particular China, Thailand, and Vietnam, is cited as a 
direct driver of poaching across media and non-governmental organization 
(NGO) reporting. Increases in elephant poaching correspond with sharp 
increases in Chinese consumer spending dating to 2006 when savings rates 
stalled and Chinese consumption rose sharply.13 Prices of ivory have 
skyrocketed in China over the past five years, even as consumption has 
increased, tripling from 750$ a pound for ivory in 2009 to over 2100$ a pound in 
June 2014. 
Historically Asians have considered wildlife as something to be used for 
medicine, food, clothing, or as decoration.  Asians covet ivory in particular for its 
association with wealth, elevated social status, purity, beauty, and tradition.14 
Wild products serve as status symbols through their demonstration of wealth and 
expense.  Individuals perceive substitutes as not as valuable or as desirable.15 In 
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some cases the rarity of a wild product drives its consumption, even to the point 
that the impact on the environment itself drives consumption, instead of inhibiting 
it.16 For example blood ivory, the ivory taken from elephants in the process of 
dying, is considered the most rare and valuable to Chinese collectors. 
Consumers also respond to marketing of new uses or methods of display for wild 
products, further increasing and driving demand.17  
In China the rise in demand in the mid-2000s relates to the designation of 
ivory carving by the government as an important intangible heritage. This 
designation revived what was an almost dead industry, renewing interest in the 
craft from middle class Chinese as well as collectors and investors.18 Very high 
end investors began purchasing ivory at ‘grey’ auctions, stockpiling raw ivory 
against rise in prices, as middle class Chinese began purchasing smaller ivory 
keepsakes and jewelry.19 
Arguments for extending or expanding the trade in ivory often rely on the 
assumption that demand is immutable.  However, mounting evidence suggests 
that Chinese consumers are responsive to education campaigns and changes in 
government policy. Surveys by TRAFFIC, WildAid, and IFAW found that when 
Chinese consumers become educated on the impacts of ivory consumption they 
were less likely to purchase ivory products. A growing number of Chinese 
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support a renewal of the trade ban.20 In 2011 the Chinese government banned 
large auctions, with an immediate impact on sales of ivory.  That year saw a 
slight drop in the number of large seizures reported which CITES and others 
attribute to the Chinese government’s actions.21   
Demand operates at multiple levels, involves a variety of volumes, across 
various groups, and is motivated by different factors. Government regulations, 
state rhetoric, availability, price, rarity, and understanding of the impacts on 
wildlife affect decisions to purchase. Important questions about consumers and 
how they make choices should be investigated to guide demand mitigations 
strategies.  
 
Community Level Explanations  
Conservation Norms 
 
Other explanations for why African states cannot protect wildlife rely on 
the assumption that Africans lack conservation norms.22  Under this perspective 
local Africans “hate” wildlife and consider animals dangerous competitors for 
scarce resources.  As such they view wildlife through the lens of human-wildlife 
conflict, do not see parks as relevant to their daily lives, and view conservation 
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efforts more broadly as relating to colonial, i.e. white, heritage. In the border 
zones between parks and settlements human-wildlife conflict is intense, placing 
communities in direct competition with wildlife for scarce resources.23 These 
competitions can result in crop destruction, damage to farm infrastructure, and 
serious injury or death for people. Elephants in particular can be incredibly 
destructive, they eat a large amount of vegetation each day, cover a wide range 
of territory, raid crops and sometimes kill people.24  
This perspective recognizes the unpopularity of conservation areas and 
programs in Africa, which follow a long history of exclusion, dislocation, and 
political domination.25 The gazetted wildlife parks where most elephants live do 
not seem to benefit or serve most Africans, catering largely to Western tastes 
and desires to see ‘wild’ animals in Africa.26 Africans who live among elephants 
have to endure all the costs associated with their existence and yield none of the 
benefits.27  
Following these assumptions is the notion that only economic incentives 
can drive conservation norm development. Such incentives include hunting 
licenses and the sale of ivory and other elephant products resulting from natural 
mortality. Essentially, when communities reap the benefits of ivory sales they will 
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preserve habitats and be more willing to endure human-elephant conflict.28 The 
argument asserts utilization is the best path to conservation and preservation.29  
A related argument asserts that by removing ivory as a revenue generator states 
are less able to afford expensive conservation and protection of wildlife.30 From 
this perspective CITES essentially constrains the ability of states to control their 
resources.31 
African attitudes towards wildlife and conservation have clearly been 
influenced by their experiences and interactions with colonialism, race, and 
central government bureaucracies and are caught up in contests over political 
power.32 Those living in wildlife areas have often lost political and symbolic power 
through the process of park construction through expropriation.33 Under such 
conditions parks and wild areas can become sites of resistance to governance 
policy, with poaching as an act of defiance.34 Poaching protected and symbolic 
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species such as elephants sends a powerful message to decision-makers and 
elites directly challenging the coercive power of the state.35  
However many Africans deeply value wildlife, elephants in particular, as a 
key component of their social, physical, and emotional landscape. Even 
individuals living in communities heavily impacted by human elephant conflict 
express varied perspectives including “anger, fear, awe, respect, and admiration” 
for wild elephants.36 Some clans identify with elephants closely, referring to them 
as mythical brothers and sisters.37 In Namibia, for example, elephants are 
revered almost as a “first people,” having occupied the land before people 
arrived, and thus deserving of respect.38 Elephants are also understood as a 
symbol of the economic value of wildlife tourism.  In fact Africans are beginning 
to view the problem of poaching as a government failure to stem corruption and 
as a waste of a valuable resource and as a crime against their national 
patrimonies.39 African newspapers, journalists, and activists have become active 
in calling out political leaders for their lack of commitment and ineffectiveness in 
curbing poaching, viewing the problem as a threat to national security and to the 
economy. 
                                            
35
 Duffy, Killing for Conservation: Wildlife Policy in Zimbabwe. Holmes, "Review: Protection, 
Politics, and Protest: Understanding Resistance to Conservation." 
36
 Moore, "Conservation Heroes Versus Environmental Villains: Perceiving Elephants in Caprivi, 
Namibia." 
37
 Evgeny  Lebedev, "Elephant Campaign: The Samburu Know the Land and Its Animals Better 
Than Anyone: ‘The Elephant Is an Elder to Us – It Is Taboo to Hurt One’," The Independent, 1 
February 2014 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/elephant-campaign-the-
samburu-know-the-land-and-its-animals-better-than-anyone-the-elephant-is-an-elder-to-us--it-is-
taboo-to-hurt-one-9101124.html. 
38
 Moore, "Conservation Heroes Versus Environmental Villains: Perceiving Elephants in Caprivi, 
Namibia." Mary Ann Pentz, Richard Bonnie, and Donald R. Shopland, "Integrating Supply and 
Demand Reduction Strategies for Drug Abuse Prevention," American Behavioral Scientist 39 
(1996). 
39
 Paula Kahumbu, "Africa: Conservation Dilemmas," in Destination Magazine (2014), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201401311198.html?viewall=1. 
  
24 
Debates over land and resource use, including wildlife, relate to varying 
social, cultural political, and economic understandings of legitimate and non-
legitimate uses of wildlife, the role of the state, and the “the power of scientific 
and other understandings of nature.”40 At all levels the control of resources, 
including wildlife, relates to the control of political power.41  
The way Africans’ attitudes towards wildlife are described may better 
reflect the agenda of conservation authorities who shape locals as either wildlife 
villains or heroes to fit particular narratives.  By flattening the complexity of 
feelings expressed about wildlife, authorities can remove African voices from the 
conversation and, importantly, from the decision making process.  Shaping 
African norms as not valuing wildlife allow for conservation interests to ignore 
local input and disregard the negative impacts that conservation sometimes 
metes out on the people closest to natural areas.42 It should also be noted that 
attitudes are not immutable but can shift in short periods of time when underlying 
human/wildlife conflicts find resolution or other changes in governance systems 
occur. 
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State Level Explanations 
Weak Governance 
 
Other scholars focus on state level factors related to weak governance as 
primary factors associated with states’ inability to protect wildlife.43 Weak 
governance refers to a lack of capacity within law enforcement, the judiciary, park 
security and corruption. 
In most elephant range states laws protecting animals are weak, un-
enforced, or non-existent. Poaching is not always identified as a crime, and 
trafficking is considered a low level offence.  In most cases individuals not 
actually caught in the act of poaching or in possession of banned products are 
typically released because law enforcement lacks the training to charge criminals 
on other offences such as weapons charges or trespassing. When levied, fines 
for poaching are typically very low, and jail times is minimal, providing little 
disincentive to poachers and traffickers who consider these among the costs of 
doing business.44 Charges rarely reflect the seriousness of crimes.45 
Weak judicial capacity impacts the ability of courts to sentence even 
repeat offenders to significant time in jail. In Kenya a study of wildlife criminals 
revealed only 8 out of 224 persons found guilty of crimes served time in jail.  The 
rest, found guilty, paid small fines and were released.  Smugglers caught at 
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airports face small fines before being let go.46 Police rarely investigate even 
when they uncover large shipments of ivory, allowing perpetrators at the highest 
levels to continue their activities. Cross-border or international investigations 
occur infrequently, and even more rarely result in criminal convictions. 
Government officials, when implicated, are seldom prosecuted, further 
undermining government legitimacy.47   
Corruption amongst state officials creates the conditions necessary for 
organized criminals to exploit wildlife.48 First, corruption undermines the creation 
and application of laws designed to protect wildlife, eroding the capacity of law 
enforcement and the judiciary.49 Traffickers- who may even be members of the 
political class- provide funds to politicians to influence the drafting of laws and 
regulations.50 Second, politicians are known to utilize wildlife as a sort of payment 
within patronage networks.51  High-level government officials, even at times 
those charged with protecting wildlife, sponsor hunts and traffic wildlife, 
undermining cohesive efforts to monitor and interdict the illegal wildlife trade. 
Corruption trickles down to lower levels. Police in some areas are complicit, as 
are rangers, soldiers, and other government employees.52 Third, when 
apprehended, poachers and traffickers bribe law enforcement and the judiciary to 
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avoid prosecution, heavy sentencing, or large fines.  Poaching and other 
extractive and exploitive practices, when orchestrated from powerful arms of the 
state, can be difficult to eliminate, in particular from a weaker arm of 
government.53  
Most African states lack the capacity to properly protect their parks and 
other wild areas, lowering the risks associated with poaching and trafficking, due 
to the high costs, low levels of funding, and lack of political will. Across Africa 
rangers lack equipment, weapons, manpower, and investigative skills and tools, 
impacting the effectiveness of enforcement measures.54  Small ranger forces are 
expected to provide protection for large and remote areas, often lacking basic 
necessities to conduct patrols.  Rangers may receive little or no training, leaving 
them ill equipped to battle organized poaching gangs often comprised of 
terrorists, insurgents, and non-state armed militias.  Poachers, on the other hand, 
typically have access to resources not available to rangers including satellite 
phones, GPS, motorcycles and other vehicles, high caliber weapon, night vision 
goggles, silencers, and funds.55 
Blaming African range states for not being able to control poaching without 
acknowledging the strength and organizational capacity of transnational criminal 
syndicates; the developing but still nascent conservation norms; the pressure 
from the international community to liberalize and privatize economies and 
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increase foreign trade; and the massive increase in demand for ivory in Asia 
shifts all of the burden for regulating the trade onto states.  Elephant range 
states, most of which suffer from high levels of poverty and lack capacity in key 
sectors are generally the least able to withstand the pressures of the global 
market or to act across jurisdictional scales. More importantly, this perspective 
oversimplifies the problem and reduces it to one of enforcement only, forestalling 
policy measures at other levels and scales which might impact demand but fall 
outside of an enforcement strategy such as demand reduction programs or 
wildlife education initiatives. 
 
Wildlife and Land Management 
 
Similarly, the role of the management and coordination of wildlife 
resources and land management in elephant range states are often cited as 
important factors in states’ (in)ability to protect ecological systems.  
Dozens of organizations and governance systems, both state and non-
state, can be active in one geographical or issue area in a country, but their 
philosophies, relations with local communities, projects, capacity and 
commitments may vary, or can conflict, leading to confusion and a waste of 
resources.56 With a multitude of interests and actors at work at each level of 
governance determining what agency is responsible for protecting resources is 
difficult.57 Under such “polycentric governance” power emanates from multiple 
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sources, not simply the state, obfuscating lines of authority and responsibility.58 
Lack of clear chains of authority, and a multiplication of authority, surrounding 
wildlife resources creates gaps in enforcement and mismatches between local 
needs and international norms.  
Moreover, wildlife management in Africa is typically centralized, top-down, 
and lacking in local input. Governments establish rules and regulations for wildlife 
management without clearly understanding local variations in wildlife populations 
or use patterns and often without regard for local input, setting the scene for 
intense competition for control of resources.59  States rely heavily on the advice 
of science at the expense of input from local communities, which can lead to 
unintended, and negative, consequences in regards to resource management.60 
Aggregating data at the national level, and then applying that data in the form of 
policies in local communities, can miss isolated problems associated with 
human/wildlife conflict, place undue burdens on other resources shared between 
wildlife and people such as water and timber, and fail to address local economic 
concerns related to the opportunity costs of wildlife management. Solution sets 
may not match with problem sets at all scales of the ecological and social 
system. 
For example in Gabon the President, Ali Bongo, set aside 10% of the 
country for national parks, without consulting indigenous communities living in or 
near parks.  In the past decade Gabon has lost over 60% of its forest elephants 
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to poaching, in part facilitated by local Baka Pygmy trackers who lead hunters to 
elephant populations, and act as porters to carry out large volumes of ivory.61  On 
the other hand, local communities often lack the resources necessary to manage 
resources, leaving them vulnerable to over-exploitation either by the community 
or non-community users. Successful local controls generally exhibit certain 
attributes including a low cost monitoring system; moderate rates of change in 
use of the resource; dense social networks must exist within communities to 
lower transaction costs; outsiders can be excluded; and users must support the 
monitoring and enforcement rules.62 In an era of globalization, mass migration, 
and networked transnational crime, it may be unrealistic to expect local 
institutions to be able to adequately address the challenges of managing a 
globally important resource from an organizational standpoint, in particular when 
macro and microeconomic factors impact their choices to exploit resources in 
order to survive.63 
The increased roles of intergovernmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and private conservation organizations in making 
and enforcing wildlife policy in many African states further complicate questions 
of authority and control of wildlife resources and land use policies.64 IGOs, NGOs 
and private conservation enterprises may or may not coordinate adequately with 
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all stakeholders, across communities, or at various levels.65 These organizations 
wield tremendous power to act as an interface between state departments, 
international donors, local stakeholders, wildlife professionals, and media 
interests to impose their vision of what “nature” should look like, and how it 
should be accessed by people. A few large NGOs dominate the field of 
conservation, projecting their largely western based ideals of wilderness 
landscapes on non-western societies.66 
Together these organizations control billions of conservation dollars 
worldwide, enabling them to craft and promote specific conservation narratives 
that correspond to their own agendas, crafted in board rooms thousands of miles 
away, with little or no input from local communities.67  NGOs often treat wildlife 
and resources as though they exist in a vacuum at the expense of social, 
economic, and land rights issues, promoting initiatives not locally relevant in an 
African context. Practitioners in NGO field offices have a propensity to institute 
policies they personally advocate, without regard for local concerns or higher 
level policy.68 NGOs may tie aid to the adoption of certain policies, placing 
pressure on communities to adopt policies that they did not have a hand in 
crafting.69 This can exacerbate conflicts between communities and the central 
government, and between communities and wildlife.70  
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Understanding the complexity of the governance systems involved in 
social ecological systems, how they interact across levels and scales, and how 
they react to exogenous factors such as transnational crime, CITES decisions to 
allow sales, and the development of infrastructure into previously unopened 
territory impact the ability of systems to adapt to pattern changes.  A perspective 
focused primarily on management practices assumes that a problem as complex 
as transnational criminal poaching has a single, rational, scientific solution by 
which one management system, applied across the board, can address poaching 
when in reality the problems arise from different conditions at different locations 
and may be impacted by a variety of normative, political, management, and 
economic pressures. 
 
Transnational Explanations  
CITES Trade Ban 
 
Economic arguments both for and against the international trade in ivory 
focus on the failures of CITES’ regulatory schemes to manage ivory as a primary 
cause of the rise in poaching over the last decade. CITES is an international 
agreement between governments adopted in 1973 in order to regulate the trade 
in wild animals and plants, and to ensure that legal trade does not threaten the 
survival of species. CITES divides species into three sections, or Appendices, 
depending on their need for protection. Appendix I species are those which 
cannot be legally traded internationally because they are threatened by 
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extinction. Species on Appendix II and III are considered not necessarily 
threatened with extinction but international trade must be regulated to ensure 
their continued survival.71  
In 1989 CITES banned the international trade in elephant products and 
moved African elephants to Appendix I. In the 1990s and 2000s several countries 
with large elephant herds have petitioned CITES to ‘down list’ their populations 
from Appendix I to Appendix II to begin trading ivory and other elephant parts. In 
1997 Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were successful and their elephants 
were moved to Appendix II, allowing limited monitored trade to occur in the form 
of monitored auctions. CITES sanctioned two ‘one-off sales’ of ivory, auctioned to 
a limited number of approved states.72 Despite the massive increase in elephant 
poaching after 2009 CITES has not recognized the sales as a factor. 
Those in favor of ending the ban and allowing the regulated sale of legal 
ivory argue that CITES current policies of limited “one-off sales” and the sales 
ban negatively impact wild elephant populations by restricting legal supplies of 
ivory while demand remains unchanged. Pro-sales advocates argue demand 
reduction is not possible in a timely fashion, leading to poaching in the absence 
of a steady legal supply of ivory.73 By restricting supply the ban increases the 
value to a level attractive to transnational criminal organizations.74 According to 
this perspective the only way to save elephants is to legalize sales and flood the 
market with legal stockpiled ivory. This would stabilize the market, lower prices, 
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squeeze out illegal sellers, and slow poaching rates.75  Pro-traders argue that 
with adequate controls and increased enforcement, sales of ivory could generate 
funds for investment back into communities and conservation programs where it 
could be used to preserve elephant habitats and relieve pressure on human 
communities forced to co-exist with wild animals.  For pro-traders the ban is not 
only failing, it is actually making the problem of poaching worse by removing 
important sources of revenue from communities, disincentivzing conservation by 
restricting the use of elephant products, and creating space and economic value 
for criminal poaching syndicates to enter the market.76  
At the same time pro-ban advocates argue the CITES ivory sales are to 
blame for the rise in demand and subsequent rise in prices for ivory. They argue 
the ivory auctions created an incentive for organized crime to exploit the high 
prices of ivory, seriously impacting poaching levels.77 They assert a legal market 
cannot be regulated in the current environment of weak law enforcement, 
corruption, uneven laws and penalties across range states, and the entrenched 
nature of TOC.78 The stocks of “legal” ivory in existence cannot meet the high 
demand and massive market for ivory and would not effectively shut out an illegal 
market, meaning poachers would continue to profit from illegal ivory.79 State 
authorities cannot easily or cheaply determine where ivory originated, making 
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determinations of legality impossible while increasing opportunities for criminals 
to launder illegal ivory.80  
Pro-ban advocates dispute the notion that a stable market in ivory would 
emerge with the advent of a legal trade, noting the market for ivory exploded 
after the CITES auctions.81 Moreover, the sales did not have the intended effect 
of depressing process.82 Prices for raw ivory tripled since 2009.83 The pro-ban 
advocates further argue the creation of a legal market through the CITES sale 
sends mixed messages to consumers that elephant populations have recovered 
and are no longer under threat, increasing consumers’ willingness and desire to 
purchase ivory.84 When uncompromised the ban created a moral deterrent for 
those wishing to purchase ivory and helped to inhibit the ability to launder illegal 
ivory internationally.85 Lastly, those in favour of keeping trade bans in place note 
the ban worked slowing the rate of poaching and reducing demand for elephant 
products during the period before the ‘one-off’ sales were allowed.86 They argue 
closure of legal markets would slow demand for illegal ivory and is the only way 
to unequivocally protect elephants.87  
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While the decision by CITES to allow the “one-off” ivory actions clearly 
impacted the incentive of transnational criminal organizations to take advantage 
of exponentially increasing demand, arguments that look at the decisions of 
CITES as the primary driver for poaching increases fail to take into account the 
variation in implementation of the regime across states; state level political 
decision-making processes and political competition surrounding wildlife policies; 
corruption; the impact of globalization processes on illicit business; government 
policies in consumption countries, the evolving norms and expectations on 
development; the speed and flexibility of TOC, and other national and local level 
dynamics that impact wildlife conservation. The regime can impact state polices, 
reinforce norms either for sales or for a ban, and serve as an arena for debate 
about conservation and regulation, but is not a stand-in for national and local 
governance of resources or the primary driver of resource user behavior.   
 
International-Level Explanations 
Neo-Liberal Trade Policies 
 
Similarly the role of neoliberalism on wildlife policies and conservation is 
viewed from competing perspectives.  Neoliberalism is credited on the one hand 
with creating incentives to preserve wildlife and habitats, and on the other hand 
with exploiting and commodifying nature.  
Wildlife agendas in African states are increasingly developed within the 
context of economic development, driven both by a general global trends toward 
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neo-liberal conservation and by the adoption in many African states of neo-liberal 
economic and trade policies at the state level.  Liberalism asserts that state 
structures restrict individual freedoms and get ‘in the way’ of business. As such, 
removing restrictions on trade, lessening regulatory burdens, and allowing the 
‘invisible hand’ of the market to act improves peoples’ lives and increases 
prosperity across the board.  Neo--liberalism impacts social-ecological systems 
through the promotion of  principles of privatization, commodification, 
deregulation, reliance on market principles, including the laws of supply and 
demand, which are based on normative assumptions promoting “continuous 
growth and continuous ‘progress’ towards some state of ‘development.’”88  
Neoliberal assumptions stress liberal principles can solve a host of 
conservation problems by infusing cash into under-resourced conservation 
programs, increasing democracy and participation through deregulation, helping 
inculcate norms of conservation, protecting and enshrining property rights, 
promoting development through eco-tourism, and promoting green business and 
environmental consciousness.89 The basic argument follows that when wildlife 
pays for itself communities will conserve and protect it to ensure future profits.  
By privatizing some aspects of utilization, whether through harvesting animals or 
through photo-tourism, wildlife is expected to gain relevancy.  Conservation 
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schemes now almost always include some plan for community development 
including the provision of education and heath cares services and employment in 
the tourism or services sector. 
While community development programs have become recognized as 
intrinsic to preservation and conservation, all of the implications of the adoption 
of neo-liberal principles within the realm of sustainability are not fully understood. 
It is unclear if tying wildlife preservation to economic development creates wildlife 
conservation norms. Studies indicate that while people may value the economic 
benefits of wildlife, their attitude towards the intrinsic value of wildlife may not 
change.90 Scholars raise several concerns related to the impacts marketization, 
commoditization, and commercialization have on the long-term resilience of 
ecosystems. McAffee argues that neoliberalism encourages viewing nature as a 
warehouse or store of products waiting to be commoditized and commercialized, 
creating conditions under which “value” is based on exchange earnings at the 
expense of intrinsic value.91  The marketability of a species becomes one of the 
most important factors in its survivability.92 Consumers subsequently emerge as 
key players in the success, or failure, of environmental policies.93  
Others note market mechanisms are not well understood in the wildlife 
trade, in particular where supply is severely restricted and demand is high.  As 
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noted above, some species are in greater demand when their rarity and price 
increase, driving over-exploitation.94 Some consumers do not want a product 
substituted from a legal market.  Additionally, parallel markets could spur 
demand from consumers not interested in an illegal market, thus expanding the 
market and increasing competition for wildlife products.  Another concern relates 
to questions about how firms in the wildlife trade act, and what incentives or 
disincentives they respond to. Many firms engaged in the wildlife trade are 
classified as multiproduct firms that enjoy economies of scale and are able to 
absorb profit losses and price wars, meaning they may stay in a trade even if the 
price of a product drops.95  
The emphasis on market expansion and demand creation under neo-
liberalism raises other key concerns. Liberalism assumes competition, which 
then requires diversification and competitive marketing, which leads to further 
commodification to increase demand.  Sales ultimately create demand and drive 
more sales, placing unsustainable pressure on wildlife populations. Expanding 
commodification pushes accumulative tendencies.96 
Further, neo-liberalism’s constant drive for expansion and development in 
the broader economy push states to open up previously isolated areas for 
development, rather than incentivizing conservation. Not only does this decrease 
the areas developed to conservation, but it places parks and other protected 
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areas in peril by increasing accessibility. By developing infrastructure in remote 
areas states facilitate the exploitation of wildlife and forests, literally building the 
roads necessary to commercially exploit and extract resources.97 Under 
liberalization developing states, and the local communities within them, 
increasingly must choose between preservation and development.  
Those wary of the role of neoliberalism in conservation further note the 
privatization of national parks and wildlife resources in Africa.  Increasingly 
African governments call on private entities to run parks, creating what some see 
as a new type of dispossession as organizations run parks and other “national” 
monuments as businesses.98 Nature becomes another vehicle for ‘sponsorship’ 
of corporate conservation organization and businesses.99 And as noted above, 
local communities may be left out of important decision-making processes as a 
result. 
Further negative implications flow from neo-liberalism’s impact on 
government policies and the allocation of scarce resources in poor countries, 
impacting states’ abilities to react to increased illicit wildlife trafficking. 
Liberalization has pushed states away from welfare policies through structural 
adjustment programs that emphasize the free market, balanced budgets, and 
privatization. States contract the delivery of social services and welfare services 
to NGOs. Under pressure to compete in the global market place states starve 
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themselves of taxes, tariffs, and other revenues in order to attract business and 
goods. The Global North has far more leeway to assume costs associated with 
globalization and competition than the South.100 Neo-liberal policies which 
emphasize a reduction of the role of the state in economic development, 
liberalization of markets, open trade, fewer protections for agricultural products, 
typically the main source of income in developing states, leaves rural peoples 
dependent on agriculture and pastoral livelihoods few protections from the 
market.  With less valuable products to sell they may intensify their use of wild 
plants and animals to supplement, or replace, incomes formerly generated 
through the state.101  
The adoption of neoliberalism also impacts the movement of peoples and 
goods.  The exponential growth of Asian, in particular Chinese, communities on 
the continent has been directly tied to increases in poaching.102 With less 
restrictions on migration more and more Chinese nationals are flooding into 
Africa, connecting the primary end-user market directly with wildlife resources. As 
Williams notes, Chinese traders are often involved in a range of commercial 
activities, which can provide a cover for illicit trades.103 These groups can be 
difficult to penetrate based on language and cultural barriers, and are reinforced 
by kinship and ethnic ties, which insulate them and provide a defense against the 
surrounding communities.  According to Gastrow, Chinese nationals were behind 
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all of the smuggling rings uncovered in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, 
Tanzania, and Kenya in recent years.104 
Regardless of its merits, liberalism is now embedded in the conservation 
landscape.  Liberalism impacts the development of both conservation and 
consumption norms; creates expectations for development and advancement; 
impacts which animals and ecosystems are viewed as valuable and are thus 
preserved; and how that value should be expressed. How its impacts are 
mitigated, or not, depends on several factors including pre-existing norms for 
conservation, the history of resource use in a community, the existence of other 
non-wildlife based income generators, land-use policies and their fitness and 
sustainability; and availability for development of virgin territories and resources, 
among others. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Managing local wildlife resources in a global context involves negotiating 
social, cultural, and regulatory regimes at every level and scale.  Three important 
findings emerge from the literature review.  First, decisions on resource 
management lie at multiple levels and scales, involving individual, community, 
national and international decision makers. Wildlife resource systems are tied 
into the global political economy.  Second, it is not possible to diagnose problems 
across cases without examining factors at all levels and scales. An explanation 
reliant only on the rise in demand ignores the role of weak conservation norms, 
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or the politics of land management and its impacts on communities’ perceptions 
of wildlife, for example.  Further, such a reductive perspective ignores a key 
dynamic- how the interactions between levels and scales, and the resource users 
and governance systems embedded in them, operate together to determine 
certain outcomes. Creating an understanding of interactions allows for an 
evaluation of points of vulnerability to help explain why resource usage changes 
in an area.  Third, there is not one single set of solutions or single correct 
articulation of a system’s challenges, which applies at every scale or level.105 
Systems evolve through interactions between and among actors and institutions 
“and resources constrained and shaped by a given social-ecological setting.”106 
They are heterogeneous by nature, and are unlikely to respond uniformly to the 
application of generic policies.   
In order to accommodate the multitude of variables identified above, and 
to incorporate multiple levels of analysis, this paper will adopt Ostrom’s social- 
ecological systems framework.107 An approach that recognizes the multi-scalar 
and multi-level nature of resource management issues is key to avoid 
inappropriate or poorly tailored resource management strategies.108  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Social-Ecological Systems 
 
Increasingly ecologists and social scientists recognize what the literature 
review above clearly illustrates- no ecosystem exists outside of human influence 
and interference. Humans are an integral part of all ecological systems, even 
remote areas with little human settlement or human wildlife interactions.1 Human 
and ecological realms are intimately interconnected and “co-evolving across 
spatial and temporal scales” within social-ecological systems (SESs).2 SESs are 
not human systems embedded in ecological systems, or ecological systems 
embedded in human systems, but are distinct systems which involve 
interrelationships and reciprocal impacts for both human and ecological 
systems.3 Natural resource management by its nature involves human claims on 
resources blurring the delineations between social and ecological systems.4  An 
SES is a “coherent system of biophysical and social factors that regularly interact 
in a…sustained manner” that includes social and ecological subsystems in 
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mutual interaction.5  SESs involve resource systems, resource units, resource 
users, governance systems, their interactions and the resulting outcomes.6 
Elephants exist in complex SESs comprised of political, economic, 
geographic, and normative features shifting over time and across space.  
Everywhere they roam elephants are subject to human actions, and human 
decision making, by licit and illicit actors including illegal killing, sanctioned hunts 
and culling operations, human encroachment on habitats, fence building, road 
construction, and monitoring efforts. Human societies living near elephant 
communities are in turn impacted by the invasion of transnational criminal 
elements, the commodification of resources, expectations related to the 
imposition of international conservation norms, economic losses or gains tied to 
wildlife management decisions, contests with animals over scarce land and water 
resources, and competing political goals of development and conservation.  
As a resource with global relevance, elephants can be conceptualized as 
a global common pool resources (CPR) existing in a global SES.  CPRs are 
“natural or human-made facilities (or stocks) that generate flows of usable 
resource units over time.”7 Two characteristics further define CPRs, which relate 
to elephant SESs.  First, creating institutions that can exclude potential users is 
difficult and expensive.  The lack of property rights means all users will likely 
overexploit because there is no incentive to conserve.  Second, the resources 
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harvested by one user are no longer available to other users.8  Resource users 
must agree to limits on their use.   
As a global CPR, African elephants are managed at local, national, and 
international levels through tiered and essentially hierarchical regulatory regimes, 
connected through laws, rules, regulations, and norms, both formally and 
informally.  At each level, governance systems interact with social and economic 
systems and react to social and economic processes.9 Actions and decisions 
taken at one level clearly impact population stability across scales, and 
governance and protective measures at multiple levels, setting the conditions for 
sustainable, or unsustainable, utilization.  As a CPR under ineffective protection 
regimes, elephants are subject to overexploitation and ultimately, depletion, by 
the potential billions of users within the global common pool.   
 
Framework for Analysis 
 
While dozens of frameworks exist to examine social-ecological systems and 
their interactions, this study adopts Ostrom’s social-ecological systems 
framework (SESF).10 The framework allows researchers to answer three broad 
questions:11 
 What patterns of interactions and outcomes such as overuse, conflict, 
collapse, stability, and increasing returns, are likely to result from using a 
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particular set of rules for the governance, ownership, and use of a 
resource system and specific resource units in a specific technological, 
socioeconomic, and political environment? 
 What is the likely endogenous development of different governance 
arrangements, use patterns, and outcomes with or without external 
financial inducements or imposed rules? 
 How robust and sustainable is a particular configuration of users, resource 
system, resource units, and governance system to external and internal 
disturbances? 
Per the SESF the social system is made up of resource users and 
governance systems. The ecological system is considered from an 
anthropocentric perspective as a resource system to be used by humans, such 
as water, fisheries, and forests, and the resource units that make up the system, 
such as quantity of water, number of trees, and numbers of fish.12  In this 
instance a resource system includes national parks and open areas, wildlife 
corridors, and other elephant range habitat; resource units are African elephants; 
users in the system include consumptive and non-consumptive users (poachers, 
traffickers, tourists, NGOs, etc); and governance system(s) include local, 
national, international regimes, non-governmental organizations and private 
conservation enterprises as nested tiers.13  
The SESF provides a methodology to untangle the relationships between 
resources users and governance systems by identifying variables at the sub and 
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supra levels to discover potential interactions and outcomes, which impact the 
resiliency of a system.  This approach can accommodate the location of an 
elephant SES at multiple levels as a local resource, state resource and a global 
common pool resource.   
 
Figure 1. A Multi-Tiered Framework for Examining Social Ecological 
Systems 
 
 
 
Source: Ostrom (2007) 
 
Applying an SES framework, as illustrated in Figure 1, allows researchers, 
and ultimately decision-makers, to understand how the characteristics of system 
“jointly affect and are indirectly affected by interactions and resulting outcomes 
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achieved at a particular time and place.”14 The framework further provides the 
opportunity to explicate how these characteristics, or attributes, may affect and 
be affected by the larger, and smaller, socioeconomic, political, ecological, and 
cultural milieu in which they exist.15 An examination of the social and ecological 
processes and the linkages between them can answer questions about how an 
SES developed into its present state, how it operates currently, and how it might 
change in the future.16 The SESF allows analysis to deal with complex problems 
through integrative, interdisciplinary approach.17  
Five key structural features recommend Ostrom’s SESF to examine the rise 
in poaching in Africa.18  First, corresponding to the hierarchical nature of SESs, 
the framework examines variables as nested or tiered. The SESF identifies first 
level ‘generic’ variables that can then be unpacked to understand how lower-tier 
variables affect outcomes.19 Unpacking and comparing variables allows for the 
identification of variables and combinations of variables that either contribute to 
the development of a sustainable system, or to resource collapse.20 The first tier 
includes the four primary variables listed above: the resource system, the 
resource units generated by the system, the users of the system, and the 
governance system. Second and third tier variables can be abundant and are 
flexible, depending on the systems to be examined, encompassing a range of 
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factors which might illuminate important points of interactions and outcomes.  
Ostrom’s original SESF identified thirty nested second tier variables for 
assessment and examination, including many of the variables noted in the 
literature review above.21 How far a researcher needs to delve to explain 
changes in an SES depends on the specific policy or research question they are 
trying to answer. The large number of variables identified and examined 
contributes to a more nuanced understanding for the relevant factors that impact 
an SES’s resilience, adaptability, and transformability, discussed below.  
Imagined as nested, each tier of an SES embeds in both a smaller and larger 
socio-economic, political, and ecological systems.  This is particularly important 
for the study of ivory poaching. The concepts of nested tiers of variables allows 
for research to adjust focus to evaluate how factors at levels above and below 
the research focus impact or explain outcomes.  Policies aimed at reducing 
demand, for example, may have a greater impact on elephant survival as a 
species than local programs to alleviate human-elephant conflicts, though such 
programs may have a greater impact on local animals.22  
Second, the SESF acknowledges the multi-scalar and cross level dynamics 
that impact SESs, allowing SESs to be understood as complex systems.  
Complex systems exhibit “characteristics not seen in simple systems such as 
nonlinearly, uncertainty, emergence, scale, and self-organization.”23 Wildlife 
SESs, existing at multiple levels, across large geographic scales, reliant on 
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decision-making from multiple levels of authority, influenced by a range of 
constantly changing normative and economic imperatives, and subject to 
aggregated decisions of disconnected resource users, exemplify the 
characteristics of a complex system.  More complex and more connected 
systems are more vulnerable to costly errors. Young et al points out in large and 
complex systems such as global wildlife SESs when network connections are 
random “an increase in the complexity of the network leads almost inevitably to 
the destabilization of the system as a whole.”24  In complex systems multiple 
subsystems can be observed and should be analyzed simultaneously at multiple 
scales and across levels.25  
Third, the SESF clearly identifies key interactions impacting systems, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.  These interactions involve (I1) harvesting levels of diverse 
users, (I2) information sharing among users, (I2) deliberation processes, (I4) 
conflict among users, (I5) investment activities, and (I6) lobbying activities.  
Interactions are the “specific activities that mediate between the social and 
ecological elements of the broader SES.”26 The SESF delineates outcomes as 
(O1) social performance measures, (O2) ecological performance measures, and 
(O3) externalities to the SES. The patterns of interactions and outcomes of 
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different users, and historical patterns of interactions and outcomes, help explain 
why an SES exists in a particular state.27  
Fourth, through its emphasis on interactions and outcomes, the SESF 
illustrates how social and ecological systems impact each other, not simply how 
human decision-making impacts resources, capturing the reciprocal relationships 
between human/environment systems. An analysis of interactions includes how 
the depletion or other impacts of exploitation may affect communities 
economically, socially, politically, and normatively.28  
Lastly, the SESF treats globalization as “a phenomena whose elements 
can be disaggregated and analyzed one at a time.”29 Globalization is a 
“transplanetary process or set of processes involving increasing liquidity and the 
growing multidirectional flows of people, objects, places, and information as well 
as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, 
those flows.”30 These multidirectional “flows” intensified under globalization, 
making the distant proximate.31 Globalization impacts all aspects of wildlife 
conservation in Africa through increased global flows of information, people, 
ideas, and money.  
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Figure 2. Second-Tier Variables in Framework for Analyzing an SES 
 
 
 
Source: Ostrom (2007) 
 
Globalization is a central feature of SESs because of impacts on the 
resilience and vulnerability of systems.32 It is intimately linked to neo-liberalism, 
capitalism, and commodification. Global products, global markets and marketing, 
and global communications have facilitated the “expansion and intensification of 
commodification” and allowed for exponential growth in wildlife transactions.33 
Four aspects of globalization impact SESs; connectedness, speed, scale, and 
diversity. Each aspect operates on two planes, both positively and negatively. 
Greater connectedness in all the arenas of globalization- goods, people, finance, 
ideology, and information- both increases opportunities for exploitation of species 
                                            
32
 Young et al., "The Globalization of Socio-Ecological Systems for Scientific Research." 
33
 Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 165. 
  
54 
and for the increased integration of large SESs.  While larger more closely linked 
systems may be able to absorb changes with greater resilience overall, they can 
also spread disturbances widely and quickly through the system.  Similarly, 
increased speed of interactions can allow for quicker response times to threats, 
but also allows for faster depletion of resources. This is particularly true in the 
wildlife sector.   At the hyper-speed of globalization communities may not 
recognize the threats to resources until too late.   Relatedly, the scale and 
impacts of interactions shifts under globalization. Local resource managers and 
users are linked to international institutions and the market without the protection 
of intermediary layers of management or control as “political, social, and 
economic processes and activities” stretch across local, national, regional, and 
global scales.34 Individual and aggregated human actions can now impact global 
resources and can quickly deplete stocks as has been clearly seen in the recent 
explosion of ivory sales.35 Globalization’s impacts on diversity relate to the 
tendency to eschew local knowledge in national and international level decision 
making, and in biodiversity, negatively impacting the resilience of resources 
systems.36  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the factors, which impact wildlife resources listed in the literature 
review, and based on the variables noted in the SESF, this study will examine 
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the hypothesis listed below.  Particular attention has been paid to the necessity 
to include cross scale and cross level interactions into the hypotheses in order to 
more accurately capture the complex nature of threats to social ecological 
systems: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In SESs where more modes of authority exist, systems will be less 
resilient to perturbations. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The imposition of rules from external organs increase the 
resilience of an SES. 
 
Hypothesis 3: When local communities engage in the management of wildlife 
industries the SES will be more resilient to disturbances than in cases where 
communities engage in the management of wildlife industries. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Resource stress or collapse is more likely to occur in states with 
weak wildlife crime legislation and/or poor enforcement of wildlife crime 
legislation than in states with strong wildlife crime legislation and effective 
enforcement.  
 
Hypothesis 5: In areas where human wildlife conflict is not effectively addressed 
the SES will be less resilient than in areas where human wildlife crime is 
effectively addressed. 
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Hypothesis 6: An SES characterized by fragmentation is less resilient to 
disturbances than a contiguous SES. 
 
Per Walker et al. this study will measure SES outcomes through the lens of 
resilience, adaptability, and transformability.37 
 
Measuring SES Outcomes 
 
Interactions and outcomes between tiers of nested variables within an 
SES can be viewed through the lens of resilience, adaptability, and 
transformability (RAT). RAT specifically focuses on measuring vulnerability within 
a resource system and how an SES copes with change.38 The RAT provides 
researchers a tool to evaluate interactions and outcomes across the nested tiers 
of an SES which could ultimately lead to the formulation of relevant and effective 
policy.  
The RAT considers past regimes, current practices, and successes or failures in 
impacting outcomes to increase resilience, and the likelihood of shifting into a 
new stable state, to measure and assess a system’s resilience, adaptability, or 
potential for controlled or uncontrolled transformation.  While resilience theory 
stresses the utility of analyzing “slow” variables which push systems to shift, this 
study introduces fast variables, such as shifting global demand for wildlife 
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products and the resulting exponentially increasing poaching rates, to highlight 
the speed of regime shifts.39 
RAT analysis locates the current state of an SES within the context of its 
stability domain in order to determine whether an SES has been irrevocably 
altered. The stability domain reflects the state of a system in the absence of 
major perturbation. Disturbance and perturbation involve major spikes or 
pressures on a system beyond the normal range of vulnerability. Systems might 
be vulnerable to certain disturbances and not to others.40 Once certain thresholds 
are crossed in any SES structure, functions, and feedback loops change and 
undergo a “regime shift” or “flip,” to a new stability domain.41 These shifts may be 
unpredictable and occur very quickly, and “may be reversible, irreversible, or 
effectively irreversible, i.e., not reversible on time scales of interest to society.”42 
Shifts can result from either human caused or natural phenomena.43 Such shifts 
may be occurring in SESs in Gabon, Tanzania, DRC, Ethiopia, Chad, the Ivory 
Coast, Mozambique, Malawi, and Mali, among others, which have lost the 
majority of their elephants.    
Resilience is the amount of disturbance or perturbation a system can 
absorb without shifting into a new stability domain.44 More resilient systems can 
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absorb larger shocks and withstand more disturbance.  A resilient system can 
change and adapt while remaining within critical thresholds.45 Long term SESs 
may have developed a tolerance to certain disturbances and can continue to 
absorb disturbances if they do not change too much over time.46 Whether a 
system is considered resilient by policymakers and community members impacts 
resources use decisions and can be highly contested. As resilience declines, it 
takes progressively smaller disturbances to push the system a new stability 
domain, in which its structure and function are substantially different.47 
Interactions between endogenous and exogenous processes contribute to 
explanations of the resilience, or lack of resilience, of systems.48  
Adaptability is about the human management of resilience in the system. 
Adaptability refers to the ability of an SES to learn; adjust to both internal and 
external factors and processes; and to continue developing within the stability 
domain.49 Because humans dominate SESs their actions both in terms of 
management and utilization determine the adaptability of a system and directly 
impact whether a system becomes an “undesirable” system, or not.50  
The ability of the social systems to manage resilience, or adapt to 
perturbations, depends on the ability of governance systems and resource users 
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to control  the trajectory of an ecological system, “change the ‘topology’ of the 
stability landscape, or change the processes in response to dynamics at other 
scales.”51 Different aspects of the social system and specific features of groups 
might constrain adaptability including norms, identity, and core values, or 
enhance or undermine SES resilience.52 SESs are vulnerable to changes in 
governance strategies, in particular those related to changes in socio-economic 
processes.53 As the speed of global interactions increases the ability of SESs 
(i.e. their human managers) to adapt quickly is paramount.    
Transformability refers to the capacity to create a new system.54 
Transformational change involves shifts in norms and values, patterns of 
interactions among actors, patterns of use and consumption, and shifts in 
organizational and political relationships.  When stability domains shift beyond 
thresholds and ‘new’ systems emerge one may consider the SES to have 
‘transformed,’ impacting both societies and environments.55 It is important to note 
transformation does not have to be uncontrolled and may not necessarily be 
undesirable. Transformation may be required when shocks threaten to alter a 
system beyond repair.56  
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Alternative stable states are possible.57 In fact adaptation and 
transformation- social change- are required to maintain ecosystem resilience.58 
As Walker et al. argues there are many examples of SESs becoming locked in 
and unable to transform until it is too late (salinized agricultural systems; dams, 
floodplains and flood control; forest fire suppression at ever larger scales).59 For 
example in Kenya in the 1980s the ability of SESs to transform and adopt new 
governance structures likely saved valuable wildlife populations, and contributed 
to a new relationship between community members, wildlife, and the national 
government.60  
 
Measurements and Variables 
Resource Units  
 
Following Ostrom’s SESF, this paper defines elephants as a resource unit.  
Relevant variables include mobility growth and replacement rate, interaction 
among resource units, economic value, and spatial and temporal distribution.   
Two types of elephant live in Africa, the savannah elephant (Loxodonta 
Africana) and the forest elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis). Larger savannah 
elephants can be found in 37 African countries with savannah zone habitats.  
Forest elephants, smaller and with round ears, live in the rainforests of West and 
                                            
57
 Carl Folke et al., "Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and 
Transformability," ibid.15, no. 4 (2010). 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 B. Walker, C. S. Holling, S. R. Carpenter, and A. Kinzig, "Resilience, Adaptability and 
Transformability in Social–Ecological Systems," ibid.9, no. 2 (2004). 
60
 Western, In the Dust of Kilimanjaro. 
59
 Ostrom, "A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas." 
  
61 
Central Africa.  Elephant home ranges cross international borders and can 
stretch to nearly 6,000 square miles depending on habitat type.  
Biological attributes of the elephant (as a resource unit) can affect the 
stability of the SES.  Population dynamics occur over decades, not months or 
years.  It may take elephant populations that suffer from overexploitation fifty 
years to recover, while others spiral into extirpation.61 The slow replenishment of 
elephants, which reach sexual maturity no earlier than ten years, and have 
calves only once every four or five years after, expose populations to 
perturbation and disruption.  In a healthy SES, elephants can reproduce into their 
sixties, with healthy populations growing at a natural rate of around 7-8% per 
year.  Populations under stress from environmental factors or poaching breed 
less frequently.  In the absence of major disturbances elephants can live to be 
over seventy years of age in the wild.   
Depending on its size an elephant can eat between 220-400 lbs of 
vegetation per day, and drink over 200 liters of water per day.  Their dietary and 
migration habits can place elephants in direct competition with human 
populations and create what has become known as human-elephant conflict 
(HEC). Adult bull elephants can grow up to eleven feet high at the shoulder and 
weigh over eight tons.  Female elephants are smaller and lighter, with an 
average height of over 8.5 feet and weight just over 7,000 pounds.  
In some countries, such as Botswana and South Africa, elephants are 
abundant, possibly to the point of over-crowding and resource system depletion. 
In other areas such as Rwanda and Ivory Coast populations are tiny, isolated, 
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and not biologically significant.  Small pockets of elephants continue to exit in 
West Africa, though populations have little or no chance of interacting.  
Populations of elephants in the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Central 
African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are increasingly 
isolated in dense forests and difficult to reach areas.   
Population surveys of forest elephants indicate a decline in populations 
between 50-62% in the past decade.  In the DRC 95% of forest have almost no 
elephants.62 Savannah populations are similarly fragmented and isolated. Some 
limited interactions occur between elephants in Kenya and Tanzania and 
between Tanzania and Mozambique.   
The economic value of elephants has shifted over the years as a result of 
international regimes and shifting norms over appropriate usage.  Elephants 
were historically valued for their tusks, hide, hair, and meat.  Tusks do not 
regenerate and can only be harvested by killing the animals. Ivory values range 
depending on which part of the value chain one examines.  At kill sites ivory can 
fetch as little as $40 per tusk, or be bartered for a few cheap trade goods like 
salt.63 Middlemen receive higher prices, around 7-120$ per lb.  Tusks weigh on 
average 12 lbs each, though they can be much larger, and as populations 
decrease, much smaller.  In end markets a large carved tusk can sell for more 
than $50,000.  
Economic value within the licit market generally relates to wildlife tourism, 
largely photo safaris, as well as limited hunting and trophy tourism, and limited 
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legally sanctioned international ivory sales. The direct and indirect economic 
contribution associated with wildlife viewing in developing countries are an 
important source of revenue generation. 
 
Resource Systems 
 
The resource system(s) elephants interact in exist across Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The relevant variables to analyze are the sector, system boundaries, 
system size, human-constructed facilities, productivity, equilibrium properties, 
predictability of system dynamics, and location.   
Savannah elephants range throughout Eastern and Southern Africa.  
Human encroachment and poaching have severely restricted the range of 
elephants, however the land in many areas could easily support more dense 
populations, in particular in forested areas of Central Africa and in the savannahs 
of east Africa.  Difficult to coral, elephants move between national parks and 
private areas, and between states, depending on the availability of water, food, 
and security.  Historically elephants migrated long distances, though in the past 
two centuries those migration patterns have been severely disrupted by poaching 
and habitat loss.  
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Users 
 
Resource use includes consumptive and non-consumptive use.  
Consumptive users may be poachers or traffickers ranging across an array of 
communities from wildlife professionals, to impoverished indigenous peoples 
acting in the illicit realm, as well as end-market users who purchase and 
consume wildlife products both in legal and illegal markets.  Key resource users 
and focus of this project are transnational criminal organizations.64 Consumptive 
use also includes sanctioned sales of wildlife products between states. Non-
consumptive users of wildlife include photo-tourists, as well as safari operators 
and local peoples in tourism related industries from handi-craft sellers to 
hoteliers, as well as NGOs and others who utilize animals as symbols for 
awareness and fund raising efforts. Other users are those living and working 
within a resource system, in particular African communities on the outskirts of 
parks, in wildlife management areas, and other protected areas, whose 
livelihoods are inextricably linked to wildlife either through community based 
conservation programs or as community members forced to endure the 
challenges of living near wildlife. In many ways, these resource users are the 
most crucial to the success or failure of wildlife management plans.  At the 
national level, considering the significance of wildlife to GDPs across Africa, all 
citizens in a given country can be considered resource users as recipients of 
public services made possible through tourism receipts. And as Young, et al., 
point out, in a global resource system in which resources are considered to be a 
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part of a common pool, the scope of resource users expands globally.  65  
Relevant variables impacting outcomes and interactions for all of these resource 
users include the number of users, socio-economic attributes of users, history of 
use, location of users, leadership and entrepreneurship, norms/social capital, 
knowledge of SES, dependence on resource, and technology used. 
 
Governance Systems 
 
Governance systems as nested and decomposable can refer to local, 
national, and international systems of management, governmental and non-
governmental. Relevant second-tier governance variables include government 
organizations and non-government organizations, network structure, property 
rights systems, operational rules, collective choice rules, constitutional rules and 
monitoring and sanctioning processes. The proliferation of governance types 
increases contests and competition over control of wildlife management policies, 
goals, and mechanisms for implementation. 
As a resource elephant populations are managed at the national level 
through wildlife and land management departments, national legislation, and 
local and national enforcement mechanisms.  States determine whether and how 
legal domestic markets for endangered species operate.  At the international 
level the trade in elephants and elephant parts is managed through CITES. 
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Why Case Studies 
 
This paper adopts a case study methodology as the analytic frame best 
suited to explicating the potential causal factors degrading or improving SES 
resilience.  The paper will examine poaching rates in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Botswana, focusing on the parks with the largest elephant populations; Tsavo, 
the Selous Game Reserve, and the Okavango Delta, respectively.  SESs in 
Tanzania and Kenya appear to be shifting into new stability domains as 
elephants are poached out, while the challenge to SESs in Botswana appear to 
relate to an over-abundance of elephants. The case studies include both 
temporal and spatial scales associated with poaching rates to determine the 
relative resilience of SESs. 
To control for background conditions these cases were selected in part on 
the basis of their general similarities related to colonialism, wildlife and land 
management policies, and early attitudes towards wildlife.  All three countries 
experienced a long association with Great Britain as protectorates and colonies 
of the empire.  Botswana and Kenya came under Britain’s sphere of influence 
after the 1885 ‘scramble for Africa.’ Tanzania became a British protectorate after 
World War I and the transfer of German colonies to UN and subsequently British 
control.  Colonial leadership initiated the park system in each country, later 
expanded under post-Independence governments.   
The case study countries all initially adopted wildlife policies based on a 
model of state control of wildlife resources, later adjusted to include, (at least 
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nominally), community based natural resources management plans of one sort or 
another. These plans not only expand community involvement in wildlife 
management but also incorporate market based neo-liberal mechanisms to 
conservation. Similar plans were introduced in most other African countries 
during the same time frame.66  
All three states are heavily dependent on foreign tourism which accounts 
for a high percentage of GDP and significant employment figures. In Kenya the 
total contribution of travel and tourism dollars, generated primarily through wildlife 
tourism, accounts for 12.4% of GDP.67 Similar figures are reported for both 
Botswana and Tanzania.68 Most travelers to Africa visit for wildlife viewing.69 
Each of the three sates discussed receive between one and two million visitors 
per year. All three states devote a large amount of their national territory to 
wildlife conservation and management.  Tanzania protects the most land, over 40 
% of its total area.  Botswana sets aside a third of its territory as parks or wildlife 
management areas.  Kenya, a more populaos state, sets aside just under 8% of 
its land in parks.  
While Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania share multiple similarities, the 
states diverge in key areas.  Neither Kenya nor Tanzania has been able to 
effectively protect its wildlife.  Several of the factors blamed correspond to those 
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listed in the literature review above. These include corruption, mismanagement of 
the wildlife sector, uncoordinated land use policy, conflicting priorities for the use 
of land (agriculture vice conservation), lack of involvement of local communities, 
unsustainable growth, the influx of foreign workers, development in wildlife areas, 
and habitat destruction.70 In both states enforcement is considered very weak, 
with corruption, ineffective and weak laws, poor investigative capacity, and lack 
of political will to dismantle poaching rings hamper efforts to stop illegal killings of 
elephants.  
Weak government responses in both countries hampered or completely 
forestalled efforts to stop the onslaught. During the last poaching crisis in the 
1980s Tanzania get poaching under control. However, during the current crisis 
the government in Tanzania has been slow to recognize the poaching crisis and 
to acknowledge the extent of the destruction of the country’s wildlife.71 The 
primary initiative launched to fight the poachers, Operation Tokemeza, was 
halted by the government over alleged abuses before any ivory kingpins could be 
charged.  In the midst of the poaching epidemic in 2010 Tanzania proposed 
down listing its elephant population to allow sales of ivory.  They did not withdraw 
the proposal until 2012.72 In 2014 Tanzania agreed to not lobby CITES for at 
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least the next ten years to honor the moratorium on sales. Their stockpile is 
worth over 50million dollars.73  
Kenya’s record on battling poaching is similarly mixed. Kenyan wildlife 
suffered high losses in the last great poaching epidemic of the 1970s and 1980s 
when the country 90% of its elephant population was slaughtered from 1973-
1987.  The population stood at less than 10,000 in 1989 when Kenya led the 
campaign to ban the international sale of ivory.74 Conservationists in Kenya 
advocated within Kenya and the international community to raise awareness 
about poaching and to pressure governments to support the CITES ban, 
achieving dramatic results.75 Despite past successes, however, Kenya currently 
denies a poaching crisis exists within its borders, skewing the numbers of 
poached elephants down to obfuscate the linkages between official corruption 
and poaching.   Recent changes in wildlife laws have yet to yield significant 
results. Their record on prosecuting wildlife cases is abysmal.  Poachers, even 
when declared guilty, often go free.  In what may be an effort to shift blame, both 
countries cite cross-border groups as driving poaching.  In Kenya Somali 
terrorists are associated with poaching while in Tanzania the blame is often 
placed on Burundian or Mozambiquan criminals. 
Tanzania and Kenya were both placed on the CITES “Gang of Eight” list in 
2013 for their failure to control poaching or trafficking in their territory. Tanzania is 
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both a major transit point and supplier of ivory to illegal markets. Estimates 
suggest that as much as one third of the ivory seized in Asia comes from or 
through Tanzania. Tanzania loses between 10,000-11,000 elephants per year to 
poachers, if not more.  Poachers operate within park boundaries, and to an even 
greater extent outside of parks in communities.76 Kenya may have lost one 
quarter of its elephant (and rhinoceros) population since 2009, contradicting 
official statistics which claim the loss of only 302 elephants in 2013.77 The actual 
number may be ten times higher.78 Kenya is a major exporter of ivory from 
Central and East Africa, most of which exists through Mombasa. The Kenyan 
Wildlife Service reports the current population of elephants to be around 38,000, 
while the African Elephant Database reports around 26,000 as of 2012.79 Both 
estimates are likely over-estimates.  
The trajectory for Botswana, on the other hand, has been one of recovery 
from past near decimation. Heavily hunted during the colonial period by the 
Boers and other settlers, Botswana had fewer than 8,000 elephants in 1960.80 
Today the country is considered a conservation success story with Africa’s 
largest and most secure elephant herd of over 130,000 elephants.  Ironically 
Botswana’s elephant population is thought to have increased as a result of 
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conflict related poaching in neighboring states.  High levels of poaching in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe and insecurity Namibia and Angola push so-called 
‘refugee’ elephants into Botswana.81  
The Botswana government considers poaching a threat to their national 
security and treat it as such, training special units of the country’s defense force 
to combat poachers.  They invoke stiff penalties and fines and have a good 
record of convicting those engaged in illegal hunts. The low levels of poaching 
that occur in Botswana are blamed on cross-border poachers coordinating with 
locals to kill wildlife.82 Botswana, a longtime supporter of international ivory sales, 
altered its position on sales in 2013 and no longer supports the ivory trade. 
Other significant differences between Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana 
exist which could be important to explain difference in SES resilience including 
the relative strength or weakness of their economies, levels of corruption, 
security factors, and demographics.  Each of the countries, following African 
states generally, moved from state-led economies to a private sector led 
development in the 1990s and 2000s.  However Kenya and Tanzania remain low 
income countries with high poverty rates while Botswana, on the other hand, is 
considered an upper middle income country.83 The perception of corruption 
varies greatly between the states, with Kenya and Tanzania viewed as highly 
corrupt by their citizens. While Botswana is considered the least corrupt county in 
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Africa.84 Kenya, bordering Somalia, has faced numerous terrorist attacks by 
Somalis and homegrown terrorists in addition to mass violence associated with 
the 2008 elections.  Somali terrorists are widely believed to be responsible for at 
least some of the elephant poaching in Kenya over the last decade.85 While 
Tanzania and Botswana both border countries, which have experienced war in 
the last two decades threats to wildlife are not generally associated with terrorists 
or other large, organized non-state armed groups.   
Demographically Kenya and Tanzania are heterogeneous societies with 
multiple competing ethnic/tribal/racial and linguistic identities.  Strong political 
leadership in post-Independence Tanzania created a national identity and 
national unity through the adoption of Kiswahili, nationalist curriculum in school, 
and local empowerment, depoliticizing ethnicity and tribe.86 Tanzania 
subsequently developed a strong “Tanzanian” national identity, and has 
experienced little interethnic conflict.87 Kenyans, on the other hand, continues to 
relate more closely to their ethnic groups through the use of local languages, lack 
of universal curriculum, reliance on appointed ethnic/tribal leaders, ‘tribalist’ 
political leadership, and the allocation of public goods along ethnic lines (favoring 
ethnic Kikuyus over other groups).  As a result Kenya continues to experience 
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political and social conflict, which breaks out along ethnic lines.88 Botswana, 
dominated by one ethnic group, the Tswana, is considered the most 
homogenous country in Africa and outside of struggles between indigenous 
Basarwa (San people) bushmen and the central government over land use 
rights, little ethnic strife exists.89 
Case study analysis aligns with the SESF and RAT at multiple points.  
First, the case study methodology meshes with the SESF’s emphasis on nested 
and tiered variables and sub variables, its inclusion of attributes of users and 
decision making processes, and their relationship with interactions and 
outcomes. Case studies focus on background conditions and the interactions of 
multiple actors and variables across levels, space, and time to explain current 
conditions. As the previous sections articulate, elephant SESs in Botswana, 
Kenya, and Tanzania operate as nested tiers of a global SESs. Elephant SESs 
are by definition transnational in terms of resource movement, resource users, 
and governance systems, shifting over time at varying speeds.  An examination 
of the RAT in any elephant SES requires a multi-scale and multi-level approach, 
across time and space, which is possible through the application of case study 
analysis.  
Second, case study analysis focuses on processes and patterns of 
interactions to determine which background conditions or combination of 
conditions are required to produce outcomes through ‘process tracing,’ which 
dovetails with the SESF applied in this study.  Process tracing involves 
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examination of “the chain of events or the decision-making process by which 
initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes,” again aligning with the 
SESF.90 The conditions of SESs shift and alter between geographies and across 
time and are the result of a long history of interactions which process tracing can 
reveal. By process-tracing the analysis can examine how the conditions within 
the case translate into outcomes. 
Third, through process tracing, case study analysis allows the researcher 
to focus on multiple data points to establish the cause and affect links between 
the independent variables to reveal observable evidence and identify key 
background conditions feeding into interactions and outcomes.  The SESF allows 
for multiple variables and encourages their study across scales and levels. In a 
study of complex systems such as an SES a research methodology that limits 
variables would inevitably lead to an analysis which flattens and oversimplifies 
problem sets to the point of meaninglessness.  Lastly, case studies are a good 
vehicle for “inferring and testing explanations that define how the independent 
causes the dependent variables.”91 Given fairly uniform background conditions 
case studies can become a semi-controlled environment.  If the case studies 
support a hypothesis than the researcher can explore the case further to deduce 
and test explanations detailing the operation of the hypothesis.   Case studies 
can explain both that hypothesis hold, and why they hold.  The case studies 
selected for this study share enough background conditions to qualify the study 
as ‘semi-controlled.’ 
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Through case study analysis this project will, in addition to exercising the 
SESF through qualitative analysis, test theories associated with the causes of 
poaching which rely on flattened, uncomplicated, monocausal variables.  The 
project will also reveal key background conditions and test their importance.  
Lastly, it will explain cases of intrinsic importance in the study of poaching and 
transnational crime. 
With the research design established, the study next turns to an 
examination of international factors that impact the elephant SESF in Chapter 4. 
This chapter identifies first level ‘generic’ variables- the resource system, 
resource users, governance system, and resource units- to unpack and relate 
variables across scales and levels to identify key interactions impacting tiers 
nested below which either contribute to ecological systems resilience or its 
degradation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how human action is shaping 
the African elephant ecosystem through over-harvesting of finite resources at the 
international level and range state level, nested immediately below. Per the 
analytic framework this study adopts, the social-ecological systems framework 
(SESF), the chapter identifies first level ‘generic’ variable interactions that can 
then be unpacked to understand how lower tier variables to explored in detail.1  
These are the resource system, resource users, governance system, and 
resource units, defined in Chapter 3. Shifts in the social-ecological system (SES) 
are linked to complex sets of local processes, and vice versa.2 
This chapter begins to unpack and relate variables across scales and 
levels to identify key interactions impacting tiers nested below which either 
contribute to ecological systems resilience or its degradation. It focuses on 
reciprocal relationships and feedback loops between the international and range 
state level. As Ostrom notes, it is imperative to understand “how systems are 
progressively linked to ever larger systems and how upward and downward 
causation linkages occur within an SES as well as across diverse sectors and 
scales.”3  In the African elephant global SES, governance failures and the actions 
of resource users at the range state level percolate up to the international level 
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with a corrosive effect on the ability of international institutions to manage 
resources in an efficient, effective, and sustainable manner. Similarly, the 
tendency towards specific usage patterns and knowledge systems resting at the 
international level reflect in patterns and practices at the range state level, with 
deleterious impacts on the health of the global SES. 
This chapter serves as the first step in the process of tracking impacts and 
interactions across all levels of the SES. SESs involve groups of resource users 
linked to one another, and to other resources across scales and governance 
arrangements. 4  
 
Interactions 
 
The sections below examine how the key generic variables- resource 
system, governance systems, resource users, and resource units- interact 
together to produce a system which is currently in crisis, potentially transforming 
from a system defined by relative resilience into one threatened with collapse. 
Interactions between parts of the SES- resources, users, governance 
systems, and the system, have largely occurred in the context of an open-access 
system, leading to local extirpation of elephant resources and the transformation 
of the SES over time. In the current era this is occurring as a result of scale and 
level mismatches between governance, jurisdiction, and knowledge systems, in 
addition to other scale challenges relating to the ignorance of scale and level 
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dynamics and misunderstandings about the role heterogeneity in the SES.5 
Scale challenges are defined as a “situation in which the current combination of 
cross-scale and cross-level interactions threatens to undermine the resilience of 
a human-environment system.”6 The three types of “scale challenge” Cash 
identifies are “the failure to recognize important scale and level interactions 
altogether; the persistence of mismatches between levels and scales in human 
environment systems; and the failure to recognize heterogeneity in the way that 
scales are perceived and valued by different actors, even at the same level.”7   
Within governance institutions these scale challenges occur alongside of 
collective action dilemmas inherent in diverse organizations. Collective action 
dilemmas occur when there is “a divergence of what is in the interests of the 
individual and what is optimal for the community or larger group.”8  By definition 
CITES relies on the collective actions of parties to protect wildlife, sometimes 
resulting in compromise to create a large coalition and move legislation.9 The 
requirement to accommodate the variety of parties within CITES and their 
varying perspectives on the role of wildlife and the appropriate management 
scale for local wildlife conservation, affects the types of policies which can be 
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adopted within CITES.10  As a globally linked system the SES is not only large, 
stretching across dozens of international borders, but it involves institutions and 
people physically located and physically distant from the SES. The SES literature 
suggests that the lack of consensus among resource users on appropriate 
resource use or conservation strategies weakens ability of the governing 
authority to address perturbations in the SES.11  These dynamics are evident 
within interactions between CITES and range states which differ on resource use 
policies and conservation goals.  
The challenges of scale dynamics and collective action problems are 
increasing the vulnerability of the system and limiting its ability to adapt to 
perturbations and respond in a way that preserves the system’s resilience. As 
Chapter 3 noted, resilience is “a measure of a system’s capacity to cope with 
shocks and undergo change while retaining essentially the same structure and 
function.”  When resilience declines, as is occurring in the SES, progressively 
smaller disturbances will have a disproportionate affect on the SES, transforming 
it into a new system “in which its structure and function are substantially 
different.”12 In the case of the African elephant SES a new system would be 
smaller, fragmented, geographically isolated, and would lose many of the 
features of an international SES. These smaller systems would, in turn, be 
increasingly vulnerable to perturbations at every level and would likely not be 
able to achieve resilience. 
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The international SES experiences the effects of all of these challenges, 
with impacts across the SES and inclusive of global resource users. 
 
Jurisdiction/Geographic Mismatches and Collective Action Implications for 
Enforcement at the International Level 
 
Scholars have illustrated that preservation of SESs require institutions 
whose scale of authority are appropriate to the geographic scale of the 
ecosystem. Perhaps more than any social ecological system on earth, by dividing 
a continent sized natural habitat among numerous states and jurisdictions, the 
rapid and continuing extirpation of elephants illustrates the costs of a mismatch in 
scales of resource systems and governing institutions. Large institutions may 
prove unwieldy and be too slow to quickly address shifts in usage patterns, while 
authorities with more limited geographic and jurisdictional reach lack the capacity 
to address perturbations closely linked with international markets and global 
resource users. Collective action dilemmas complicate management further, as 
states within the system attempt to exert their preferences on the entire system, 
or flout system requirements altogether. Other issues related to jurisdictional and 
geographic scale mismatches relate to how species are monitored and tracked, 
and levels of funding available for conservation. The performance of CITES in 
the management of the global elephant SES, as the following discussion 
illustrates, provides evidence to support this hypothesis. A more detailed 
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discussion of tiers nested below- primarily governance authorities resting at the 
range state level, will be developed in the case study chapters. 
The notion of geographic/jurisdictional scale mismatch refers to “poor fit 
between the levels of authority and size of a system (state control of fisheries or 
ranges that extend across zones), and the scale of jurisdiction for solving that 
problem.”13 Problems associated with the management of fugitive species which 
move into and out of territories and across state boundaries often relate to scale 
mismatches.14 As resource systems increasingly operate on a global scale, shifts 
in usage patterns and utilization strategies amongst potentially millions of users, 
test the capability of large institutions to react and adapt quickly to avert 
uncontrolled and unplanned transformation.  
Lacking an enforcement arm that operates below the international level, 
CITES relies on its ability to identify and sanction state level actors in response to 
overexploitation of the SES. However given the accelerated pace of change 
Ostrom identifies as a challenge to global SES, the slow pace of CITES’ 
bureaucracy creates difficulty in quickly identifying and addressing perturbations 
across levels of the SES.15 16 Long periods between meetings allow populations 
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to continue to decline without action at the international level. Parties only meet 
to review policies and implementation of the convention every two to three years 
at the Conference of Parties (CoPs).17 The process of introducing an issue, 
lobbying, deciding to vote, and voting can take years. When decisions are made 
implementation is not necessarily immediate and relies heavily on Parties’ 
willingness and ability to comply.  States are often given years between 
mandates and implementation, leaving species to continue dwindling into 
extirpation. Moreover, even decisive actions by CITES, such as moving a 
species from Appendix III to Appendix II, may have little or no impact on trade 
levels.18   
CITES’ bureaucracy makes it difficult for the institution to quickly identify 
and engage with states of concern.  It took CITES the better part of a decade to 
publicly name the “gang of eight” countries of concern, despite early indications 
of organized crime, government complicity, and high levels of poaching.19 The 
gang of eight includes the source countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, transit 
counties, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, and destination countries, 
Thailand and China. These countries had come to CITES’ attention for their role 
in the illegal ivory trade as early as 1998 and were cited every year as key 
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players in the illicit trade in studies, however no action was taken.20 It took CITES 
another year to recognize other key countries in their ‘gang’ of offenders, despite 
abundant evidence of their role in the international illicit trade including Gabon21 
and Mozambique,22 important sources for ivory with confirmed severe population 
declines over the past five years, weak or unenforced laws, and clear 
government complicity in the trade. CITES slow response time enables 
transnational criminals who can swoop into an area, decimate resources, and 
move items to market quickly, before authorities can respond.23 
CITES commitment to regulating a sustainable trade is further undermined 
by its failure to ensure states remain in compliance with the treaty and do not 
create conditions conducive to the penetration of organized crime into the 
market. CITES can invoke sanctioning mechanisms for non-compliance with 
reporting; non-compliance with specific requirements under the Action Plan for 
the Control of Trade in African Elephant Ivory; and for inadequate domestic 
implementing legislation; but rarely does. These sanctions can include barring 
countries from trading in any listed species, an action with significant economic 
impacts to states.24 25 CITES did not even call on these states to shut down 
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domestic markets, despite evidence that ivory is laundered through them.26 
CITES did not pass sanctions on any of the named countries, instead only 
requiring each state to deliver an action plan to address the issue.27  At the 
Standing Committee Meeting on Animals in 2013 CITES only directly addressed 
China and Thailand after the official meetings had formally ended, despite their 
pivotal roles in the illicit trade. If applied, CITES sanctions could halt the 
international trade of over 35,000 plant and animal species to and from offending 
countries, a major economic and reputational blow.28  CITES unwillingness to 
apply meaningful sanctions to states in contravention of the treaty’s mandates 
contributes to non-compliance, limiting the treaty’s effectiveness.   
The most egregious example of this failure is the handling of the second 
“one-off” sale to China. CITES did not follow up on the Chinese market after the 
one-off sale and has not addressed evidence clearly illustrating the role of the 
sale in the rise in poaching or the level of illegal trade, and its rise, after the sale.  
Chinese continue to be implicated in ivory trafficking on a regular basis across 
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Africa, and the continuation of large scale seizures throughout 2014 indicate 
unsustainable trade to Asia continues.29 The unwillingness or inability of CITES 
to hold China accountable for its role in the international trade in illicit ivory and 
for the transformation in the SES is repeated across other major consumer states 
in Asia and within African range states.  At the time of publication CITES has not 
sanctioned any state for its failure to control the illicit ivory trade.   
These failures are mirrored at tiers nested below the international level. 
Membership in CITES does not preclude states crafting harsher penalties for the 
illegal collection and trade of wildlife. Parties could implement voluntary 
moratoriums on trade in listed species within their borders, or enhance laws 
meant to protect species. However, across the resource system, laws and other 
controls on wildlife crimes at lower tiers of the SES do not typically reflect the 
gravity or scale of wildlife crime. Most states do not have strong laws proscribing 
the illegal killing or trafficking of wildlife, many do not enforce the laws that are on 
the books, and often lack the capacity or political will to identify criminal 
trafficking.30 Changes to legislation to more closely link penalties with the scope 
and scale of crimes committed, has occurred slowly, if at all.31 While most range 
states are parties to CITES and have agreed to abstain from trading elephant 
ivory at the international level they have failed to create or enforce anti-poaching 
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and trafficking laws at the state level where poaching and trafficking occurs 
before it becomes transnational.32  
 
Challenges to Resource Monitoring across Geographic and Jurisdictional Scales 
 
Governance of the SES relies on effective monitoring of resources and 
resource use patterns within the system, challenged by its existence across 
dozens of international borders and jurisdictions. Ineffective monitoring of wildlife 
resources can lead to ‘information problems.’33 Essentially, information problems 
can include assuming an individual population exemplifies population dynamics 
at large; ignoring variability between populations; and ignoring the viability of 
remaining stocks, all of which can lead decision makers to prescribe policies 
incompatible with sustainability.34 However, CITES leaves some of the most 
burdensome and technically difficult aspects of monitoring the illegal trade to 
states with little capacity or political will to meet the challenge.35 The resulting 
data is often faulty, incomplete, or inaccurate resulting in underestimates of 
illegal sales and kills in most countries.  The Monitoring the Illegal Killing of 
                                            
32
 Parties designate a CITES Scientific Authority and CITES Management Authority to oversee 
data collection and law enforcement to ensure compliance. Management Authorities ensure trade 
provisions under CITES are met and creates a licensing system to track and control trade. 
Scientific Authorities makes determinations on the effects of trade on a species, monitor exports, 
and provide advice on trade levels to Management Authorities.   
33
 Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, "The Struggle for the Commons," 1908.  
34
 Ibid. 
35
 TRAFFIC, the Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce, manages ETIS on 
behalf of CITES and produces analyses of patterns and drivers of illegal trade for presentation at 
each CoP. See CITES, "Memorandum of Understanding (Mou) Concluded between Traffic 
International, on Behalf of the Traffic Network, 219c, Huntingdon Road, Cambridge, Cb3 Odl, 
United Kingdom and the United Nations Environment Programme, Secretariat of the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (the Cites Secretariat), 
15, Chemin Des Anémones, 1219 Châtelaine, Geneva, Switzerland,"  (1 November 1999), 
http://www.cites.org/common/disc/sec/CITES-TRAFFIC.pdf. 
  
87 
Elephants program, commonly known as MIKE, measures trends in illegal killings 
and identifies factors related to the trends.  The program operates in sixty sites 
across 30 African range states. These sites hold between 30-40% of the 
continent’s elephants. The proportion of illegally killed elephants (PIKE) is 
measured at each site through carcass examinations and is used to indicate 
regional levels of poaching36 and produce analysis on trends in illegal killing.37  
Obtaining reliable data across sites is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, 
the sites do not represent a random sample of elephant range sites. The second 
concern relates to the difficulty analyzing and comparing the data provided.  
Because patrols vary on areas covered or methods and intensity of patrols, the 
chances of finding carcasses vary greatly even within sites.  Because sites exist 
in countries with a range of resources devoted to wildlife conservation the level of 
effort and capacity within staffs can vary greatly across MIKE sites.38 Resulting 
analysis of MIKE and PIKE data conducted by CITES underestimated the level of 
illegal killing across Africa and influenced decision maker within the body to 
continue pursing avenues to expand the legal trade in ivory. Information released 
by CITES using its MIKE program often contradicts that released by scholars and 
other wildlife authorities.39 Seizures of data of trafficked ivory captured through 
the CITES Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) is similarly wanting. ETIS 
reports contain information on seizures relating to countries either directly 
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involved in the ivory trade or that have been identified as a source, transit, or 
destination country for illegal ivory, or whose nationals are considered to be 
involved in the illicit trade. Recommendations contained in ETIS reports are used 
to mandate assessments of ivory trade controls in countries of concern.40  
However, as currently compiled, ETIS reports do not accurately reflect the level 
of illicit international trade or even accurately record seizures. Six African 
elephant range states have never submitted elephant product seizure records 
despite being implicated in seizures.41 Records may not specify the weight of 
seizures, but merely pieces of ivory, making quantification difficult.42 Despite the 
information problems evident CITES’s statistics governance mechanisms rely 
heavily on this data to inform decision making bodies, impacting the ability of 
Parties to make the type of informed decisions on levels of trade necessary to 
ensure the responsible management of species at the international level. 
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Challenges to Funding Conservation across a Geographically Expansive SES 
 
In an SES a significant institutional mismatch related to the levels of 
funding for conservation activities and the funds available for those activities can 
undermine the ability of even well formulated policies to positively impact wildlife 
populations and trade levels.  Within the African elephant SES such a funding 
mismatch occurs across levels of governance within the SES, meaning while the 
burden of enforcement measures and conservation initiatives are forced down to 
lower tiers in the SES, implementation funds are lacking. At every level of the 
international SES funding available for conservation is “a fraction of the hundreds 
of billions in annual expenditures which would be required to reduce biodiversity 
loss significantly.”43 This is despite the fact that African range states within the 
SES are deeply dependent on the survival and health if the SES for significant 
portions of their national GDPs.  
CITES lacks the funds to invest in even core programs and initiatives. 
CITES has the power to urge, but not to require, parties to provide funding to 
implement recommendations. The institution relies on a trust fund and 
contributions from parties to fund the organization and its activities making it 
vulnerable to chronic and significant shortfalls. Parties consistently fail to pay 
dues to CITES, and often do not contribute to special funds. CITES expected 
contributions of nearly $6 million for operations in 2014, but reported less than $3 
million received by October 2014.  Some states contribute less than $100 per 
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year while others pledge high amounts and fail to deliver.44  Lack of funding 
hampers the ability of CITES to enforce decisions.  For example, at the 14 th CoP 
in 2007 CITES mandated that African elephant range states create an Action 
Plan to provide “coordinated and immediate action.”45 The Fund was not 
launched until 2011, with the goal of raising $100 million over three years for law 
enforcement programs.46 It raised less than $100,000 the first year.47 The chronic 
lack of funds impedes the ability of CITES’ programs to improve enforcement 
mechanisms for African elephant range states.   
Despite heavy dependence on environmental resources, in particular 
wildlife viewing tourism, for GDP growth, range states fail to invest in 
conservation proportionally either to the scale of the threat the environment 
faces, or the level of return possible on investments.  This dynamic will be more 
closely examined in the follow-on case studies, which examine cross-level 
interactions at the range state level and below. Most range states similarly fail to 
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invest in wildlife programs or fund conservation efforts beyond monies earned 
through entrance fees and other use fees at parks, despite the potential for 
wildlife tourism to boost national GDPs and introduce foreign currency into the 
market. The estimated tourist viewing value of an elephant is $1.6 million over its 
lifetime. In just one year an elephant is expected to contribute nearly $23,000 to 
local and national economies through non-consumptive wildlife viewing.48 In 
some countries tourism receipts generate as much as 50% of GDP,49 while 
elephant tourism alone can accounts for as much as 20% of wildlife tourism 
receipts.50 Including knock-on effects, tourism has impacts construction, 
transportation, telecommunication, financial services, restaurants, agriculture 
fisheries, food processing, light manufacturing, handicrafts, and other goods and 
services available in the informal sector.51  Range states lose millions of dollars 
and future economic value when wildlife is poached, and yet consistently fail to 
adequately fund conservation and enforcement programs or to strengthen laws 
to protect wildlife.  Law enforcement capacity and capacity within ranger forces, 
as stated elsewhere in this document, are undermined by weak investment and 
lack of material resources by governments.52 Because CITES rarely and weakly 
sanctions states for their inadequate controls, improvements are not forthcoming. 
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Uncontrolled transformation of the SES could have devastating consequences in 
Africa and irreparably damage its tourism industry.   
Regional organizations largely consist of weak and poorly funded 
institutions that in many cases only began addressing (ineffectively) poaching in 
the later stage of the crisis. NGOs, acting independently or in partnership with 
states, are not equipped either through legislation or in terms of funding levels to 
conclusively address illegal hunting and the complex problems associated with 
the practice. The largest NGOs operate with huge annual budgets in the tens or 
hundreds of millions of dollars, operating programs in countries across the globe 
while reaching millions of individual members.53 For example, the most well 
recognized international wildlife NGO, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), operates 
on an annual budget of over $228 million.54  While significant and necessary 
across all tiers of the resource system, NGO funding cannot fill the gap left by the 
failure of formal governance structures to invest in conservation. 
 
Cultural Diversity Challenge and Heterogeneity in the SES 
 
What is referred to by Cash as heterogeneity in the system, and by 
Ostrom as cultural diversity, challenge management of the SES in two ways.  
Both scholars are referring to the challenge of managing resource users and 
governance authorities nested in tiers below the international level who may not 
agree either on the scale of a perturbation, or its significance. Heterogeneity in 
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how actors perceive perturbations facing the SES relates to how they perceive 
the scale of the SES. They may choose to shape a problem as local, national, or 
global depending on the response they hope to shape. 55  Cultural diversity 
between resource users and governance authorities in the system can create 
deep cultural divides, making it more difficult for institutions to identify 
perturbations or solutions in a cross-culturally relevant manner. This gap results 
from a lack of cross-level interactions in the knowledge systems and a 
misunderstanding of how different actors perceive the value of resources.56  
Differences in how parties perceive the scale of perturbations in the 
system directly impact their pattern of usage of resources. Range states within 
Africa continue to disagree over how best to secure elephant populations, 
through a trading regime or conservation and preservationist regime, because 
Southern African states shape the problem of poaching as localized 
geographically to other segments of the SES. They treat their populations as 
separate from the global whole and argue that local abundance can be sustained 
even in the face of a massive uptick in poaching. Actors at different levels are 
motivated differently and may be compelled or motivated to strengthen or 
weaken linkages between scales for political purposes. The drive to shape a 
problem as local or global, or at another level, can be understood as way for 
governance authorities at tiers below the international level to both simplify the 
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problem, and control solutions, which in the case of range states interested in 
exploiting their elephant resources is a trade model of conservation.57  
Southern African states have consistently argued that a legal ivory trade is 
both compatible with conservation and necessary to maintain healthy populations 
in the long term. South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia have 
all tabled proposals aimed at reopening a regulated trade, though Botswana 
changed its position in 2013.58 In 2010 Tanzania and Zambia submitted 
proposals to down-list their elephant populations in order to sell stockpiled ivory 
and trade in live animals, despite their inability to demonstrate appropriate 
enforcement controls and mounting evidence of a poaching crisis, in particular in 
Tanzania.59 Considerable dissent surfaced amongst the African range states and 
other parties over the proposal. Kenya and India, in collaboration with 
international NGOs, lobbied at CoPs and among member states to reject any 
opening of the ivory trade, including one-off sales.60 A coalition of range states 
voted against the measure and it was defeated.61  Congo, Ghana, Kenya, 
Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo proposed extending the 
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moratorium on sales during the same CoP, illustrating the vast gulf between 
states lobbying for expanded sales and those seeking to support the ban.62  
 
Heterogeneity/Cultural Diversity Challenges In Resource Use Patterns 
 
The heterogeneity/cultural diversity challenge helps explain user behavior 
in the face of systemic crisis. While globalization facilitates the flow of goods and 
people and connects users and markets, even in the context of global 
interconnectedness values do not easily transfer wholesale across cultures or 
levels. The lack of conservation norms or a deep understanding of SES 
dynamics, either in terms of elephant biology or the weakness within nested tiers 
of the governance system, partly explains Chines policies to promote utilization 
over conservation. Issues facing the SES are framed and shaped according to 
political, cultural, and economic expedience by the most veracious resource 
users, creating a disconnect between how the system is valued by local users as 
opposed to distant users. The governing institutions have not been able to halt 
the over-exploitation of the system or to mitigate or control illicit resource users.  
Because of the global nature of the ivory trade, the physical distance 
between resource users and the absence of cultural norms surrounding 
conservation, consumers in China and across Asia have a weak or nonexistent 
understanding of SES dynamics, which undermines sanctioning and 
policymaking to preserve the SES. They typically couch the issue as an African 
issue not related to Chinese behavior, defining the problem as local and bounded 
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to African countries, removing the need to respond.63 The most lucrative 
segments of the illicit ivory trade are dominated by resource users, primarily 
Asian, who have not historically interacted within the SES on a large scale but 
are deeply connected through tradition and culture to the consumption of ivory.  
They view ivory as simultaneously a cultural symbol and as an investment. 64   
Most Mainland Chinese, far from the African elephant resource system, do 
not understand the relationship between ivory and poaching, assuming that tusks 
simply fall out of an elephant’s mouth, like teeth, without harming the animal. 
Their lack of knowledge contributes to a willingness to consume ivory.65 
Traditionally, cultural norms in China have not conveyed protections on wildlife. 
Chinese have viewed wild animals as sources of food, clothing, and medicine for 
millennia.66 67 Considering the rise in prices for ivory and the seemingly endless 
expansion of the market, harvesting or purchasing ivory to the point of 
destruction of the SES can be considered a desirable and rational strategy to 
maximize both short and long term gains for illicit users. Once elephants become 
extinct trade restrictions become unnecessary, allowing for unlimited price rises 
on a finite resource.68   
In areas where Chinese do interact with the resources system their 
proximity-in the context of weak laws and weak capacity within range states, lack 
                                            
63
 Cash et al., "Scale and Cross-Scale Dynamics: Governance and Information in a Multilevel 
World." 
64
 Vira, Ewing, and Miller. 
65
 Gabriel. 
66
 TRAFFIC, "What’s Driving the Wildlife Trade? A Review of Expert Opinion on Economic and 
Social Drivers of the Wildlife Trade and Trade Control Efforts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao Pdr 
and Vietnam". 
67
 Zhang Li, Ning Hua, and Shan Sun, "Wildlife Trade, Consumption and Conservation 
Awareness in Southwest China," Biodiversity Conservation 17 (2008).  
68
 Acheson, "Institutional Failure in Resource Management." 
  
97 
of conservation norms, lack of understanding of elephant SESs, and economic 
motivations-drives consumption. Improvements in infrastructure and 
transportation, increased wealth, recent opening of borders between China and 
its neighbors in Southeast Asia, and a general lack of wildlife trade monitoring in 
China all contribute to the growth of the wild animal market in China.69  One 
estimate suggests as much as 80% of the world’s wildlife crime is trafficked 
through or to China.70   
For individual Chinese, and the transnational criminal networks who 
control the trade in ivory, ivory acts as yet another resource to be extracted from 
Africa for processing and value addition in China.  The values of ivory shifts 
significantly depending on its location along the supply chain.  At the point of 
collection in remote areas in Africa ivory prices vary between $50-100/kg ivory, 
though the value can be far less.  Poachers may kill elephants for as little as a 
bag of salt, a share of the meat, or small cash remunerations.71  At consolidation 
points where ivory begins its journey overseas the price rises to $250-400/kg.  
Chinese markets value ivory at around $2100/kg.  In the retail market a large or 
intricately carved piece can sell for millions of dollars.72  Based on an average 
weight of 5kg per tusk, raw elephant ivory from an average sized set of tusks is 
valued around $21,000 at the final point of sale.73  These high values do not 
accrue to range states. 
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The rise in Asian demand for trafficked wildlife can be linked directly to 
poaching increases in Africa.74  Within the ivory trade transnational organized 
crime primarily consists of Asian lead, Africa run operations which move large 
quantities of ivory from Africa to points in Asia, in particular China.  Following the 
model, Africans dominate the networks until ivory reaches the stage for 
containerization, recruiting poachers and killing and consolidating wildlife, after 
which Asian transnational organized crime syndicates take over.75  African 
segments of these networks consist of a variety of actors including state security 
forces, rebel groups, political officials, businessmen, indigenous people, and 
members of the conservation community, in addition to cross-border insurgents 
and terrorist, covered separately below.   
While other nationalities take part in the Asian segments of the trade, 
Chinese have been implicated in ivory-related offenses in almost all African 
range states, and in every part of the ivory chain other than the actual animal 
killing.76 As globalization has made international travel and trade easier, more 
and more Chinese have moved to Africa, directly connecting consumers to the 
resource system. Chinese are the primary buyers of ivory in domestic markets 
across Africa, contributing to a significant ‘ant trade’ in ivory back to China as 
well as to the facilitation of industrial level trading.77 The diaspora links local 
markets with international ivory markets through direct trade and facilitation of 
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criminal networks. NGO reporting links both Chinese diplomatic and military 
missions to Africa with increases in local ivory trade volumes and prices.78   
The UNODC estimates two-thirds of the global ivory goes to Asian 
markets, dominated by China.79  Wealthy Chinese buyers view ivory as a smart 
investment, responding to media hype that ivory investments are ‘risk free’ 
particularly in light of quickly escalating prices.80  In a renewed market Chinese 
buy ivory as an investment, for its social value as a status symbol, for its art 
value, as jewelry or ornament, for religious objects, and for medicinal purposes.81   
The knowledge scale mismatch goes hand in hand with a mismatch 
between the resource available and resources required to satisfy the market. The 
fast-paced rise in demand in China cannot be met by available stocks whether 
restricted to natural mortality of elephants, use of state stockpiles for sales, or 
through targeted harvesting of problem animals.82 As Cumming notes, “growing a 
resilient landscape depends heavily on finding an appropriate match between the 
scales of demands on ecosystems by human societies and the scales at which 
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ecosystems are capable of meeting these demands.”83  This has not occurred 
within the global African elephant SES.  The large number of resource users with 
conflicting norms on wildlife usage undermines the development of non-
consumptive use conservation norms. The sheer number of resource users 
entering the system who lack conservation norms threaten to transform the 
system irrevocably. 
Under a pro-trade regime the Chinese government views ivory as a 
source of revenue and as a vehicle to preserve Chinese ‘identity’ in a crowded 
global media sphere.84  While the Chinese have long had a cultural affinity for 
ivory its popularity had waned after the 1989 trade ban. When the government 
declared ivory carving as an intangible cultural heritage worth preserving in 2006, 
it revived the industry.85  The designation allowed the ivory carving industry to 
access state resources and was the primary rationale behind Chinese requests 
to purchase ivory in the second ‘one-off’ CITES auction.  
The CITES sale provided China 62 tons of ivory, expanding the domestic 
market for ivory and the structures to support that market. In 2004, 17 companies 
were licensed to process raw ivory and an additional 87 retailers the right to sell 
ivory.86  By 2014 the number of carving factories and retailers grew to 37 and 
145, respectively. Three-quarters of ivory factories are state owned enterprises, 
meaning inflated prices and high demand directly benefit the government.87  
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Some of the failures of the Chinese government to provide adequate 
protections to the African elephant relate to the mismatch in knowledge scales 
and the heterogeneity in value systems across resource users. The Chinese 
government has failed to demonstrate commitment to elephant conversation and 
enforcement of CITES mandates. The government control of the ivory trade 
remains lax as measures put in place to manage it are widely subverted.88  China 
failed to secure its ivory stockpile, an important responsibility under CITES meant 
to keep ivory form poached elephants out of the market. In 2008 the EIA reported 
over 110 tons of ivory- equivalent to 11,000 dead elephants-was missing from 
government controlled stocks as early as 2002. The theft was not investigated 
and no arrests were ever made.  To reiterate points made above, under lax 
Chinese controls up to 90% of ivory in China is illegal, and more than half of legal 
ivory factories launder illegal ivory.89 The Chinese arrest few traffickers, do not 
regularly investigate illegal activities within ivory carving or retail outlets, and do 
not publicly acknowledge a link between the purchase of ivory at the CITES 
auction, the rise in demand, or the increases in poaching across Africa.90 
Both the aggregated decisions of individual Chinese to consume, and the 
policies of the government to promote the ivory trade and consumption of ivory, 
are contributing to the transformation of the global SES.  
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The Precautionary Principle and CITES’ Failure to Recognize Scale and Level 
Dynamics 
 
The actions and preferences of range states, including their governance 
systems and use patterns, impact the ability of the international governance 
structure to operate effectively. Disagreements amongst range states and the 
inability to achieve consensus among them on the desirability and consequences 
of ivory sales facilitate CITES’ position on sales. CITES has consistently left the 
door open to trade and continues to insist that a legal trade is possible. The 
organization does not acknowledge any link between the one-off sales and either 
an increase in demand or poaching.  Ignoring scale dynamics entirely, CITES 
has not recognized its own role in the growth in the illicit trade in ivory. 91 CITES 
has failed to acknowledge any links between the one-off sales and the increase 
in poaching.92  These failures not only weaken the norm against consumption of 
ivory but legitimize discussions around use of other wildlife products, in particular 
rhino horn, and the feasibility of legalizing sales. 
In the 1980s when trade controls were first established CITES put up few 
barriers to continued trade. As currently, they relied heavily on states to set trade 
levels and monitor and control ivory sales to maintain sustainable off-takes. The 
Ivory Trade Control System established through CITES in 1985 was replete with 
corruption and mismanagement. Only states with scientifically based 
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management programs were technically allowed to export ivory; however 
counties without adequate management programs simply moved their ivory to 
neighboring states for export. The quotas established, reported to the Secretariat 
and the Ivory Control Unit, consisted of a report of expected tusk export numbers 
per year. States were required to mark ivory for identification purposes.93 The 
system did not establish or enforce maximum volumes of trade, relying instead 
on range states to determine quotas and their sustainability.94  In 1987 the IUCN 
reported to CITES that nearly 80% of the ‘legal’ ivory in the world market was 
from poached elephants. The monitoring system had failed ad populations 
plummeted further.95  Moreover, to induce more states to join CITES, the body 
provided amnesties allowing states to sell massive stockpiles of illegally ivory on 
the international market. Half of Africa’s elephants perished under CITES failed 
trading and ivory control regime in the 1980s.96  Despite this, the CITES 
Secretariat actively opposed any ban on ivory trading and “lobbied heavily for 
continued trade.”97  
CITES and range states’ failure to recognize scale dynamics as impacting 
the viability of elephants as a species amounts to an abandonment of the 
precautionary principle which was put in place to guide decisions in the 
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international body.98 The precautionary principle states that in the case of 
“uncertainty regarding the status of a species or the impact of trade on the 
conservation of a species, the Parties shall act in the best interest of the 
conservation of the species concerned and, when considering proposals to 
amend Appendix I or II, adopt measures that are proportionate to the anticipated 
risks to the species.”99 The principle reflects a commitment to usage strategies 
aimed at sustainable use within resilient SESs and conservation in 
circumstances of overexploitation.  
Since the early 1980s CITES has consistently underplayed the threats to 
elephants related to trade, and has over-estimated the ability of states to protect 
wildlife and regulate and control trade.100  Trade in ivory has been allowed to 
continue despite mounting evidence that trade is unsustainable, cannot be 
controlled by existing mechanisms (or those anticipated in the near future), and 
threatens elephants in most of their range. CITES clearly did not apply the 
precautionary principle in its decision to allow China to purchase ivory, despite 
reports from CITES research arm, TRAFFIC, as early as 2004 indicating  “a new 
emerging consumer market in China was the principal driving force behind the 
upward trend” in ivory seizures from 1998.101 Unable to achieve consensus, 
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CITES continues to facilitate the exploration of legalized ivory sales. In 2007, in 
the midst of the current poaching crisis, CITES commissioned a study to explore 
a decision-making mechanism for a process to regularly trade in ivory. The study, 
released in 2012, determined trade was sustainable from Appendix II countries 
using only natural mortality, despite clear evidence by the time of publication that 
elephants face a major poaching crisis in most of their range. It also provided an 
outline of how a regulated trade would function under CITES.102 CITES will take 
up the proposal at the CoP in 2016.  
 
Short Term Gains to Resource Utilization 
 
While some states have consistently advocated for a resource use strategy 
bolstered by consumption, ivory sales as a resource use strategy provide only 
short term gains and little economic benefit for range states or local resource 
users.  Longer term strategies which emphasize resource conservation, on the 
other hand, allow range states to benefit from constant and accruing gains to 
wildlife resources. 
                                                                                                                                  
enforcement. However, the moratorium only restricted sales from the four countries included in 
the 2008 sale, leaving a loophole allowing other states to petition for sales.  At the same CoP 
CITES did not address whether or not poaching levels were serious enough to threaten the 
survival of the species throughout most of Africa. See Samuel Wasser et al., "Elephants, Ivory, 
and Trade." 
102
 R.B. Martin et al., Decision-Making Mechanisms and Necessary Conditions for a Future Trade 
in African Elephant Ivory: Final Report, (Consultancy for the CITES Secretariat 24 May 2012). 
Kenya Elephant Forum, "The Cites “Decision-Making Mechanism”,"  (February 2013), 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCgQFjAB&url=htt
p%3A%2F%2Fwww.elephantvoices.org%2Fthreats-to-elephants%2Fivory-trade-fact-sheets-
2013.html%3Fdownload%3D220%3Afact-sheet-7-the-cites-decision-making-
mechanism&ei=XhcPVbL7JYnCggSqo4CYBQ&usg=AFQjCNFbRzP1arYHLxjTYgLZVEs6BmpLq
w&bvm=bv.89060397,d.eXY. 
  
106 
Range states continue to lose out on the full economic value of their 
elephant resources as a result of the illegal harvesting of elephant ivory.  While 
legal ivory sales not only fail to bring states significant economic value, they 
contribute to the increase in demand for ivory, met primarily though illicit 
channels.  Harvesting increases, as a result, negatively impact states’ abilities to 
fully realize the potential of wildlife tourism as a revenue generator.  
Following patterns, which remain relevant, in the pre-ban era most states 
did not realize significant profits from the sale of ivory, even during periods of 
intense harvesting.  African states exported from 600 to 1,160 tons of ivory per 
year from 1979-1986, however all but seven states reported merchandise export 
earnings related to ivory as less than 2 per cent of total receipts.103 The latest 
ivory sales coordinated through CITES continued the trend of low profits for 
range states and big benefits for consumer states and criminal organizations 
African range states earned $15 million from the sale of 152 tons of ivory in the 
two CITES auctions.104 Traders and collectors, in addition to transnational 
criminal groups, in China and Japan continue to reap the profits.105   
At the same time states lose current and future economic values 
associated with elephant viewing, the criminal killing of wildlife reduces security 
and stability in already weak states.  In areas impacted by cross-border poaching 
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gangs- insurgents, terrorists, and other dangerous non-state armed actors, 
populations suffer multiple forms of violence including kidnapping, sex slavery, 
forced labor, torture, and murder.106 Poaching and other organize crimes 
committed by these groups lengthen conflict, destroy local environments, 
severely restrict licit economic growth, and sew insecurity across regions. They 
contribute to the development and perpetuation of ‘war economies’ and trading 
networks which trade all manner of illicit natural resources from coal to 
diamonds, to ivory, connecting conflict zones to regional political economies and 
licit and illicit actors in government and business.107 Where ivory trafficking is 
controlled by members of the political and/or security establishment already weak 
institutions are further diminished, contributing to the general breakdown in the 
rule of law.108  The concentration of illegal power that accrues to illicit actors 
undermines government effectiveness and legitimacy and increases 
corruption.109 
In 2010 the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated 
120 tons of ivory entered the market each year illegally, totaling $228,610,200 
million wholesale, dwarfing state revenues from the legal ‘one-off’ ivory sales.110 
The inability of governance systems to protect ivory resources means poachers 
and traffickers essentially operate in an open access system with few effective 
rules or regulations to limit their resource usage strategies.  
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The SES as an Open Access System 
 
Through most of its history the SES essentially operated as a de facto 
open access system in which “everyone is permitted to harvest a resource” with 
no restrictions on resource use until local governance structures emerged in the 
late 19th and early 20th century.111 Open access systems typically experience two 
forms of ‘free-riding,’ “overuse without concern for the negative effects on others, 
and a lack of contributed resources for maintaining and improving” the system.112  
These patterns are evident across the African elephant SES. Resource use 
patterns for elephant products, both ivory and meat, have been largely 
dominated by market driven resource maximization strategies since the earliest 
periods of (non-African) human/elephant interactions. These strategies 
consistently resulted in over-harvesting and exploitation of elephant resources, in 
some areas to the point of extirpation- local extinctions.  As a result, after 
centuries of heavy hunting for ivory, only 4 million elephants remained in SES at 
the turn of the 20th century, where historically tens of millions of elephants had 
roamed.113   
The earliest extirpations of elephants occurred within the context of the 
Roman Empire. The Romans sought out elephants for their ivory, for 
entertainment, and for their ability to provide services to humans, driving their 
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local extinctions in North Africa and in the Middle East.114  European expansion 
into Africa from the 1600s onwards drove local population crashes first in 
Southern Africa and then in West Africa.  For centuries the ivory trade tracked 
closely with the international salve trade, as both goods travelled the same trade 
routes from remote areas to coastal trading zones where they were sold to 
international buyers.115 During this period European and American markets 
dominated the trade, importing millions of tusks per year in the 1800s during an 
age of industrial ivory production. European markets alone imported 1,000 tons 
of ivory per year during the 1800s.116 Ivory acted as a commodity for harvest and 
export to the industrialized West for manufacture into billiard balls, piano keys, 
hair combs, and other trinkets.117  Then as now the aggregated decisions of 
individuals to consume ivory drove the market while international institutions 
facilitated the trade. The current demand in Asian markets similarly drives the 
trade, and the patterns of use, evident within SESs across Africa, threatening to 
permanently transform the SES at the global scale.118   
Resource utilization strategies began shifting around the turn of the 20 th 
century, transforming interactions between resource users and resources from 
consumptive utilization to non-consumptive utilization. Governance mechanisms 
emerged to create laws and regulations protecting remaining elephant 
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populations.119  Changing fashion trends, the Great Depression, and the two 
World Wars further reduced ivory consumption in the West, easing pressure on 
elephant populations. In the 1970s Japan emerged as a major international 
market, reinvigorating demand.120  In the 1980s public awareness raising 
campaigns greatly reduced demand in the West.  After the 1989 trade ban was 
adopted international sales of ivory plummeted almost immediately, and the 
international market for ivory “went into rapid collapse.’121  
In the late 1980s and 1990s usage patterns shifted as the international 
community drove African governments to adopt neoliberal community based 
conservation models.   After the massive poaching epidemic of the 1970s and 
1980s, the international community, NGOs, and African governments recognized 
that fortress style conservation was inadequate to meet the requirements to 
protect a fugitive resource, in particular in light of quickly growing human 
populations which inevitably conflict with wildlife.122  Community based natural 
resource management (CBNRM) became the preferred strategy to address 
poaching and improve management of wildlife outside of parks, where most 
wildlife lives.123 Wildlife resources within CBNRM programs in many parts of the 
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SES became targets for elite predation and rent seeking as values to wildlife and 
land increased with liberalization.124 
Utilization strategies shifted again in the 2000s as markets expanded in 
Asia with preferences oriented towards consumption. Following earlier trends, 
market driven exploitation began threatening to transform the SES around 2002 
before heating up in 2006 and 2009, and exploding from 2010.125  As much as 5-
7% of the elephant population is being slaughtered annually, and the rate is 
increasing, “shrinking the timeframe for elephant survival across most of the 
species’ range to within 10-15 years.”126 Since 2010, when poaching rates first 
outstripped birth rates, elephant populations have been in net decline.127  
Pressure from the massive international market continue to shrink the SES 
across the continent, transforming some local SESs.  The SES has not adapted 
in response to these perturbations, degrading resilience, which will, if unchecked, 
decrease the ability of the SES to “reorganize in the wake of change.”128  
With the exception of the brief period following the international trade ban 
from 1989 to the early 2000s when poaching rates had declined, the governance 
system and licit resource users have not been able to protect African elephants 
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from market demand for ivory.129  The governance system has consistently failed 
to “establish rules curtailing resource use in the interest of long-term 
sustainability” throughout the SES.130 
 
Roving Bandits in the Open Access African Elephant SES 
 
What Ostrom refers to as “roving bandits,” in this case transnational 
organized criminals trading in ivory, operate across the SES with impunity, linking 
resource users across the global SES with wildlife products.131 In a globalized 
SES, markets develop so quickly that illicit actors can move in, exploit a 
resource, then move out of an area at an accelerated clip before authorities can 
mount a response.132 Ostrom identifies ‘accelerating rates of change’ as a key 
challenge to the management of global SESs. Accelerating rates of change 
refers to how quickly environmental thresholds are passed compared to how long 
it takes governance authorities or others to notice. The speed with ivory 
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traffickers are able to exploit resources challenges the ability of governance 
authorities across levels to react in time to halt the transformation of local 
SESs.133 In a largely open access system, these criminal poachers adopt a 
resource maximization strategy meant to realize gains as quickly as possible 
through whatever means necessary.134 Criminal networks trafficked as much as 
170 tons of ivory between 2009-2014, representing as many as 229,729 
elephants illegally killed.135 
The United Nation’s Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
defines transnational organized crime in terms of crime groups.  Crime groups 
include more than three people, operating for a period of time, with the intention 
to commit criminal actions for profit.136 Crimes become transnational when: 
 their activities take place in more than one country;  
 are planned in one country and executed in another; involves an 
organized crime group that engages in activities in more than one state; 
and 
 when the effects are felt in more than one state.137   
TOC involving wildlife is often referred to as wildlife crime or environmental 
crime. Environmental crime involves five areas including the illegal trade in 
endangered species and wildlife; illegal trade in ozone depleting substances; 
illegal dumping, trade and transport of waste and hazardous substances; illegal, 
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unregulated, and unreported commercial fishing; and illegal logging and trade in 
protected woodlands.138 Wildlife crimes cost the world economy between $70 
and $213 billion per year. 139  
The large scale of ivory seizures, complex shipping routes, expense related to 
organizing and carrying out hunts, the sophisticated weapons used, and the 
organizational capacity to coordinate, containerize, and move large amounts of 
ivory clearly point to the involvement of transnational organized crime. Since 
1989 authorities seized at least 55 large shipments of ivory (over 2.3 tones).140 
Between 1989 and 2010 approximately 21 tons of ivory were seized each year, 
with some spikes in 2002, 2006, and 2009. From 2011-2014 the rates 
approximately doubled to around 40 tons per year.141 As a low-risk, high-profit 
enterprise transnational criminals use ivory to generate hundreds of millions of 
dollars in revenue per year. While in some areas illicit ivory syndicates have 
operated for decades, transnational organized crime became most heavily 
involved in the illegal trade in ivory in the 2000s.142  
Transnational ivory trafficking illustrates how globalization can impact 
resilience and vulnerability of SESs. Criminal networks cross state boundaries in 
the SES and operate as global multinational businesses, connecting local 
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resources to global markets through complex and interlinked networks. They 
penetrate institutions in the business community and in government, including 
those tasked with protecting wildlife. They coordinate through harvesting, trading, 
and transporting networks to subvert national and international laws and move 
the ivory and other wildlife products to market.143 Harvesting networks are 
directed by a financier who can supply weapons and material to poaching 
parties. These individuals are often well connected politically, as evidenced by 
the near complete lack of trafficking convictions across Africa or Asia.144 
Harvesting networks can include poor villagers, park rangers, professional 
hunters, conservation authorities as well as large poaching gangs such as rebel 
groups or insurgents working under the direction of a financier.145 Involvement by 
the political elite in poaching syndicates greatly increases the number of illegal 
kills and can directly contributes to high rates of poaching.146   
Once harvested, ivory enters one of many sophisticated transportation 
networks. Ivory is typically trucked to points of debarkation for consolidation and 
for containerization for shipment to the Far East.  Transportation networks 
encompass a range of licit and illicit actors including professionals in the travel 
industry, ‘conservation’ professionals, attorneys, border agents, shipping clerks, 
businessmen, and government officials. These individuals provide services to 
criminal and terror networks to move illicit ivory from its point of origin to 
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destination.147 These networks move ivory through the blackmarket as they 
would other illicit goods such as weapons, drugs, minerals, or counterfeits.148  
Trading networks further involve a wide range of actors, intersecting with other 
illicit networks including weapons, human smuggling, and the illicit traffic in 
minerals. Criminal gangs trade weapons and cash with insurgents and terrorists 
for ivory.149 150 151 In this way they supply armed groups with more weapons and 
material used both to sustain conflict and poaching activities.152  The emergence 
of armed groups as players in the international SES further complicates solution 
sets by adding a national security dimension to governance challenges. At the 
consumer end in China and other Asian destinations illicit ivory may be 
laundered into the legal system through trading networks or carved in black-
market factories owned and operated by ivory trafficking networks.153 
Organized criminal networks are the physical manifestation of conceptual 
linkages between remote landscapes and wildlife in Africa and the international 
markets decimating them. 
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Shifts in Governance and Usage Patterns 
 
After years of inaction, threats at the international level of the SES have 
begun to drive change in both usage patterns and governance systems across 
the SES, with impacts trickling down to lower tiers across the system. Shifts in 
governance reflect what may be a movement towards new management 
structures, which more closely combine and coordinate governance authority 
across a variety of actors at multiple levels.154 These shifts can be attributed to 
greater awareness of SES dynamics and the global scale over which these 
dynamics occur. 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations and the Management of Wildlife Resources 
 
International NGOs play an increasingly important role in the governance of 
wildlife resources, augmenting formal governance structures across levels of the 
SES. NGOs play a key role in in raising awareness on wildlife issues and in 
establishing an agenda at the international level focused on coordinated action to 
halt the transformation of the international SES and to protect specific local 
SESs.  Their efforts are gaining in momentum and achieving important goals, in 
particular as regards Chinese consumption of ivory and attitudes embedded 
within the Chinese government. 
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International conservation NGOs provide further physical manifestations of 
the global interconnectedness of wildlife areas and international consumers and 
users of wildlife resources. They connect international consumers (non-
consumptive) of wildlife resource users with the local populations across the 
global elephant SES through fund raising initiatives, local programming, and 
awareness raising campaigns.  They exert influence both on state wildlife policies 
and on communities living near wildlife, holding a unique position of authority in 
the international community to set and shape wildlife agendas.155 They 
coordinate internationally, join coalitions, and attempt to impact public opinion, 
shape international institutions, and influence international and national laws.156  
International wildlife NGOs shape awareness on wildlife issues by 
regularly conducting serious studies of wildlife populations and factors 
threatening them which are shared with states, released to global media outlets 
and are available freely online. NGOs conduct research and investigation, 
provide expert scientific and legal interpretations, perform monitoring services, 
and publish regular reports on environmental issues and surrounding 
circumstances to ‘name and shame’ authorities at multiple levels.157 NGOs 
widely publicize important scholarly works focused on wildlife population 
dynamics, using hard data and science to underlie arguments for conservation. 
Some international conservation NGOS conduct surveys of elephant populations 
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to accurately report figures. Others examine ivory markets and explore drivers of 
the wildlife trade.158   
NGOs have successfully framed wildlife crime and the ivory trade as an 
important issue at the international level. For the past three decades NGOs have 
lobbied CITES to provide further protections for elephants and to reject bids for 
further one-off sales.159  NGOs were instrumental in instituting the ivory trade ban 
in 1989.  The lobbying efforts of EIA and the US based African Wildlife 
Foundation (AWF) brought attention to the elephant poaching crisis in the late 
1980s and were instrumental in shifting public attitudes away from ivory 
purchasing.160 A consortium of NGOs played a critical role in the Ivory Trade 
Review Group (ITRG) and its report on the devastating impact on poaching, 
submitted to CITES prior to its formal decision to halt the international trade.161  
The report had a major impact on decisions by the US, the European 
Community, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and the UK, which all announced 
full or partial ivory bans after its release.162 During the latest poaching crisis 
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NGOs spotted trends in wildlife crime before CITES or range states recognized 
either the scope or the scale of the crisis, in some cases as early as 2000.163  
In recent years investigative reporting by NGOs uncovered the link with 
terrorism and insurgency, the militarization of poaching, and the role corruption 
plays in facilitating the trade.164 In many cases without NGO reporting to 
supplement CITES reports little substantive research would exist.  Key 
international wildlife scholars and NGOs began raising the alarm about the 
increase in elephant poaching while CITES research and analysis arms 
continued to claim poaching had not increased as a result of the first one-off sale.  
For example in 2007 scholars argued ivory from over 37,000 elephants was 
entering the market each year, years before a poaching crisis was acknowledged 
by CITES.165  According to Princen, “NGOs appear to be key actors in moving 
societies away from current trends in environmental degradation and toward 
sustainable economies.”166  
 
Increased Awareness of the Globality of the SES 
 
Increased awareness of the interconnected nature of the SES and the 
“planetary consequences” of resource use decisions is beginning to influence 
Chinese governance policies on the utilization of ivory resources as well as the 
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actions of individual resource users.167 Ostrom argues that communities no 
longer need to be small or physically co-located to monitor each other’s’ 
activities, that the internet, communications technology, and other aspects of 
globalization, has not only created larger communities but also contains the 
mechanisms by which individuals can hold others within the SES accountable for 
overusing resources.168 Until this period, resource users and the governance 
system had failed to recognize or acknowledge important scale and level 
interactions, i.e. the link between increased demand and the impacts of over-
harvesting at a high rate over a short period.169 
Evidence suggests Chinese government and consumer attitudes may be 
changing away from a preference for utilization and consumption of ivory, due in 
large part to the work of international NGOs which have been increasingly 
successful in linking transnational environmental crime and its lasting impacts on 
wildlife and communities with government policies and  individual decisions to 
consume wildlife products After intense lobbying by IFAW and other international 
wildlife NGOs in 2011, China adjusted laws on the illegal wildlife trade, and shut 
down live auctions of raw ivory,170 thought to be a major market for poached 
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tusks, in addition to participating in some international level law enforcement 
actions aimed at illicit wildlife trafficking.171   
In light of the global nature of the ivory market, and the unsustainable level 
of demand demonstrated by users in China and other Asian states, international 
NGOs place a particular focus on reducing demand for wildlife products.  
Demand reduction strategies in China attempt to link iconic African species with 
iconic Chinese species to alert consumers of the impact of their choices through 
familiar imagery. Wild Aid is spreading their ivory demand reduction message-
“When the buying stops, the killing can, too” across China, reaching a billion 
people per week.172  The International Fund for Animal Welfare’s (IFAW) “Mom, I 
got teeth” campaign, which depicts a baby elephant telling his mother about his 
tusks, was seen by 75% of urban Chinese.173  Strong and effective demand 
reduction programs can create a norm against use and inculcate a zero tolerance 
norm for any consumption. These campaigns clearly link Chinese consumer 
behavior with the survival, or disappearance, of iconic species. Evidence 
suggests Chinese attitudes are shifting on ivory as a result of such campaigns.174  
NGO appeals aimed at the Chinese government are two pronged, at once 
highlighting China’s role as an emerging world leader and focusing attention on 
the immediate impact the Chinese can make in stopping poaching and shaming 
                                            
171
 CITES, "Operation Cobra Ii Press Release: African, Asian and North American Law 
Enforcement Officers Team up to Apprehend Wildlife Criminals,"  (10 February 2014), 
http://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/news/sundry/2014/operation_cobra_ii_pr.pdf. 
172
 WildAid, Annual Report 2013, (San Francisco: WildAid, 2013), 
http://www.wildaid.org/sites/default/files/resources/WildAid_Annual_Report_2013_Final_Low-
Res.pdf. 
173
 Grace Ge Gabriel, "Promoting Animal Welfare in China,"  (11 August 2010), 
http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/node/2485. 
174
 "With a New Year in China Comes a New Campaign". 
  
123 
the country in the international media for failure to take substantive action.175   
After intense lobbying and local recruitment of Chinese elites, NGOs have been 
successful in pushing the government to enforce some laws against trading in 
endangered species which appear to have impacted levels of poaching in Africa, 
though poaching continues to occur at unsustainable levels.176 In 2011 China 
began strictly enforcing sales of ivory at ‘grey market’ auctions. This action had 
an immediate impact on sales and prices of ivory, which dropped by 20-30%.  
The ban limited liquidity in the ivory market, removing some incentive to invest 
and speculate in ivory.177 In 2014 the government implemented changes in its 
wildlife protection laws to make it illegal to knowingly consume or purchase 
poached wildlife.178 
Prosecutions for wildlife crimes, though still low, are increasing in China, 
with the maximum penalty of life in prison for wildlife crimes. China increased 
local enforcement through the National Inter Agency CITES Enforcement 
Collaboration Group (NICECG) of China, which mobilized over 100,000 
enforcement officers specifically focused on wildlife crime. It initiated both 
Operation COBRA I and COBRA II, large scale international efforts, to bust 
wildlife trafficking rings. The operations resulted in hundreds of arrests.179  
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Following an international trend, the Chinese government burned six tons of 
illegal ivory in January 2014.  China has also stepped up aid to African 
governments battling poachers and increased efforts to educate Chinese migrant 
workers in Africa.180  
 
New Institutions to Address Segments of the SES 
 
The efficacy of governance systems shifts over time.  As Young notes, an 
institution that at one time operated effectively may later no longer serve the 
needs of the SES.181 Range states are adapting to weaknesses in the current 
governance mechanism by creating new institutions and adapting existing 
institutions to address wildlife issues.    Shifts in how range states are interacting 
to adapt to perturbations in the SES are a reflection of the need to bolster 
governing authorities and perhaps realign jurisdictional scales to more closely 
correspond to regions and areas. These adaptations are meant to address a 
fundamental challenge of the global SES- the mismatch between levels of 
jurisdictional authority and enforcement capabilities inherent in a large 
international system. By scaling down governance structures from the entire 
international SES to discrete regional sections range states can focus not only on 
illegal trafficking of wildlife but on long term conservations strategies to sustain 
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wildlife resources. Increasingly supra-state coordination on wildlife management 
within the resource system occurs through regional intergovernmental bodies, 
transfrontier park management authorities, and issue specific regional bodies 
focused on anti-poaching. These organizations do not provide further authority 
on the trade in species, but do play a role in in promoting sustainable 
management practices of shared resources.  
Range states are turning to existing bodies to enforce governance 
agreements on the conservation of the SES. The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
also encompass broad mandates to coordinate environmental policies within a 
framework of regional integration. These bodies generally establish common 
approaches to wildlife and land management across a region.182 Supra-state 
management authorities with specific mandates to conserve and protect wildlife 
resources are also emerging across the SES. Gabon, Cameroon, and the 
Republic of Congo coordinate in the TRIDOM,the Tri-national Dja–Odzala–
Minkébé landscape,of the Western Congo Basin Moist Forest Ecoregion 
(WCBMFE). Cooperation in TRIDOM, formalized in 2005, includes a tri-national 
governance structure over seven total protected areas and over 20 million 
people.183 A transfrontier park operates between Burkina Faso, Niger, and 
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Benin.184 Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration, made up of parks in 
three countries, spans Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC.185 Tanzania and Kenya 
share the Amboseli- West Kilimanjaro and Natron- Magadi landscape where they 
coordinate to conduct periodic aerial censuses.186 The Tanzania-Kenya 
borderlands span 16 protected areas ranging from Serengeti-Mara to Tsavo-
Mkomazi and support the largest bushed savanna elephant population in Africa.  
Further, in 2012 the East African Community Transboundary Ecosystems 
Management Act sets up a commission to oversee the conservation and 
sustainable development of important East African trans-border ecosystems.187 
Several trans-frontier parks exist in Southern Africa, the largest being the Greater 
Limpopo Trans-Frontier Park stretching between South Africa, Mozambique, and 
Zimbabwe.188  Other trans-frontier parks exist across the continent. Cross-border 
agreements include strategies to address environmental degradation, anti-
poaching, tourism development, land use strategies, and other issues which 
transcend physical borders and threaten SES performance.189  
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Other important international initiatives instituted by range states revolve 
specifically around the increased threats to wildlife and poaching. The 1996 
Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal 
Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, includes states in Central, East, and Southern 
Africa.190 The agreement facilitates cooperation amongst the states for 
investigations of wildlife crimes and was integral to the success of the 
international police action, COBRA II.191  In 2013 Botswana hosted the African 
Elephant Summit to gather leaders of African states and wildlife experts to 
discuss urgent measures required to stem the growing illegal ivory trade and its 
impacts on elephant populations in Africa. Attending states adopted 14 ‘urgent 
measures’ to contribute to elephant survival. The measures presented ivory 
poaching as a national security priority.192 That same year ECCAS adopted an 
Extreme Emergency Anti-poaching Plan (PEXULAB) to combat poaching.193 
Under the plan member states created an inter-state coordination mechanism for 
the fight against poaching and urged individual countries to create national units 
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involving all the administrations involved in wildlife criminality. Cameroon, Central 
African Republic and Chad agreed to develop a mixed operational unit to fight 
poaching, conduct joint patrols, focus more on investigations, improve 
intelligence gathering and utilization.194 In 2014 Tanzania hosted the Regional 
Summit to Stop Wildlife Crime and Advance Wildlife Conservation, a forum 
primarily focused on transnational wildlife crime in the region.195  
In most instances cooperative agreements are in the nascent stages of 
development and have not yet proven effective at stemming the illegal ivory trade 
or poaching, or in achieving consensus amongst states on the viability or 
desirability of a legal ivory trade. However, they signify a willingness and interest 
in addressing perturbations holistically and in coordination in the near term 
outside of CITES mechanisms, an important shift not evident in other 
international institutions. These organizations offer the potential to operate as an 
important vehicle to address perturbations at the regional trade level where 
policies can be crafted to address specific threats on an appropriate time-scale.  
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Social-Ecological System Performance 
 
Ostrom notes the social performance of an SES can be described through 
a variety of terms such as accountability, efficiency, and equity. In the African 
elephant SES the social performance- the performance of the human 
components of the SES- can be described as lacking accountability and equity. 
The system is inefficient and slow, and operates as a de facto open access 
system.   
Accountability refers to whether “the central actors can to some extent be 
held responsible” for actions impacting the SES.196 At the international level the 
primary resource users, states and transnational criminals, have not been held 
accountable by CITES for the transformation of the global SES. CITES has not 
held itself accountable for its failure to uphold the precautionary principle and the 
increase in poaching across Africa related to the increased demand and the ‘one-
off sales.’ As an international authority on wildlife trade, CITES retains the 
institutional authority to shape international opinion on the ethics and viability of 
international trade in species. However, the organization has not asserted that 
authority to effectively shift norms around elephant conservation, instead opting 
to defer to technical definitions and mandates in the treaty.197  
At tiers nested below the international level range states and consumers 
cannot agree on the existence of an existential threat to elephants within the SES 
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and have failed to craft a plan of action. Even in the midst of a poaching crisis 
ranges states fail to bolster or enforce laws protecting wildlife, invest in wildlife 
conservation and in measures to protect future economic gains related to wildlife 
viewing. While range states have expressed a willingness to create and join 
regional organizations devoted to coordinated action to protect wildlife, and have 
participated in the organization and running of conferences devoted to raising 
awareness on threats to wildlife, few concrete outcomes can be tracked. 
Consumer states in Asia have begun to address wildlife crime as a serious issue, 
however continue to value cultural interpretations of the utility of wildlife and rely 
on range states to bare the greatest burden of enforcement. Of the stakeholders 
identified within the governance system, international NGOs have accepted the 
greatest responsibility in investigating wildlife crimes and shifting consumer and 
government behavior. 
The governance system and licit resource users have proven inefficient in 
addressing threats to the SES. Coordinated action at the international level only 
rarely occurs and does so on a slow schedule not accordant with the pace of 
destruction within the ecosystem. Information is not effectively gathered or 
shared across the SES, limiting the ability of policy makers to scope 
perturbations in the system or to craft policies to address effectively the 
perturbations. Funding to protect wildlife consistency fails to reach needed levels. 
CITES’ seeming acephalous organization, political wrangling in the CoPs, over-
reliance on unreliable scientific metrics, and inability or unwillingness to enforce 
sanctions on states not in compliance with the treaty limit the Convention’s ability 
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to fulfill its mandate and quickly address wildlife crime. The Convention has not 
adequately addressed the increase in illicit trade, and has even continued to 
pursue the development of a mechanism to regulate a legal trade in ivory.  
African range states, despite the development of cross-border mechanisms, also 
fail to address international trade and have not effectively addressed the illegal 
trade outside of Southern Africa. And even there, poaching rates have increased 
and are expected to increase further in the coming years in the absence of more 
meaningful controls put in place, and as resources are poached out in the rest of 
the continent.  
As currently functioning the SES is not equitably structured in terms of 
apportioning benefits or costs. The range states bear the greatest cost in both 
economic, environmental, and security costs related to the loss of wildlife. The 
removal of elephants and other wildlife limits the ability of states to attract 
tourism, a major income earner and job creator.  Impacts on the environment 
may be far reaching as elephants play an important role in dispersing seeds, 
excavating waterways for other animals, and checking the expansion of forest 
into grasslands and savannahs. Aside from reputational costs, consumer states 
and individuals within them enjoy the continuation of cultural traditions which left 
unhindered may have died out along with high pecuniary returns.  
Ecological performance measures relate to how the resource system and 
resource units react to interactions with the governance system and resource 
users. Overharvesting, the unsustainable off-take of wildlife, characterizes the 
ecological performance of the African elephant global SES. The resource system 
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could easily support more dense populations, in particular in forested areas of 
Central Africa and in the savannahs of eastern Africa.  
The inability to adequately control trade at the international level through 
CITES, and the attendant increase in demand that accompanied the ‘one-off’ 
sales in 2002 and 2008, are transforming the global SES. Without adaptation at 
the international level, begging to occur, elephants will be locally extirpated 
across much of their range.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates that interactions between endogenous and 
exogenous processes contribute to explanations of both vulnerability and 
resilience of the African elephant SES. Both actions of international resource 
users and range states weaken the ability of an essentially open access system 
to combat illicit resource use. The chapter identifies important scale and level 
dynamics impacting the ability of the system to respond to perturbations at the 
international level, as well as revealing how collective action dilemmas impact the 
ability of the SES to effectively respond to perturbations. 
Several scale challenges are identified. First, as Cash notes, is the 
jurisdictional/geographical mismatch between levels and scales in the SES.198  
Mechanisms at the international level lack enforcement capabilities, these 
deficiencies are mirrored at the tiers nested below in state enforcement systems. 
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As a result, the scale of criminal activity has not been met with an attendant 
increase in capacity for enforcement. Again, these failures are mirrored and 
repeated at tiers below the international SES. Laws restricting trade are 
essentially unenforced at all levels. A second scale challenge emerges from 
institutional challenges over the funding required to fully address the illicit 
trafficking in ivory and the funds available. Neither the governance systems 
involved nor non-consumptive resource users adequately fund measures to 
protect wildlife from the current scale of exploitation. Third, the value/knowledge 
mismatch, what Ostrom refers to as a cultural diversity challenge, create 
conditions in which actors’ favor their own preferences for usage despite 
outcomes to the system.199 As a result CITES as an international governance 
authority is limited in its ability to protect species by lack of consensus amongst 
parties on the political, economic, and cultural valuations of endangered species. 
Related is the mismatch between scale of resources required to satisfy the 
market and those available. The ecosystem is clearly not capable of meeting the 
demands of the market and remaining resilient, or possible even extant.200 These 
scale mismatches are complicated by the collective action dilemmas apparent 
within CITES and amongst range states. Their inability to achieve consensus on 
the desirability and viability of a continued ivory trade impact the ability to identify 
or address problems of illicit resource use and overexploitation of resources. In 
the absence of effective rules and regulations the system operates as an open 
access system, with the potential for transformation. 
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This chapter demonstrates how globalization acts as a central feature of 
SESs because of impacts on the resilience and vulnerability of systems.201 As 
concatenations increase between the SES and global markets the system has 
become larger, includes more resource users with varying norms and history of 
use, adding uncertainty and complexity to the system.202  Globalization, 
increasing speed of interactions, increasing the flow of information, facilitating 
global travel and trade, allows for the faster depletion of resources and the 
amplification of ‘mismatches’ between levels of governance and scope and scale 
of resource use across the system.  As in the past, the current SES, at every 
level of analysis, exists within the context of the global political economy and 
cannot be conserved without reference to dynamics at play at multiple levels. 
In the absence of effective mechanisms to adapt to the increased level of 
perturbations across the system, the international African elephant SES could 
transform uncontrolled, shrinking and shifting to a more geographically limited 
space in Southern Africa. Currently the level of harvesting and the decimation of 
local SESs nested below the international level are severally impacting the 
resilience of local systems and that of the whole. Adaptation in response to these 
threats has not occurred on the temporal scale necessary to halt the change at 
the international level.  
Because human actions dominate SESs, adaptability in a system is a 
function of the individuals and groups managing that system across levels. As a 
nested and tiered system, governance authorities below the international level 
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affect both local SESs and the international SES. The following case studies will 
examine how three states- Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana- are adapting their 
SESs’ to meet the challenges facing their national SESs in the context of 
perturbations across the entire social-ecological system. 
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CHAPTER 5 
KENYA 
 
Problem Statement 
 
In 2014 after multiple gruesome poaching incidents within Kenya, the 
nation’s media and international NGOs called on the Kenyan government and 
wildlife management authorities to declare poaching a national disaster.1  
Conservationists shaped the issues facing Kenya’s social-ecological system 
(SES) as a poaching crisis on par with what Kenya experienced in the 1980s, 
when continent wide about 100,000 elephants were poached each year.2 This 
simplistic assessment of perturbations facing Kenya’s SES ignores entirely other 
key factors transforming Kenya’s SES, as well obfuscates Kenya’s role as a 
trafficking hub in the international level social ecological system. Applying the 
social ecological systems framework (SESF) reveals that Kenya’s SES is 
exposed to “multiple, interacting perturbations,” 3 facing threats across levels and 
scales of the SES and from various users and practices. Combined these 
threats, if not addressed, could transform the Kenyan SES in an uncontrolled 
fashion while continuing to degrade the international level SES.4  These 
perturbations relate not only to Kenya’s position within global ivory markets as a 
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trafficking hub and source for ivory, but also stem from legacy conservation and 
land management laws and policies which have proven inadequate to address 
threats, and in some cases exacerbated threats, to the SES. 
Kenya’ primary role in the international SES relates to its emergence as 
an international ivory trafficking hub. Criminal networks link SESs in Central 
Africa to global markets through Kenya. Mombasa is considered the continent’s 
most important ivory trafficking hub.5 Kenya’s weak laws, lack of enforcement, 
and connectivity to global shipping enable illicit traffickers and users.6 Corruption 
and mismanagement within the KWS exacerbate the problem further, allowing 
criminals within the wildlife establishment, in the political sphere, and powerful 
businessman deeply involved in the wildlife trade to continue operating even in 
the face of growing international scrutiny.7  Poaching of wildlife within Kenya 
creates another layer of threat to the SES.  Reportedly, around  500 elephants 
are officially reported poached each year, though the number could be far 
higher.8  However illegal killing has not reached the scope or scale which could 
threaten SES transformation outside of other factors, as in Central Africa or 
Tanzania.  
The greatest threat to Kenya’s national SES likely resides at tiers below 
the international and national level SES, with deep roots in colonial era 
conservation and land use policies. Local resource users within the system are in 
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the process of shifting livelihood strategies, pursuing short term goals of resource 
maximization, which contribute to the fragmentation, degradation, and potential 
destruction of large swaths of the SES.9 In the absence of adaptive strategies, 
this transformation could lock the SES into new patterns. SESs shift into new 
systems when fundamental change occurs, like desertification, salination, or 
forest fire suppression at a large scale, or as in this instance, fencing, intensive 
agricultural practices, and intensive pastoralism.10  Current usage patterns are 
driven by the absence of national land use policies and effective wildlife 
management mechanisms which include participation of local communities in 
decision-making, undermining the resilience and adaptability of the Kenyan SES.  
Centralized national policy and postcolonial institutions have marginalized 
stakeholder participation in efforts to manage the SES and combat poaching. 
Since the colonial era, government policies have excluded local communities 
from the decision-making process and from the ability to enjoy economic gains 
from wildlife, undermining the development of conservation norms, and 
contributing to land use practices incompatible with conservation.11 The open 
access nature of trust lands in particular have increased human-animal conflicts 
and undermined efforts to combat poaching. Subdivision of communal lands has 
further weakened ties between stakeholders as well as the ties of stakeholders to 
the SES. This undermines norms of caretaking for the SES. Together, these 
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factors create strong incentives for stakeholders to overexploit the SES rather 
than conserve it. 
Kenya has responded to perturbations in the resource system, both those 
related to long-term trends of land use, and shorter term upticks in poaching 
related to rising demand for ivory, by adapting resource governance through 
state mechanisms, primarily the Kenya Wildlife Service; revision of land use 
policies and land tenure regimes; and through the integration of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) across the spectrum of conservation.  By 
updating wildlife laws and adopting land use reforms at the national level, the 
Kenyan government put in place structures to address all aspects of the 
challenge to Kenyans resources from overuse to illegal exploitation. Operating 
independently and in tandem with the government, NGOs bolster community 
support for conservation initiatives by acting as a force multiplier within wildlife 
dispersal areas, augmenting most of the services provided by the government. 
Through both the government’s deliberative approach and the more ad hoc 
nature of NGO involvement, the SES may be able to avoid uncontrolled 
transformation.  Adaptation of the governance system in Kenya has the further 
potential to impact the international SES by disrupting illicit trade routes and 
complicating the international traded decimating Central African elephant 
populations.   
Following the SESF, this chapter first describes Kenya’s resource system 
and units, highlighting the small size of Kenya’s protected areas and the unique 
nature of its system, which depends on the ability of human and wildlife 
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populations to coexist.  The following section examines the governance system 
in Kenya and key interactions between the state and resource users, which have, 
over time, contributed to the development of livelihood strategies not conducive 
to conservation.  The following section examines the steps the governance 
system has undertaken to address threats to the SES, which, if successful, could 
guide the transformation of the SES at the national and local levels and decrease 
the role Kenya plays in degrading the international SES.  The conclusion 
highlights the utility of the SESF in tracing patterns and processes that 
contributed to the development of the SES. 
 
The Resource System and Resource Units 
 
The small size of Kenya’s protected areas, the fugitive nature of wildlife 
resources, and the unproductive character of the landscape in general present 
challenges to the management of the SES.12 Compared to most other African 
countries, Kenya sets aside a relatively small portion of its landscape for 
conservation. Kenya’s parks and game reserves occupy 7.5% of the country’s 
landmass, a total of 43,673 km, almost entirely within areas known as arid and 
semi-arid landscapes (ASALs).  Protected areas include 22 national parks, 28 
national reserves, and five national sanctuaries, in addition to four marine 
national parks and six marine national reserves. At the same time, most of 
Kenya’s wildlife exists outside of protected areas, in communally held lands and 
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private property, creating conditions under which conflicts between wildlife and 
humans are inevitable.13 Between 80-85%, live outside of the park system in 
wildlife dispersal areas within the ASALs, along with approximately 10 million 
people.14   
The competition between human and wildlife populations is made more 
intense by the poor quality of the landscape. The ASALs are fragile 
environments, experience low and erratic rainfall, periodic droughts, and low 
organic content.15 Despite the poor quality of the land, human population 
densities remain high in the ASALs at 49.7 per sq/km, increasing each year 
through high birth rates and migration.16  This landscape is important to Kenya’s 
indigenous people and communal landholders, in particular the Maasai, who 
depend on the landscape to preserve their livelihoods and culture.17 
While nearly half of Kenya’s total land area could sustain elephant 
populations fragmentation of habitats is increasing and accelerating as more 
people move into the ASALs, reducing the available resources for elephants and 
other wildlife.18  Habitat fragmentation is “the process by which habitat loss 
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results in the division of large, continuous habitats into smaller, more isolated 
remnants.”19 These smaller and more isolated parcels, even with ideal localized 
conditions, are not as efficient as larger areas of contiguous habitats where 
elephants are free to roam.  Elephants cannot successfully exist in small or 
confined areas because they will, with population growth, negatively impact 
resource availability.20 Elephant habitat decreases and fragments everywhere 
human habitation increases.21  Intensive human use of the SES is also resulting 
in the loss of wildlife dispersal areas and migration corridors to agriculture and 
development, degradation, commercial and subsistence poaching, and human-
wildlife conflict (HWC).22   
The primary contiguous elephant ranges still in existence include the 
northern coast, the Tsavo-Chyulu-Amboseli-Kilimanjaro complex, the Aberdare-
Mt Kenya-Laikipia-Samburu-Northern Area complex, the Nguruman-Mara-
Serengeti complex, and Nasolot-Romoi-Kerio Valley. Tsavo is Kenya’s most 
famous wildlife area, home to the country’s largest population of elephants.23  
Amboseli boasts the continent’s longest studied elephant populations and is 
considered one of the best places in Africa to view elephants.  The park was 
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declared a UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Reserve in 1991.24 Three key trans-
frontier populations exist along Kenya’s borders with Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Somalia. 25  The Tanzania-Kenya borderlands span 16 protected areas ranging 
from Serengeti-Mara to Tsavo-Mkomazi and support the largest bushed 
savannah elephant population in Africa.26   
The current poaching crisis is the second one to hit Kenya in the past forty 
years.  From the 1970s until 1990 Kenya’s elephant herds declined from 167,000 
elephants to less than 20,000.  In some areas the poaching epidemic depleted 
populations by as much as 85 percent.27 The current crisis is not thought to 
include anywhere near the volume or proportion of illegally killed elephants, 
though actual numbers of both extant populations and the levels of poaching are 
in dispute. Kenyan government estimates place the current population of 
elephants at around 35,000 total, with only around 500 poached yearly. 
Conservationists argue the population hovers around 25,000, with potentially 
thousands killed in recent years.28 Individual elephants in Kenya, some of the 
largest in the world, are targeted by organized gangs for their massive tusks, 
some operating transnationally and potentially connected with terrorist groups. 
Two of Kenya’s most iconic elephants, Mountain Bull and Satao, were killed by 
poaching gangs within months of one another in 2014.  Another elephant with 
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over 100 pounds of ivory so far has survived four separate attacks.29  In one of 
the worst poaching incidents in the current epidemic, a Somali gang killed 11 
elephants in Tsavo East national park in one episode.30  Despite these events, 
the KWS has denied there is any wildlife decline, either through poaching or 
otherwise, despite clear evidence that as much as 30% of its wildlife in total has 
disappeared since 1985.31   
In Kenya the domestic and international trade in elephant parts are 
proscribed, meaning the economic value to Kenya of its elephant population 
relates primarily to its tourism viewing value.  Tourists travel to Kenya specifically 
to view the large free-flowing populations of animals, in particular elephants.32  At 
least 12 “hundred pounders,” elephants with tusks weighing over 100 pounds per 
side, live in Kenya.33 Individual elephants can be major tourist attractions whose 
loss extends beyond the individual and can impact the community and the 
tourism industry generally.34  
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The Social System: Governance System and Resource Users 
 
As the SESF literature suggests, examination of the social and political 
history of a resource system can reveal underlying dynamics, which drive current 
processes and patterns of governance and resource use.35 The laws, rules, 
regulations, and investments a state makes for its resource system reflect the 
values held by decision makers and resource users within the system, with 
rippling impacts over time.36  These dynamics are clearly illustrated in this case 
study.  The governance system and resource users in Kenya interact within a 
system shaped and defined by colonial era policies centralizing state control of 
wildlife and restricting and limiting community input on wildlife utilization.  These 
policies continue to inform local norms on wildlife as well as state legislation. In 
Kenya, the SES has been shaped by the interactions between the local 
indigenous Kenyans and colonial leadership; the post-Independence leadership; 
the conservation community, largely white and Western; and nongovernmental 
conservation organizations.  These interactions have taken place over time within 
the context of a waxing and waning global ivory trade, currently on an upswing.  
The social systems have been slow to adjust, within formal structures, to 
changes within the SES related to social interactions including demographic 
shifts, changing land use and livelihood strategies, and increased illicit resource 
use. Colonial era policies and politics of conservation continue to impact 
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conservation norms and the development of land use strategies, impeding 
adaptation of the SES to threats, natural and human.  
Two primary legislative areas, wildlife conservation and land use, 
influence the decisions on conservation and development strategies within the 
SES which state and non-state organizations must either reconcile or work 
around to protect wildlife and habitats.37  This section first narrates early 
conservation strategies in Kenya which continue to influence polices and norms 
on wildlife.  It then briefly discusses concepts of land tenure and land use policy, 
central aspects of SES governance which impact both development and 
conservation decisions amongst Kenya’s resource users. It also examines the 
governance structures, resource users, and important interactions impacting the 
health of the SES. 
 
Colonial Era Governance 
 
Kenya’s current governance structure is rooted in colonial era wildlife 
policies, which ignored local SES dynamics in favor of central control of wildlife 
and wildlife management and the exclusion of local communities. From the 
earliest period of British colonial rule, government policies on wildlife operated 
from the notion that wildlife populations could be best preserved in the absence 
of human populations. Under colonial authority, wildlife was initially viewed as a 
nuisance not compatible with large scale agricultural enterprises. Wildlife, 
including now nearly extinct species, was regularly cleared from land prior to 
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development. Colonial policies eventually developed to adopt a preservationist 
stance on wildlife which valued preserving species over economic utilization. In 
the late 1800s Kenya created its first wildlife reserve with the goal of protecting 
wild animals for future hunting.38  These game reserves were created by 
removing indigenous peoples from their traditional rangelands. Maasai, Kikyu, 
Kalenjin, Smaburu, and Pkot peoples, among others, suffered mass 
displacement as they were shifted onto their own “reserves” to make space for 
wildlife, as well as for large-scale European agriculture ventures.39 Policies and 
practices established by the colonial authorities in the indigenous reserve system 
were incompatible with livelihood strategies and cultural practices, resulting in 
degradation of the landscape and chronic resource deficiencies for both human 
and wildlife populations.40  Under British rule, all wildlife became the property of 
the Crown. All hunting by indigenous people was proscribed and no mechanism 
was created for local communities to utilize wildlife resources through non-
consumptive means.41 
By establishing the state as sole owner of wildlife, colonial authorities 
removed responsibility for conservation from local communities, ignored local 
epistemologies, including indigenous methods of conservation or 
conceptualizations of the relationships between wildlife and human communities, 
and damaged indigenous norms for conservation. These policies of exclusion 
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and displacement were continued in the post-independence period and removed 
important connections to wildlife, the sense of local responsibility to protect, and 
any potential to sustainably exploit wildlife within relevant local contexts.42  
At the end of the colonial period parks were the exclusive haunt of Europeans 
and settlers.  Locals were excluded from decision-making and were not allowed 
to utilize wildlife resources. Early post-Independence polices sought to alter 
these realities, however, policies of centralization, state ownership of wildlife, and 
exclusion of local communities continued.43 
 
Land Use Legislation 
 
Because Kenya’s parks and reserves cover only a fraction of wildlife 
habitats, the land use strategies of those living in wildlife dispersal areas and 
government policies to guide those strategies have important implications for 
conservation. Two aspects of land use are relevant for wildlife management and 
conservation; land policy, and land use policy. Land policy relates to issues of 
legal ownership and tenure.  Land use policy refers to rules and regulations 
established to protect land and water resources from degradation as a result of 
development or other utilization.44 
Land tenure in Kenya is rooted in colonial era policies and the indigenous 
reserve system, set up to remove indigenous people from more productive 
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agricultural zones and wildlife areas. In Kenya, land tenure is classified as either 
public, private, or communal. Public land is held by the government and includes 
Kenya’s protected wildlife parks and game reserves.  Private land is held 
individually as property. By far, most land in Kenya is communally held Trust 
Land in areas formerly set aside as indigenous reserves under the colonial 
authority.45 Nearly all of Kenya’s protected areas and wildlife exist within Trust 
Lands.46   
Trust Lands consist of group ranches and conservancies as well as 
unincorporated and unregistered lands.47 Nearly all of the pastoralists living in 
Northern and Eastern Kenya live on Trust Lands.48 Group Ranches are the only 
legally recognized mechanism to manage land communally. Group ranches exist 
primarily in Maasai areas in Kajiado, Narok, and Amboseli, though they have 
spread to Laikipia and Samburu.49 All of Kenya’s communally held group ranches 
and about 50% of the total livestock population, representing millions of cattle, 
sheep, goats, and camels,50 exist in the trust lands abutting Kenya’s parks and 
game reserves.51  Conservancies can refer to a sanctuary on either private land 
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or within a group ranch or trust land area managed for the purpose of wildlife 
conservation.52  
Over time trust lands have evolved into “open access” systems difficult to 
protect from predatory elites or to manage in a way conducive to conservation. 
Trust Land is managed by County Councils with legal requirements to consult 
communities in decisions dealing with land allocation. However, in practice these 
bodies exclude community members from decisions on resource and land 
management choices. As a result, communities possess “no rights to exclude 
outside users, to make and enforce land governance or allocation decisions, or to 
enter into third-party agreements pertaining to land use.” 53  Additionally, as noted 
below, no provisions within the wildlife law outline a framework for communities 
within trust lands to collectively develop wildlife conservation areas, limiting the 
potential for economic development related to wildlife tourism. The lack of 
protections for community rights and challenges associated with developing 
conservation programs drives land use practices that are often incompatible with 
wildlife conservation.54  
The second concept relates to land use policy.  Land use policy deals with 
the management of land and natural resources aimed towards sustainable use, 
with tenure issues as secondary concerns.  In Kenya, no national land use policy 
existed until 2009, leaving a multitude of statutes and acts to govern resource 
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management through provisions in legislation dealing with agriculture, forestry, 
water, and other areas of land use. These statutes and acts are not only 
disparate, identifying multiple authorities across government to address land use 
practices in an uncoordinated fashion, but additionally often lack provisions on 
sustainable use of the environment or minimum requirements for biodiversity 
preservation. Where such provisions exist for sustainable use practices, they are 
largely ignored and/or unenforced.55   
In the absence of protections for communal land owners, or a national 
policy creating universally applicable standards and usage guidelines for 
environmental resources, protections for the SES are piecemeal and subject to 
arbitrary change.56 
 
Post-Colonial Wildlife Management  
 
Post-colonial wildlife legislation attempted to redress past grievances and 
create a more inclusive governance authority. The first attempt in post-colonial 
Kenya to codify a national wildlife policy was a 1975 Sessional paper outlining a 
comprehensive wildlife management strategy.57 The document moved away from 
solely preservationist policies of colonial Kenya, identifying the primary goal of 
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wildlife conservation to optimize returns from wildlife through aesthetic, cultural, 
scientific, and economic gains.  Economic gains were to accrue both from 
tourism and hunting. The policy noted the importance of the equitable 
disbursement of wildlife returns, and the provision of compensation for losses 
due to human wildlife conflict. 58  It identified the state and wildlife authorities as 
partners with communities abutting parks and reserves in the development of 
compatible land use strategies. In practice, however, the state retained central 
control of wildlife and largely excluded local communities from either decision 
making or revenue sharing.59  
The Wildlife Conservation Management Act (WCMS) passed in 1976 to 
implement the policy, creating the Wildlife Conservation and Management 
Department (WCMD) under the Ministry of Tourism to manage the state’s 
parks.60  Though initially it issued hunting licenses and allowed some limited 
trade in wildlife on private lands, that right was rescinded in 1977 under pressure 
from the international community concerned about uncontrolled poaching. The 
state again became solely responsible for the management of wildlife and all 
costs related to wildlife conservation.61  The WCMD managed the country’s 
wildlife during the massive poaching epidemic of the 1970s and 1980s when 
Kenya lost 85 percent of its elephants and 97 percent of its rhinoceros. With 
                                            
58
 Ibid., 60. 
59
 Western, In the Dust of Kilimanjaro. Didi, "Devolution of Wildlife Management in Kenya to 
Enhance Community Participation: An Assessment of Kenyan Legal Frameworks."  
60
 Doshi et al. 60. 
61
 Kameri-Mbote. 
  
153 
revision to the 1976 wildlife law, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) replaced the 
WCMD in 1989.62   
 
Current Governances Structures 
 
Kenya’s current governance structures, consisting of the Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS) and hundreds of non-government organizations, operate across 
the SES to protect the country’s wildlife and promote sustainable development 
and conservation practices. However structural weaknesses in the KWS, weak 
wildlife laws, corruption and mismanagement within the KWS, structural barriers 
to the inclusion of local communities in conservation, and lingering distrust of 
conservation NGOs impact the effectiveness of conservation efforts. These 
issues are exacerbated by the continuing legacy of colonial wildlife policies, 
which relied on exclusion of local communities and a strict preservationist 
philosophy to create the nation’s parks.63 
The KWS is the lead agency for the implementation of international 
conventions and domestic legislation aimed at conserving, protecting, and 
managing the country’s wildlife across all lands, whether held publically, within 
the trust land system or privately.64  The KWS carries out wildlife policies to 
include all functions related to running the country’s protected wildlife areas, from 
manning gates and marketing Kenya’s wildlife attractions to running community 
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education and development programs to enforcing wildlife crime legislation.65  
The service consists of multiple departments focused on conservation and 
management within protected areas; conservation and management in areas 
outside of protected areas; public awareness and education; regulation of the 
wildlife industry; and establishment, managing, and marketing of economically 
viable wildlife-based enterprises.66 Their primary responsibility is the 
management of the country’s parks and reserves, with important law 
enforcement functions including the reduction of poaching; security personnel 
and conservancy ranger training; and securing park borders, infrastructure, 
personnel, and visitors.67  
The KWS also plays a role in intelligence gathering, investigation and 
prosecution of wildlife crimes, and analysis of poaching and trafficking trends.68 
They work with other law enforcement agencies, including Customs, the national 
police, INTERPOL, the Lusaka Agreement Task Force, Kenya Airports Authority 
and Kenya Ports Authority, in addition to NGOs, conservancies, and community 
governments to enforce wildlife laws.69 They monitor wildlife populations through 
PIKE and MIKE mechanisms as well as through independent research projects 
and biodiversity and habitat assessments.70 Initiatives aimed at the reduction of 
poaching also involve large-scale operations to remove illegal grazers from parks 
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and wildlife dispersal areas, placing KWS rangers in situations of armed 
conflict.71 The KWS considers itself a strong advocate for wildlife issues 
generally. The organization lobbied the government for stronger laws and greater 
capacity within the judiciary and across agencies to bolster penalties for wildlife 
crime. It maintains a firm stance against the ivory trade and support the CITES 
ban.72 
Park management further includes all administrative functions, from 
manning gates to booking safaris and marketing wildlife programs and amenities. 
Community development projects, public awareness raising, and educational 
initiatives are core functions of the KWS.73  KWS engages in community building 
projects both as a donor and as partner in revenue generating enterprises in 
tourist areas.74 It is charged with addressing issues of human wildlife conflict.75  It 
further bear responsibility for managing critical water catchments which provide 
the country’s drinking water as well as its hydroelectric power. The KWS is 
responsible for 90 percent of safari tourism to Kenya and approximately 75 
percent of the total tourism receipts.  Tourism accounts for nearly 10 percent of 
Kenya’s GDP and is the third largest earner after agriculture and 
manufacturing.76   
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Wildlife NGOs in Kenya, both native and international, are some of the 
strongest in Africa, and operate across the spectrum of conservation. The KWS 
lists over 100 other organizations at the local, regional, and international level as 
partners in caring for Kenya’s wildlife. Reflecting more general international 
trends in the last two decades NGOs in Kenya moved from service delivery to 
“direct action, advocacy and involvement with setting government policy agendas 
and other political decision-making.”77 NGOs engage in a range of activities from 
awareness raising, education, monitoring of wildlife, intelligence gathering, anti-
poaching, and infrastructure support. These groups augment the KWS by 
conducting education and awareness raising programs; funding emergency 
wildlife veterinarians; patrolling areas adjacent to parks; removing snares; and 
other services to aid wildlife and enforcement.78 Some specialized NGOs focus 
on tracking wildlife criminals; assist with prosecutions; study trends in illegal 
killing; and contribute to investigation, intelligence, emergency management and 
data management.79  NGOs operating outside of parks and reserves contribute 
to poaching arrests in addition to monitoring the landscape for snares, poison, 
and other illegal trapping and killing mechanisms.80  NGOs are deeply involved in 
driving the development of community based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) schemes, in particular conservancies, over the past two decades.  
Conservancies operate in communal areas for the purpose of setting aside land 
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for wildlife conservation.81  Increasingly NGOs engage in direct payments to local 
peoples to augment human wildlife conflict compensation funds to 
conservation.82 NGOs link the local and national SES to the international 
information landscape, influencing opinion leaders in Kenya and internationally.83  
 
Challenges within Governance Authorities 
 
Multiple issues challenged the ability of the governance system, both the 
KWS and NGOs, to react to perturbations within the SES including weak and 
largely unenforced wildlife crime laws; the lack of legislation supporting 
community conservation; structural weaknesses within the KWS; and distrust of 
conservation NGOs.  Failures within the Kenyan governance system affect not 
only the health of the local SES and its subsystems, but also impact the ability of 
the international SES to respond to perturbations in the system. 
 
Wildlife Legislation Failures 
 
Until recent revisions, Kenya relied on the Wildlife Conservation 
Management Act (WCMA) passed in 1976 as the basis for all wildlife polices, 
including penalties to address illicit resource use and community management of 
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resources. The WCMA proved to be a weak mechanism for addressing the 
numerous threats to the SES in Kenya, with further implications for the health of 
the international SES as Kenya developed into a major trafficking hub for Central 
African ivory 
Before revision to the wildlife law took effect in January 2014, in Kenya 
wildlife crime legislation was weak or unenforced, creating an environment of 
impunity for traffickers and poachers as well as opportunity for corrupt officials. 
Under the WCMA the application of penalties and fines for wildlife crime was not 
commensurate with the value of wildlife products.84 Wildlife trafficking and other 
wildlife crimes were treated like low-level offenses or misdemeanors.85 Few 
perpetrators served time in prison for wildlife crimes, including those involving 
high-value elephant and rhinoceros products. The law did not levy financial 
penalties commensurate with the value of wildlife products. Most arrests 
centered on low-level offenders and did not include kingpins, allowing for 
powerful players in the international trafficking of ivory to go unpunished.86 In this 
climate of impunity, wildlife officials involved in poaching avoided all criminal 
penalties despite evidence of complicity in poaching and trafficking. Lack of 
investigative capacity and official acts of corruption hindered the ability of law 
enforcement or the judiciary to address adequately the scope or scale of wildlife 
crime.87  Weak laws undermined actions by the KWS and NGOs working to 
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safeguard wildlife in Kenya, and allowed the international trade through Kenya to 
flourish largely unhindered.88   
Though not at the level apparent in neighboring countries, both wildlife 
officials and law enforcement officials in Kenya engage in poaching and 
trafficking of wildlife.  Considerable evidence suggests that high-level officials, 
including in the KWS, are tied to poaching and regional trafficking rings.89  One 
ring is thought to control the entire rhino horn trade in Kenya and to be 
responsible for the mass killing of 11 elephants in Tsavo.90  Members and former 
members of the KWS have been implicated in poaching rhino and elephants, 
hiring killers who use inside information to target animals. KWS officials have 
been accused of framing conservationists with the possession of ivory.91 Though 
not reflective of the numbers of officials involved, at least 17 KWS officials have 
been arrested for involvement in wildlife crimes since 2009,92 while other security 
forces are thought to take bribes to cover up illegal trophy hunting.93 Police 
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officers have been arrested with ivory,94 and have obstructed and interfered with 
arrests and investigations.95  
Another key weakness in the legislation was its failure to map out a 
framework to promote and protect community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) programs.96  While recognizing community participation 
as a goal, and economic utilization as a key component of conservation, the 
legislation did not outline a clear path for community groups or private business 
owners to create conservation-based businesses on private land.97  There is no 
legal definition for what a conservancy is in Kenya.98 The KWS and conservation 
organizations could encourage community conservation of wildlife but offer no 
guarantees of state support.99 In what Didi refers to as “silent devolution” 
communities created conservancies and sanctuaries in communal areas in the 
                                            
94
 "Two Nairobi Police Officers Arrested with Ivory at a Thika Roadblock,"  in The Standard Digital 
News (3 May 2014), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000110848/two-nairobi-
police-officers-arrested-with-ivory-at-a-thika-roadblockc. 
95
 In one instance nearly three tons of ivory was seized in Kenya- police officials were accused of 
withholding the name of the owner to help him avoid persecution.  In other instances police 
refused to raid ivory stashes. "'Bosses' Protecting Ivory Smugglers, Claims Officer,"  in Daily 
Nation (6 June 2014), http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Bosses-protecting-ivory-smugglers-claims-
officer-/-/1950946/2339818/-/format/xhtml/-/gioglj/-/index.html. Police are accused of removing 
evidence against Faisal Mohammad, a notorious international wildlife trafficker based in Nairobi 
More cops summoned to court for evidence tampering. Mohammad was arrested in Tanzania 
after being placed on INTERPOLs most wanted list. "More Cops Summoned to Court for 
Evidence Tampering,"  in Capital News (24 December 2014), 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/12/more-cops-summoned-to-court-for-evidence-
tampering/. 
96
 Kameri-Mbote. 
97
 Didi, "Devolution of Wildlife Management in Kenya to Enhance Community Participation: An 
Assessment of Kenyan Legal Frameworks," 20. 
98
 Nelson. 11. 
99
 Didi, "Devolution of Wildlife Management in Kenya to Enhance Community Participation: An 
Assessment of Kenyan Legal Frameworks." 
  
161 
absence of any wildlife or protected area policy or law as not for profit 
companies, trusts, and community based organizations.100 
Other limitations of the wildlife legislation include a lack of compensation 
for victims of human wildlife conflict, with limits both on the levels of payments 
and restrictions on the circumstances under which individuals could request 
compensation. Human-wildlife conflict (HWC) refers both to injuries to humans 
caused by wildlife and to threats wildlife face during interactions with humans. 
Wildlife, in particular elephants, threaten human populations through crop raiding; 
environmental degradation; general insecurity to people; property destruction; 
injury and death to livestock; and injury and death to people.101  Human-wildlife 
conflict also refers to the opportunity costs to conservation or development, 
borne respectively by both humans and wildlife.102  The WCMA did not allow 
payments for infrastructure or crop loss, stoking the animosity of populations 
towards wildlife and feeding into the perception that the KWS and other 
conservation authorities cared more for wildlife than people.103  The law failed to 
reduce human wildlife conflict.104 
Weak laws protecting wildlife and the lack of coordinated land tenure and 
land use policies limit the potential of state and non-state actors to coordinate 
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responses to perturbations in the SES. Instead, the absence of coordination   has 
allowed for ad hoc responses to land use challenges to develop.  The increased 
levels of poaching; clear mismatch between the level and number of wildlife 
crimes committed and convictions achieved; and the inability of the government 
to integrate, harmonize, and enforce land use policies to conserve wildlife and 
habitats necessitated revisions to the law.105  While legislation passed to address 
land tenure and land use issues and to strengthen wildlife laws since 2009, as 
discussed below, the impacts of these shifts are not yet known.  
 
Structural Weakness in the KWS 
 
The wide range of responsibilities, which fall to the KWS stretch the ability 
of the service to ensure conservation goals are met.  Poor management, weak 
capacity, and corruption within the KWS have at times limited the effectiveness of 
the service, with impacts for the domestic and international SES.   
In its own publications the KWS identify problems in the organization to 
include high leadership turnover; corruption; loyalty to a person and not to the 
organization; poor reporting; information suppression; low staff morale; low 
revenue; tribal divisions among staff; low investment; lack of implementation of 
recommendations; low donor support as a result of mismanagement; lack of 
strategic leadership; poor governance systems; negative corporate image; lack of 
structure; and a feeling that NGOs have too much influence on the 
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organization.106 Despite some initial success slowing the rate of illegal hunting in 
the 1990s, the KWS experienced a decade of high turnover and poor 
management at the highest levels, with 13 directors in 14 years, in addition to 
“low staff morale, lack of clear direction and a poor public image... (and) political 
interference, poor governance, inadequate management systems and structures, 
and low revenue occasioned by fraud.”107  KWS rangers often lack basic 
necessitates such as food, boots, fuel, weapons, and ammunition.  In many 
cases poachers are far better equipped.108  The KWS is supported almost 
entirely by ticket sales and foreign donations, despite its wide ranging mandate 
and contribution to the economy. KWS rangers are expected to patrol vast 
landscapes; monitor wildlife; address illegal grazing; and initiate and coordinate 
community development projects in addition to performing menial duties such as 
manning park entrances and performing administrative duties.109 As noted 
above, KWS officials and others in the wildlife establishment have been involved 
in the domestic and international trafficking of ivory and elephant poaching. 
A major failure of the Kenyan government and the KWS relates to their 
unwillingness to collect and share important information on the health of wildlife 
populations, or to publicly acknowledge the scope and scale of elephant 
population decline. Governance of the SES relies on effective monitoring of 
resources and resource use patterns within the system. Without effective 
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monitoring, decision-making at the local, national, and international level of the 
SES are challenged.110 Public officials are loath to reveal the actual level of 
illegal killings or to declare poaching a national emergency.111 They deny a 
poaching crisis exists in Kenya. The last comprehensive summary of the status 
of Kenya’s national herd of elephants dates to 2002 and is likely inaccurate. 
Other trend data is only reliable for a few well studied populations in Tsavo, 
Amboseli, Meru, Masai Mara and Samburu/Laikipia. The KWS relies on statistics 
dating to 2008, at the latest, to determine elephant populations in the country’s 
parks.112 The KWS tightly controls information on poaching incidents within the 
state’s parks, leading to questions about the veracity of collected data and 
limiting the ability to craft effective policy.113  Despite publishing statistics form an 
elephant census in Tsavo which indicated a decline of 1,500 elephants in three 
years in one park/ecosystem, the KWS continues to publish figures stating that 
country-wide only between 300-400 elephants are poached each year.114   
 
Distrust and Criticism of Conservation NGOs 
 
Distrust of conservation NGOs further hampers the ability of organizations 
to collaborate to protect wildlife and participate in conservation initiatives.  
Distrust stems from racial imbalances within early conservation structures, both 
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under colonial authorities and post-Independence, and how those racial 
imbalances played out in relation to the development of the park system.  
For decades, conservation in Kenya was generally viewed as the purview 
of white Europeans. Early wildlife policies built the parks by excluding local 
peoples and creating preservation zones for the use and enjoyment of wildlife by 
non-Africans. Conservation professionals showed little sympathy for Africans 
displaced by wildlife. Through the 1980s most conservationists were scientists 
with little interest in the people and communities living near wildlife areas. White 
Kenyans and expats continue to exert a heavy influence on the conservation 
community in Kenya, and while many are sympathetic to African causes, they are 
accused of lacking understanding of local culture and politics. As the park system 
became more popular with tourists and developed into an important economic 
resource, the politics of race with white conservationists, white tourists, and white 
beneficiaries of wildlife preservation juxtaposed against black Africans receiving 
little economic development mirrored earlier policies under colonialism of 
exclusion from land and marginalization in decision-making processes.115   
Other criticisms relate to the development of conservancies, largely 
pushed by NGOs over the past two decades.  Conservancies are owned by 
indigenous people and leased to managers, often from old colonial families who 
run lodges and safari operations to accommodate foreign tourists.  They may be 
not-for-profit ventures or operate as for-profit concerns. At their best CBNRMs 
employ local people, provide development, educational, and other social services 
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while protecting wildlife and habitats.116 At their worst conservancies are accused 
of all of the ills associated with wildlife and land management in Kenya more 
generally. Multiple examples illustrate the tendency of conservancies to leave out 
local stakeholders in primary decision-making processes, and the failure to take 
into account indigenous conservation norms,117 mirroring the exclusionist policies 
of the central government. They can exacerbate ethnic conflicts if not managed 
properly.118 Despite promises of economic gain, revenue sharing schemes and 
direct payments promised by conservancy founders are often small, inequitably 
distributed, viewed as hand-outs, and are subject to manipulation by community 
councils.119 It is unclear if the livelihoods of Kenyans have been improved by 
participation in CBNRM programs.120  Conservancies are increasingly criticized 
as being elite vehicles with poor track records for sharing revenue or conserving 
wildlife.121   
Challenges within the governance structures impact the ability of those 
structures to react to interactions between licit and illicit resource users within the 
resource system. As a result, those interactions have proven to be detrimental to 
the system and incompatible with long-term conservation of habitats or wildlife.  
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Resource Users, both Illicit and Licit 
 
Applying the SESF, this section identifies patterns and processes which 
developed in the Kenyan SES since the colonial era to understand why Kenya’s 
SES is threatened with transformation.122  Social interactions among resource 
users and the system in Kenya are impacting the resilience and adaptability of 
the system.123 Key factors include changing demographic patterns in terms of the 
numbers of people living in wildlife areas; political and social institutional shifts 
away from communal management of land resources towards individual 
ownership and accumulation; and cultural shifts including in the valuation of 
wildlife and valuation of particular livelihood strategies.124  Together these 
changes have resulted in shifts in land use patterns which, if continued, could 
transform the landscaped and impact permanently the resilience of the SES to 
absorb perturbations.  Resilience in this context refers to both social and 
ecological systems within the SES because the changing land use strategies are 
damaging to the point, in some areas, that over time the land will become less 
productive for all living things it currently supports.125  If the Kenyan SES 
becomes locked into a new system unable to support large amounts of wildlife, 
impacts will reverberate at the international level of the SES.126  
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In Kenya both licit and illicit users within the system contribute to its 
degradation. Licit users negatively impact sustainability of the SES through land 
use strategies which maximize short-term gains at the expense of long term 
sustainability for both human populations and wildlife.  Illicit users take advantage 
of the weaknesses within the governance system, in particular weak laws and 
lack of capacity within the KWS, to exploit wildlife, both poaching elephants in 
Kenya and trafficking massive quantities of wildlife harvested elsewhere through 
Kenya to points in Asia.   
 
Licit Resource Users 
 
The use patterns of the resource users in Kenya’s SES, indigenous 
people and more recent immigrants living on Trust Lands in wildlife dispersal 
areas, have been shaped by colonial policies of exclusion, state ownership of 
wildlife, and weak protections for communal landholders. Carried over into the 
modern era these policies and attendant use patterns, characterized by shifts in 
land tenure from communal to private ownership, have resulted in serious 
degradation of the resource system for both communities and wildlife, 
threatening the uncontrolled and unplanned transformation of the SES. The 
lifestyle and land-use shifts occurring among Kenya’s resource users at lower 
tiers of the SES considered collectively and in aggregate may result in 
transformational change of the SES, in this instance in an uncontrolled and 
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unplanned manner. 127  As the SESF literature indicates, examining and 
understanding cross-scale social interactions can help explain why resource 
usage changes in an area.128 
As noted in the section above, colonial authorities purposefully established 
indigenous reserves and wildlife reserves in areas outside of key agricultural 
zones that whites heavily utilized, meaning the costs and burdens of 
conservation were born by local Africans from the earliest period of 
conservation.129  As Yeager and Miller write, “it was the technologically least 
adaptable African societies that were compelled to make room for the new game 
sanctuaries,” including Maasai and other groups reliant on pastoral lifestyles.130   
They were excluded from management of wildlife resources and not granted 
rights to exploit resources, whether those resources existed on public, private, or 
communally held territory.   
The forced removal of indigenous people from their traditional communal 
lands and the designation of the state as sole owner of wildlife damaged the 
traditional tolerance and value on co-existence felt for wildlife, removing 
important local and traditional connections to wildlife, the sense of the 
responsibility to protect, and any for local communities to practice sustainable 
exploitation.131 Maasai in particular remember forced evictions in terms of illness, 
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death, and destruction and, importantly, betrayal by governmental authorities.132  
For example, the Maasai did not traditionally hunt elephants, or other wild game, 
due to social taboos, except in rituals initiating manhood.133  They consider 
elephants to be the only other animals besides humans to have a soul.134 Forcing 
the Maasai off their lands wakened the link between the people and their land 
and “wildlife became someone else’s property and responsibility.”135 Despite 
mythical associations and traditional beliefs, many Maasai and others currently 
express a “not in my backyard” approach to conservation, they believe in it and 
support it, as long as it does not impact their lives directly.136 As a result, the 
conversion of public goods into state property without accommodations for equal 
access or utilization policies aggravated  “the situation of communities … that 
have been subordinated for long and result in great poverty and exploitation 
without the achievement of conservation or equity.”137 Communities over time 
eschewed responsibility for wildlife management and conservation, after being 
excluded from the process for decades.138  
By centralizing policies on wildlife, the government alienated wildlife from 
communities, negatively impacting indigenous conservation norms and 
removing responsibility for wildlife and the environment from local 
communities, with impacts lingering into the present era.139 
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Shifts in Land Tenure 
 
Because of the unique nature of Kenya’s SES in which most wildlife lives 
outside of protected areas in trust lands and group ranches, the land use choices 
and lifestyle strategies of those living within these areas will impact the 
sustainability of wildlife populations. Some land use choices, such as pastoralism 
and ranching, are more conducive to wildlife populations than others, in particular 
dense settlement and intensive small farming.140 Lacking a national land use 
policy or protections for land tenure, and in the context of weak conservation 
norms, the inability to utilize wildlife, and a history of exclusion from decision 
making or revenue sharing within conservation areas, Kenya’s resource users 
follow a resource maximization strategy built around the subdivision of 
communally held lands with serious negative implications for wildlife and the 
future of conservation.    
Multiple factors have driven shifts in land tenure from communal 
ownership to individual ownership in trust lands over the past decade. Lacking 
the authority to develop and enforce formal rules and regulations for land use, 
and lacking adequate protections at the federal level, trust lands essentially 
existed as “open access,” subject to the predation of elites, illegal land grabbing, 
and exploitation.141  Uncertainty about the future for communal land holders who 
lack adequate protections through the government and have suffered for 
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decades from land grabbing elites, have created incentives to overexploit.142 
Shifting land tenure from communal to private holdings provides some 
protections for communities, and has become widespread in group ranches in 
southern Kenya and has spread to trust lands in the north.  Immigration from 
more overcrowded rural and urban areas placed a premium on land within the 
ASALs, despite their unsuitability for intensive agricultures.143  Shifts in 
indigenous lifestyle choices related to increased access to Western education 
and the spread of Christianity as well as a desire to diversify income strategies 
by pursuing intensive agriculture in addition to pastoralism have further driven the 
trend towards sub-division of communal lands.144  The absence of legislation 
establishing a framework for the development of community based 
conservancies further removes incentives for communal management of land. 
Under individual ownership, land holders can utilize the land any way they deem 
fit, irrespective of whether or not wildlife also may depend on resources.  145  The 
shift to individual ownership of land ushered in “land subdivision, fencing and 
conversion for other uses, particularly agriculture, infrastructure and urban 
development.” 146 147  When human populations were scattered through game 
animal territory these impacts could be more easily absorbed.148  At intensive 
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levels these practices transform the landscape and can lead to precipitous 
declines in many species.   
Sub-division has proven disastrous for human populations and wildlife in 
group ranches.  Farming replaces wild plants and grasses, reducing an area’s 
biodiversity by focusing on a small number of crops. The millions of cattle, sheep, 
and goats within pastoral communities reduce grazing area available for wild 
animals, block their traditional migration paths, and negatively affect large 
predators, creating a situation in which domestic and wild animals compete 
directly for food and water, setting up communities for conflict with government 
policies aimed at protecting wildlife.  Irrigation, fertilization, firewood collecting 
and charcoal production further deplete limited resources.149   The conversion of 
wetlands to farmlands degrades soil, increases use of pesticides and chemicals 
and thus run-off, and requires far more water than human and animal uses,150 
destroying critical habitats.151  It should be noted indigenous people retain larger 
herds of livestock with reduced amounts of seasonal migration on their small 
farms, displacing wildlife directly and impacting wildlife indirectly through 
reduction in forage and slower recovery of forage material after dry periods.152 
Subdivision increases the numbers of stakeholders in a community, multiplying 
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the number of land holders necessary to negotiate with in order to create areas 
with the critical mass needed to protect wildlife.153  
Moreover, human wildlife conflict (HWC) intensifies in densely populated 
areas, with greater numbers of people, crops, and wildlife impacted. Until the 
passage of the new Wildlife Bill, like most other African countries, Kenya did not 
pay for crop, livestock, or infrastructure losses related to human wildlife conflict. 
Loss of life received a small remuneration, between $500-$1,200.154 By not 
compensating victims of HWC adequately, the KWS created the impression that 
animals’ lives were more important than humans, a perception which continues 
to damage wildlife norms.155 These increased conflicts further lessen the 
possibility of successful conservation efforts, already degraded by increased and 
altered land use practices.156 Poaching and the destruction of “problem animals” 
increases in areas of intense HWC as locals attempt to clear the land of what 
they consider damaging animals.157 The removal of elephants and other large 
herbivores, meanwhile, has contributed to a shift in vegetation from grassland to 
bush land and scrubland, limiting forage opportunities for livestock.158 
Privatization of communal lands is occurring as a short-term resource 
maximization strategy. Decisions are made with the current generation in mind, 
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even when it is acknowledged that the decisions are damaging for community’s 
long-term economic prospects and are unsustainable for wildlife.  As Acheson 
notes, however, the question of sustainability only applies if one cares about the 
future.  In the developing world, for many people the only important factor is the 
ability to sustain oneself in the present, not a vague concern about future 
generations.159  The tendency to maximize short-term gains is increased by the 
lack of knowledge on how land use strategies impact the environment.  Even 
where locals noticed negative effects of land use- decreased water quantity, 
decreased access to resources, impacts on wildlife, impacts on livestock, 
increased competition among resource users, and decrease of the overall area of 
the swamps, they express support for immediate exploitation of resources 
because they lack a long-range understanding of impacts.160 The requirement to 
provide for the immediate basic needs of families and households override 
“appropriate long-term survival strategies that may be more sustainable for rural 
landscapes.”161 For example, Maasai around Amboseli increasingly shift to new 
livelihood strategies including subdivision and intensive agricultural usage162 
despite acknowledging these strategies are inappropriate for large scale animal 
husbandry or agriculture.163 Economic pressure also discourages conservation 
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as individuals may be more worried about their current circumstances than any 
future eventualities.164  
The shifts in land tenure towards individual ownership in Kenya’s trust 
lands, if left unchecked, threaten to transform the SES in an uncontrolled and 
unplanned manner.  The fragile ASALs will be unable to support intensive 
agriculture for an extended period of time, placing large human and livestock 
populations at risk from food and water shortages and the effects of 
desertification and soil depletion.  Wildlife populations, lacking access to 
necessary resources, migration corridors, and safety from human wildlife conflict, 
will continue a fast and steady decline. 
 
Illicit Users 
 
In Kenya illicit actors associated with trafficking and poaching of wildlife 
are embedded in networks of criminals, corrupt government officials and 
businesspeople, and non-state armed groups which link local SESs to global 
resource users. These networks also connect to harvesting and facilitation 
networks across the continent decimating wildlife populations in Tanzania and 
Central Africa.165   Weak protections for wildlife and the lack of enforcement of 
trafficking laws enable this trade to occur.166 
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Mombasa has emerged as the primary hub for moving ivory from central 
and east Africa to Asia by air and by ship.167  In 2013, Kenya seized over 13 tons 
of ivory, likely representing only about 10 percent of the ivory flowing through the 
country.168  Estimates suggest as much as $300 million worth of ivory flowed 
through Kenya in 2013.169 According to Vira, Ewing, and Miller, “a significant 
amount of evidence suggests the collusion of Kenyan state, security, and political 
officials in the ivory poaching trade.”170  Without the complicity of individuals in 
government, in the conservation industry, or the assistance of local communities, 
poachers would be unable to “find and poach so many elephants so quickly.”171 
Multiple reports have been released indicating links to the highest levels of the 
political establishment. Members and former members of the KWS have been 
implicated in poaching rhino and elephants, hiring killers to target animals using 
inside information.172  At least 17 KWS officials have been arrested for 
involvement in wildlife crimes since 2009.173  Security agencies are accused of 
accepting bribes to cover up illegal trophy hunting.174  At the same time, the KWS 
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has investigated the role conservancies may play in poaching.175  High-end 
resorts are thought to engage in illegal trophy hunting.176   
The ivory trade in Kenya follows the continental model of Africa-based, 
Asian run transnational crime described in more detail in Chapter 4.177  Asian 
transnational criminal networks, dominated by the Chinese, are thought to be 
responsible for most of the ivory trade in and through Kenya.178 Africans kill 
wildlife and transport ivory and other wildlife products to consolidation points. 
Once the animals are killed, poachers coordinate through middle-men with 
brokers and consolidators who prepare the ivory for shipment overseas.179 
Locals receive little pecuniary benefit and experience most of the risk associated 
with illegal killing of wildlife.180  They may poach opportunistically, or as part of 
small organized poaching gangs with specific targets.181 Poachers target the 
largest bulls with the biggest tusks as well as smaller elephants, including 
juveniles, with very small tusks. Poachers engage in mass killings when possible, 
as evidenced by multiple instances in which entire families of elephants have 
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been gunned down in a single episode in both Tsavo and Amboseli.182 Ivory 
kingpins in Kenya profit considerably more than low-level poachers; however 
scholars calculate even when profits reach into the millions those numbers 
represent about 6 percent of the profit of Asian traffickers.183 
Poachers include local indigenous people, transnational poaching gangs, 
and corrupt officials.  Kenyan poachers both adapt old technologies and take 
advantage of new technologies to kill and traffic wildlife. They use cell phones to 
communicate with handlers and other facilitators to track and kill wildlife, and to 
coordinate transportation and consolidation.184 While poachers continue to use 
automatic weapons when possible to kill wildlife, they have also adapted to new 
monitoring techniques and sensors placed in parks.185 Electrocution, poisoning 
by food and water, spears, and poisoned arrows kill the majority of elephants in 
Kenya.186  Poachers also target other valuable species, in particular rhino, for 
export from Kenya.  Porous international borders allow poachers from Tanzania 
and Somalia to enter Kenya to kill wildlife illegally.  Some evidence suggests that 
Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group based in Somalia, poach elephants and traffic ivory 
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to support their violent conflict activities.187  According to Vira, Miller and Ewing, 
“Kenyan poachers are particularly notable for their high levels of violence when 
confronted with ranger forces. Shootouts, ambushes, and ranger casualties are 
no longer uncommon, while poachers appear equipped with increasingly better 
information, equipment, and weaponry.”188 
A considerable amount of poaching in Kenya is attributed to illegal herders 
and grazers invading the group ranches and conservancies where most elephant 
poaching in Kenya occurs.  They both poach wildlife and harbor poachers as well 
as provide a cover for their illegal activities.189 These herders sew insecurity 
through armed cattle rustling and banditry.  Heavily armed, illegal herders often 
pose a significant and overt threat to park security,190 in particular when park 
security and other law enforcement officials seize portions of their herds.191  
Herders degrade the landscape further by bringing in tens of thousands of 
livestock to conservation areas in search of forage and water. In the worst cases 
they are known to attack park infrastructure, destroy fencing, and set fires.192  
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Illegal herders plague conservation areas across the country, and in some areas 
are the primary parties responsible for poaching.193 
While licit users of the resource system contribute to immediate and large-
scale damage and to the transformation of the SES, illicit users play a more 
pernicious role through illicit trafficking of wildlife, illegal harvesting, and intensive 
and unsustainable use of fragile ecosystems, contributing to wildlife declines, 
insecurity and corruption.   
 
Resilience, Adaptation, Transformation  
 
In response to the perturbations facing the Kenyan SES as a result of 
increased trafficking, poaching, and shifting land use strategies, the governance 
system is adapting and transforming in an effort to maintain resilience in the 
SES. Per the SESF, systems can transform either in an uncontrolled manner, or 
utilize crisis as an opportunity to adapt and adjust systems and structures to 
meet challenges.194  Transformation draws on adaptation and the management 
of resilience occurring at multiple levels and across scales.195  As illustrated 
below, the Kenyan governance system appears to be adapting to manage the 
SES to avoid uncontrolled transformation. Examples of adaptation within the 
governance system include reshaping laws, rules and regulations to react more 
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quickly to perturbations in the system, as well as altering the balance between 
central and local control of resources in order to manage them at the appropriate 
level.  Adaptations which create a more resilient SES among users include 
adjustments to land use strategies to ensure conservation of the resource for 
both human and wildlife communities. Because the effects of system dynamics 
can take years to ripple through the system the success of some shifts will not be 
immediately obvious to observers.  For example, the results of devolution of 
authority to stakeholders in the community will take years to emerge.  Other 
shifts in governance, such as alterations to legal codes and changes in law 
enforcement practices, can be judged effective or ineffective in the short-term 
through the study of arrests and convictions.  
Whether ultimately successful or not, adaptation and transformational 
change in Kenya is occurring as stakeholders recognize the failure of policies 
and the imperative to adopt new thinking and new strategies to avert uncontrolled 
transformation.196 Within the international level of the SES, CITES sanctions and 
the spotlight provided by international NGOs on issues facing Kenya’s SES are 
driving change. At the same time the strong national wildlife establishment, made 
up of the KWS and NGOs, has been instrumental in raising awareness on issues 
facing wildlife in order to adapt and transform the system. 
This process is occurring in Kenya both through deliberative shifts on 
governance polices and through ad hoc solutions developed piecemeal by 
resource users within the system.  At the national level, legislation to address 
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challenges facing wildlife, both in terms of enforcement and within the broader 
context of land tenure and land use, have passed and are in the process of 
implementation. At the community level conservation programs have grown in 
the absence of formal legal mechanisms and now occur across large swaths of 
Kenya’s trust land.  If the reforms Kenya has embarked on have the intended 
effect, changed land-use strategies, strengthened laws, effective resource 
controls, and national land policy, they will contribute to the transformation of the 
SES to a stronger system able to absorb disturbances by addressing the 
linkages between levels and scales of the SES.197 As Cash notes, management 
plans that address scale issues and linkages across levels are more successful 
at both assessing problems and finding sustainable, politically palatable, 
solutions. 198 
Both immediate and longer-term shifts are occurring. These shifts have 
occurred with progressively increasing urgency over the past five years and 
include actions ranging from the creation of a CITES mandated Action Plan; 
passage of a strong wildlife conservation management bill; development of a 
robust and inclusive National Elephant Management Plan; increased and 
proactive oversight of the KWS by national authorities; increased cross border 
collaboration; successful public awareness raising initiatives; actions to mitigate 
HWC; and importantly, legislative movements to devolve authority and address 
contentious land tenure issues.   
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Kenya cut poaching levels and increased enforcement of anti-trafficking 
measures to include arrests and seizures of ivory and other illegal wildlife 
products. In 2014 poaching of elephants decreased fifty percent over the 
previous year.199  
 
CITES and International NGOs 
 
CITES named Kenya in the ‘gang of eight’ in 2013, contributing to a series 
of shifts in governance through public “naming and shaming.”  Along with 
Uganda, Tanzania, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and China, CITES threatened 
sanctions and instituted requirements that each state develop a national action 
plan to address both poaching and trafficking. CITES required action plans to 
address “legislation and regulations, national and international enforcement, 
outreach and public awareness.”200  Within one year of being so tasked, Kenya 
drafted an action plan meeting most of CITES requirements.  Of the fourteen 
actions Kenya identified under the framework, CITES rated six as “substantially 
achieved,” five “on track” for achievement, one “challenging” and two were rated 
as “unclear.” CITES noted Kenyan achievements in legislation and regulations, 
enforcement at the national level and inter-agency collaboration, outreach and 
public education, and reporting.201 According to the KWS, after the national 
                                            
199
 John Muchangi, "Kenya: Poaching Reduces by Half, New Kws Figures Show," in AllAfrica.com 
(28 January 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201501281456.html. 
200
 CITES, "Eight Countries Submit National Action Plans to Combat Illegal Trade in Elephant 
Ivory,"  (16 May 2013), http://cites.org/eng/news/pr/2013/20130516_elephant_action_plan.php. 
201
 "Sixty-Fifth Meeting of the Standing Committee: Interpretation and Implementation of the 
Convention: Species Trade and Conservation: Elephants: Elephant Conservation, Illegal Killing 
and Ivory Trade."  
  
185 
action plan was put in place seizures of trafficked ivory in East Africa, in 
particular Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, increased 80 percent.202  Kenya was 
removed from the ‘Gang of Eight’ list after only one year.203  
International and national conservation organizations have loudly called 
out Kenya for its role in trafficking and its weak wildlife laws. One devastating and 
influential report shed light on Kenya’s role in the international trafficking of ivory 
and the clear complicity of officials in the act.204  Adding to the pressure to adjust 
tactics meaningfully, Wildlife Direct published a scathing report detailing the 
inefficacy of Kenya’s outdated and weak wildlife laws. These laws essentially 
allowed poachers and traffickers to operate with absolute impunity, impervious to 
even small fines or minimal jail sentences. For their part the KWS, in a series of 
papers published in the George Wright Forum, on their website, and in their 
published strategies, recognize and acknowledge threats related to habitat 
fragmentation, overcrowding in fragments, loss of biodiversity, and increasing 
threats from poaching as well as shortfalls in the management and capacity of 
the organization.  Lastly, the multitude of NGOs operating on the ground across 
Kenya’s conservancies and group ranches provide invaluable information both to 
the Kenyan government and the broader international community of the threats 
facing the SES. 
 
                                            
202
 Kenya Wildlife Service, "Gang of Eight Now Expanded to Gang of Nineteen," 2014 
http://www.kws.org/export/sites/kws/info/news/2014/Download/Gang_of_eight_now_expanded_to
_gang_of_nineteen.pdf. 
203
 Muchangi, "Kenya Escapes Cites Wildlife Sanctions". 
204
 Vira, Ewing, and Miller. 
  
186 
Increased Capacity within Wildlife Crime Legislation and the KWS  
 
By bolstering wildlife crime legislation and strengthening the KWS, the 
Kenyan government is attempting to address perturbations within both the 
domestic and international level SES.  
Debated for years, Kenya passed the Wildlife Conservation and 
Management Act (WCMA) in December 2013.  It came into effect in January 
2014 and addresses shortfalls in every aspect of wildlife crime legislation and 
enforcement. The law increased penalties for poaching and trafficking,205 with 
penalties up to life in prison for poaching elephants or rhinos.206 The law reduced 
the period traffickers wait between prosecution and trial, increased efforts to 
report wildlife crime, and strengthened local law enforcement capacity.207 The 
law increased collaboration between law enforcement agencies and established 
an Interagency Anti-Poaching Unit that combines elements of the national police 
and KWS, deployable to poaching hotspots and border points, and provided 
funding to recruit and train 1,000 new rangers.208 Kenya instituted training for 
members of the judiciary and prosecutors.209 In an effort to bolster investigative 
capacity, Kenya developed networks of informers and reached out to the public 
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to report wildlife crimes. 210  The introduction of sniffer dogs at entry and exit 
points into Kenya has increased the seizure rate of ivory and other illegal 
trophies immediately. With funding from Google and in partnership with the 
Consortium for the Barcode for Life, an international NGO, Kenya is in the 
process of upgrading and updating its forensic lab to aid in investigation of 
wildlife crime.211  This effort will increase investigative capacity and allow Kenya 
to monitor more closely its ivory stockpile through DNA analysis.212 Regulations 
specifically targeting illegal grazers were included in the 2013 WCMA, allowing 
the KWS and other law enforcement agencies to act with authority to expel 
people and livestock from protected areas.213 The KWS cracked down on illegal 
grazing, pushing out large numbers of cattle from Tsavo, Amboseli, and other 
key wildlife areas.214  In the first six months of 2014, over 250 poachers were 
arrested,215 and the most prominent trafficker in Kenya was arrested in 
December 2014.216   
Under increased scrutiny from international organizations, the Kenyan 
government is actively managing the KWS to ensure shifts in the law and the 
capacity-building measures put in place are implemented. After allegations of 
mismanagement within the KWS emerged in 2014, the national government 
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initiated an investigation into the agency’s shortfalls, established a committee to 
investigate the problem of poaching within the country’s parks and dispersal 
areas, and committed to hiring hundreds more personal for the service.217 The 
committee identified multiple areas for improvement including the budget, 
payment for rangers, fencing policies and infrastructure, lack of equipment, 
shortfalls within intelligence, community engagement, and corruption within the 
procurement sections of the KWS.218  The government increased the KWS 
budget by 13 percent, though the service continues to rely on revenue generating 
schemes within the park system and donors for the majority of funding.219 
 
Addressing Human Wildlife Conflict 
 
Both through legislative changes and proactive actions by NGOs, the 
governance system is working to address human-wildlife conflict.  In response to 
changing trends in conservation and a recognition of the disconnect between 
Kenyans and their national wildlife, the KWS’s strategy to address human-wildlife 
conflict evolved over time from one focused primarily on safeguarding animals’ 
lives to an approach focused on prevention. Current approaches to addressing 
HWC consist of both compensation payments for losses, and increased 
opportunity for economic gains to offset opportunity costs related to conservation. 
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The 2013 WCMA revised compensation schemes to allow for communities 
and individuals to apply for remuneration related to the loss of crops and 
livestock.220 The bill greatly increased the amount of money available for claims 
to KSH5 million for death and KSH2-3 million for permanent injury or death. 
Claims for compensation of crop, livestock or infrastructure loss can be made 
through the local County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committees 
(CWCC) for adjudication and ruling.221 Investments in equipment and technology 
are steadily reducing HWC. 222 
Other strategies to prevent or address HWC include a focus on protecting 
crops and infrastructure through fencing and moats to prevent conflict in 
agricultural areas.  In the worst cases animals may be translocated to prevent 
conflict, or be eliminated. The KWS instituted a mobile rapid response team 
specially trained to address HWC, equipped to deal with problem animals to 
swiftly respond to community complaints.223 Through extensive conflict mapping 
the KWS has identified high conflict areas where large populations of human 
populations intersect and interact with wildlife populations in order to anticipate 
and prevent problems. They monitor HWC through a database to track incidents. 
224  
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Conservation organizations and conservancies increasingly offer 
compensation due to livestock or property loss, in addition to opportunity costs 
related to not utilizing land for alternate uses.225  Insurance funds contributed by 
the government, commercial tourism operators, NGOs and or local stakeholders 
are seen as a way to provide finance and, literally, stake-holder buy-in to the 
process.226  They further mitigate HWC through community education outreach 
programs, eco-tourist development, direct payments for livestock and 
infrastructure loss, direct payments for opportunity costs, and through multiple 
mechanisms to separate physically humans and wildlife.227 For example, to 
prevent elephants from over-grazing in certain areas and degrading the 
landscape for humans and wildlife once traditional migration routes were cut off, 
a group of conservancies and trusts, along with the KWS, created an elephant 
migration corridor with an “elephant underpass” to allow elephants to safely pass 
under a roadway and to other parts of their habitat.228 Successful ventures are 
credited with reducing human/wildlife conflicts as well as mitigating other 
resource conflicts within communities.229 This reduction is important because 
when communities feel like they cannot address human/wildlife conflict 
successfully they are less likely to support conservation initiatives and may in fact 
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actively oppose the presence of wild animals, hindering efforts for 
conservation.230 
While compensation programs are criticized for being reactive, inefficient, 
and not financially secure, increasingly the KWS and the conservation 
community believe the best way to stem HWC is by increasing the opportunities 
for communities to benefit financially from wildlife resources and through a 
process of devolving authority to local communities. 231 
 
Land Use Policy Changes 
 
Over the past five years Kenya has significantly altered legislation and 
policy to address deeply rooted issues of land use, land tenure, and rights to 
wildlife utilization, in an effort to create a more inclusive wildlife governance 
system and to foster long-term utilization strategies.  The 2009 National Land 
Policy, the 2010 Constitution, and the 2013 WCMA all provide mechanisms to 
increase community participation in wildlife management through the devolution 
of some authority to lower tiers of the SES.  By addressing gaps and failures in 
legislation at the national level, Kenya may be able to overcome scale challenges 
and adopt policies which address both the needs of local users and long term 
goals of sustainability within the SES. These shifts, while ambitious, are likely to 
prove the most challenging because they attempt to dismantle tendencies 
towards centralization of decision-making authority which have been 
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institutionalized within Kenya’s SES from its earliest period. As evidenced below, 
it is unresolved whether devolution is occurring ‘in name only’ or if central 
authorities are actually creating avenues for significant stakeholder input in 
decision-making processes. 
Issues impacting resource users in dispersal areas include the lack of 
protections for communal landholders and the lack of legislation to frame the 
creation of private conservation organizations in communal lands.  Kenya is 
addressing these challenges through formalized devolution of some aspects of 
wildlife and land management and by strengthening land tenure laws. Devolution 
“refers to the relocation of powers to lower levels while a related concept of 
decentralization refers to the relocation of administrative functions from central 
location to lower levels.”232 The goal of devolution is to enhance citizen 
participation, increase the power of local communities and individuals to make 
decisions, and strengthen state-society relations across sectors.233  Devolution of 
authority to local communities creates avenues for communities to contribute to 
decision-making on wildlife issues and benefit financially from wildlife resources, 
both important for encouraging land-use practices conducive to conservation.  
Devolution also has the potential to re-embed indigenous conservation norms 
into decision-making on wildlife policies at the local level.234 
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Until the constitutional reform of 2010, the Kenya’s constitution did not 
directly address wildlife or provide guidance on conservation.235 Under Kenya’s 
new constitution, important aspects of environmental management are being 
devolved to provincial and district levels. The KWS decentralized authority over 
the country’s eight conservation areas, Western, Mountain, Tsavo, Southern, 
Coast, Central Rift, Northern, and Eastern.236 Provincial and District Environment 
Management Committees are responsible for protecting water sources; carrying 
out impact assessments; promotion of environmental awareness and mitigation 
strategies to prevent environmental degradation; and coordinating between 
NGOs and government agencies; among other key tasks formerly controlled by 
the central government.237   
The 2013 wildlife law, in line with the constitution, legislates opportunities 
for local participation in wildlife management. The bill directs the KWS to set up 
County Wildlife Conservation Committees (CWCC) responsible for developing 
management plans, registering community and private conservancies, and 
ensuring that the costs to wildlife do not outweigh benefits.238  The new law also 
allows for local communities to create Community Wildlife Associations (CWA) to 
advance community participation in wildlife management and facilitate conflict 
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resolution within specific regions. In addition, the bill provides a mechanism for 
local communities to apply for licenses to partner with the KWS and investors to 
utilize wildlife resources through bio-prospecting, a potential income generator.239  
These partnerships, if successful, could provide incentives to focus on long-term 
preservation.240  
To create greater protections for communal land holders and to 
disincentivize the privatization of communally held land, Kenya passed a National 
Land Policy (NLP) in 2009.  The NLP simplified land categories into communal, 
public, or private lands, giving each land tenure category equal recognition under 
the law and providing protections for customary land tenure.  The policy 
“repudiates the focus on converting customary tenure into individual 
ownership.”241 Importantly, it provided, along with shifts in the WCMA, the legal 
framework necessary for communities to create community-based conservation 
organizations allowing economic benefits from wildlife utilization. The NLP 
acknowledge customary and traditional resource management rules and 
practices, and requires land use regulations to consider conservation and not 
simply opportunities for economic exploitation. The policy asserts that 
investments in community lands must benefits local communities and their 
economies.242  The NLP is supported by the 2010 Constitution, which adopts 
provisions securing community land rights, greater accountability, and increased 
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decision making authority.243 Land ownership and management was a key issue 
driving Kenya’s new constitution, adopted in 2010.244  
It is unclear to what extent these changes in law and policy will impact 
resource users within the system.  Following past patterns, even the devolved 
authorities are delegated and limited, with most authority remaining with the 
central government.  An assessment published in 2014 indicated governance of 
natural resources and environmental policies had not fully devolved to the local 
level in all counties due to institutional weakness and limited capacity.245  In 
terms of environmental regulations, county governments are assigned an 
implementation role, not a policy setting role, undermining the basic tenets of 
devolution. 246   
Similar issues have surfaced over implementation of the NLP. The 
Constitution requires legislation to provide for the establishment of community 
lands to be passed by 2015.  The Community Land Bill, under development, and 
other supporting legislation, serves to implement the NLP. The Community Land 
Bill is meant to codify protections for communal landholders and to develop 
institutions for community input; however the institutions so far developed are not 
representative of community membership and have not developed decision-
making processes conducive to community involvement.  The bill further fails to 
outline clearly rules for conversion of land from communal to private ownership, a 
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major problem facing wildlife conservation currently.247  The law does not require 
communal councils to have land-use plans, another shortfall with impacts for 
conservation.248 
Under the constitution and the WCMA the national government remains 
responsible for the protection of the environment and wildlife,249 remains the 
owner of all wildlife in Kenya, and retains most of its management rights over 
wildlife. On matters relating to wildlife and the environment, national laws 
override county laws.  By the distribution of functions, wildlife management 
remains the purview of the central government, not local governments.250  
Critics have seized on key aspects of devolution mechanisms to highlight 
the challenge in mitigating centralizing tendencies. Didi argues aspects of wildlife 
law actually weaken opportunities for participation by implementing strict 
registration, permitting and licensure requirements.251  Under the WCMA 
communities may not undertake any tourism initiatives, educational initiatives, 
filming, or commercial photography without a license from the KWS.  All non-
consumptive wildlife utilization schemes must be registered with the CWCCs and 
obtain a permit from KWS. Under the WCMA the KWS retains the authority to set 
up CWCCs and to staff them with multiple representatives from the central 
government, skewing their makeup towards the KWS and the central 
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government, with fewer positions allocated to local participants. Though locals 
create the Community Wildlife Associations (CWAs), all CWAs are subject to 
licensure by the KWS and registration through the CWCC, again placing 
authority within the central government. Lastly, prior to the bill’s passage local 
authorities managed the land and tourism aspects in national reserves, while 
KWS undertook the bulk of wildlife management activities. The Wildlife Bill 
moves all national reserves to national parks, eliminating the role of local 
authorities in the reserves. While the new wildlife bill does provide a legal 
framework for the development of conservancies, it does not ultimately devolve 
authority to them. The KWS retains authority to oversee tightly their management 
plans. The fear among supporters of devolution is that the KWS will simply not 
create the councils and not implement the primary avenue for devolution and 
decentralization. 252   
Ultimately, while the Constitutional Reforms, the NLP, and Wildlife Act 
together provide greater opportunity for community involvement, it is limited to 
“co-management” and not to autonomous or devolved authorities.253  While 
authority is not devolving to the extent originally intended, communities are 
increasingly able to take a part in conservation strategies and to benefit 
economically from wildlife. Expanding the roles and responsibilities of 
communities living near wildlife to include the conservation and preservation of 
wildlife and habitats has the potential to increase the success rate of 
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conservation programs in unprotected dispersal areas outside of the national 
park or reserve system, where most wildlife lives.254 
 
Increased Cross Border Collaboration 
 
Because of the global nature of the SES and the regional linkages 
between Kenya’s resource system and that of neighboring countries, cross-
border collaboration remains a priority.  Managing cross-border elephant 
populations is a particular concern, addressed though agreements with Tanzania 
to count and monitor populations in the Amboseli-Kilimanjaro, Tsavo-Mkomazi 
and Serengeti-Masai Mara ecosystems, all of which span borders. To address 
trafficking, in 2014 police commissioners from several East African states met in 
Nairobi to participate in training to improve intelligence gathering, combat 
terrorism, and intercept contraband, including ivory.255  Late in 2014 it was 
announced Kenya would house the Environmental Security Office of Interpol in 
Nairobi, responsible for increasing collaboration between police organizations 
focused on wildlife trafficking across the region.  The expansion of Interpol in 
East Africa is in part meant to stem the rising tide of poaching and other wildlife 
crime.256  At the international level, Kenya increased collaboration with China to 
enforce wildlife laws, conduct investigations, and raise awareness amongst 
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Chinese nationals in Kenya about the ramifications of ivory consumption.257 In 
terms of cross-border collaboration, funding from private organizations increase 
the ability of conservation stakeholders to address perturbations in the SES and 
to increase the capacity of local and national services to protect wildlife. In 2012 
representatives of government wildlife organizations from Kenya and Tanzania, 
community based resource management programs, and community 
representatives from across the region met to discuss wildlife management 
issues, in particular poaching. 258 
 
The 2012 National Elephant Strategy  
 
In response to the complex threats facing the SES, in 2012 Kenya 
developed its first National Elephant Strategy. Past policies focused on a narrow 
subset of threats, primarily associated with poaching.  Acknowledging the more 
complex problems facing the SES currently, the new strategy addresses threats 
related to “a growing population, climate change, wildlife crime, and abuse of the 
environment,” creating conceptual linkages across levels and scales of the 
SES.259  The strategy explicitly notes complex issues specific to Kenya which 
impact the SES including the large numbers of elephants living outside of 
protected areas; the increase in human populations in those areas; the lack of 
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coordination in terms of land use planning; the movement beyond Kenya’s 
borders of some elephant populations; and the lack of capacity resident within 
government agencies to adequately implement complex conservation 
initiatives.260  
The strategy lays out goals to devolve authority to local communities; 
increase collaboration with neighboring states where elephant populations 
interact; focus research on elephant behavior; and increase capabilities of 
monitoring efforts.261 It also identifies important threats to elephant conservation 
including poaching; degraded habitats; fragmentation of habitats; HWC; loss of 
wildlife corridors and buffer zones; lack of national land policies; negative 
attitudes towards elephants; increased demand for agricultural land; lack of 
economic incentives to conserve; and insecurity. The document lays out a 
pathway to combat each threat with clearly laid out roles and responsibilities, 
actions, and measurable objectives. While it remains to be seen whether or not 
the strategy can achieve its goals long term, the document provides an honest 
assessment and baseline from which government actors and NGOs can 
collaborate deliberatively.262 
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Increased Public Awareness of Wildlife Crime 
 
Recognizing that SES perturbations can have local and global causes and 
outcomes is key to addressing both jurisdictional and informational challenges in 
the preservation of the SES.263 Governance authorities in Kenya painstakingly 
connect local SES challenges to global markets through public awareness raising 
campaigns integral to shifting scalar thinking on the SES.  KWS uses Twitter, 
Facebook, and a functioning and sophisticated website to educate Kenyans and 
the world on wildlife issues facing Kenya. Public awareness raising campaigns 
included some sponsored by the First Lady Margaret Kenyatta such as the “Ivory 
Belongs to Elephants” and “Hands Off our Elephants” campaigns, and 
celebrations for Word Wildlife Day.264 Kenyan authorities reach out to local 
communities to conduct anti-poaching campaigns as well as holding interagency 
awareness and sensitization training.  NGOs, conservancies, and game ranches 
maintain their own media presence through social networking sites and websites, 
providing both scientific information on the SES as well as real-time reports on 
poaching, illegal grazing, trafficking, and efforts to combat these wildlife crimes. 
The information sharing made possible through these combined efforts allow for 
a nuanced and informed understanding of all aspects of challenges facing the 
SES, and creates opportunities to find creative solutions. 
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Conclusion 
 
By applying the SESF to the Kenya case study, linkages emerge across 
levels and scales of the SES, illustrating how interactions at the domestic level, 
such as legislation and the actions of resource users, can impact the 
international system, while international level factors such as increased illicit ivory 
use and CITES’ enforcement actions can shift outcomes in the domestic SES. 
Kenya’s weak laws and lack of enforcement enable international ivory traffickers 
to penetrate its porous borders and move massive quantities of ivory to 
international markets, with impacts rippling across the international SES as 
elephant populations in Central Africa are poached to extirpation. By failing to 
strengthen domestic legislation before the international poaching reached crisis 
proportions, Kenya not only failed to protect its portion of the international SES 
but contributed to the degradation of the entire system.  Similarly, at the domestic 
level the slow response to changes in the resource system driven by shifting 
resource utilization strategies within the SES will impact the health of the system, 
and its ability to absorb perturbations and disturbances.   
By applying the SESF the chapter illustrated how changes to the modern 
SES relate to policies and practices stretching into the earliest colonial era, 
deepening understanding of the challenges it now faces. The lack of a national 
land use policy or an effective land tenure policy has undermined the resilience, 
adaptability and transformability of the Kenyan SES.  As a result much of 
Kenya’s trust land operates as open access, degrading the landscape for both 
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humans and wildlife, increasing human/wildlife conflict and undermining efforts to 
combat poaching. The subdivision of communal lands which has occurred in the 
absence of policies conducive to private conservation weakened ties within and 
between communities, creating barriers to future conservation efforts and 
undermining conservation norms.  By centralizing wildlife policies the government 
has marginalized stakeholder participation in efforts to manage the SES and 
combat poaching, damaging indigenous conservation norms and removing the 
responsibility conserve and protect from local communities.  
Tensions continue to exist within Kenya between the centralizing tendencies of 
the wildlife establishment and the ethics and rhetoric of decentralization 
espoused in public policy.  If Kenya cannot resolve these tensions resource 
users will continue to make decisions that best benefit their immediate needs, not 
the longer terms requirements for resource conservation.  Together, these 
factors create strong incentives for stakeholders to overexploit the SES rather 
than conserve it.  The politics of partial reform now evident in Kenya, whereby 
rules and regulations skirt reform, but do not fully enact it, may ultimately 
undermine attempts at controlled transformation of the SESF. 
This analysis of the SES in Kenya also provides a detailed understanding 
of the range of policy prescriptions, both through official channels and as a result 
of “silent” processes, that are helping the SES adapt to maintain resilience. 
Kenya is attempting to address the entire range of issues facing the SES from 
the immediate problem of poaching and trafficking to longer term and more 
complex issues surrounding land reform and livelihood strategies. Instead of 
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applying a “panacea” approach that disregards the complexity of the problems 
facing the system, linked through usage patterns to the global SES, Kenya made 
concrete changes in response to perturbations within the system. Because of the 
nature of these shifts, including deep institutional and cultural changes, evidence 
of their efficacy may only slowly materialize.   
The next case study, focused on Tanzania, illustrates the impacts of 
uncontrolled transformational change as the result of corrupt enabling 
mechanisms within nested tiers of the system and failures at the international 
level to monitor and address threats within the SES.  Despite Tanzania’s early 
adoption of devolved authority over wildlife, community based natural resource 
management programs, and far larger system of protected areas, the country 
faces both a poaching crisis and widespread negative conservation norms, 
degrading the SES’s ability to adapt effectively in the short and long-term.  Some 
areas of Tanzania’s elephant SES have already transformed, perhaps 
irrevocably. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TANZANIA 
 
Problem Statement 
 
Tanzania has one of the largest systems of protected wildlife areas in 
Africa.  Unlike in Kenya, authority over wildlife was devolved to local communities 
through pilot programs and later through clear legislation by 1998. Considerable 
donor funds support the implementation of community based natural resource 
management programs as well as all other aspects of conservation. Because of 
Tanzania’s early recognition of the role of communities in conservation, the 
development of legislation to protect communal land rights and the supporting 
policy to enable community wildlife management, the country was in many ways 
better positioned to protect wildlife than Kenya. Yet, the country is both a major 
source of ivory and trafficking hub for ivory exports from Central Africa to Asia.  
One third of all illicit ivory seized globally came from Tanzania between 1989-
2009.1  In 2009 half of all the ivory seized in the world originated from Tanzania.2 
The country has lost half of its elephant population, the largest in East Africa and 
second largest on the continent, since 2006.3   
                                            
1
 "United Republic of Tanzania," (CoP15 Doc. 68 Annex 6a). 
2
  Open Season: The Burgeoning Illegal Ivory Trade in Tanzania and Zambia, (London: 
Environmental Investigation Agency, 2010), http://eia-
global.org/images/uploads/Open_Season.pdf. 
3
 EIA, Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania’s Elephants, 
(London: Environmental Investigation Agency, 2014), http://eia-international.org/wp-
content/uploads/EIA-Vanishing-Point-lo-res1.pdf. 
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While typically blamed on corruption, as the SES literature makes clear, 
the resource management failures in Tanzania cannot be related to one factor or 
a few inter-related factors existing at one level of analysis. Instead, one must 
understand them in terms of factor interdependence “and the way that various 
complex factor combinations cause resource-management attempts to fail.”4  The 
interplay of exogenous globalizing forces, including the hyper consumption of 
Asian consumers; connectivity of global markets; adoption of neoliberal 
conservation, and the state’s subverting of many of its tenets, impacts the 
resilience and vulnerability of the SES. Additionally, endogenous processes 
including corruption, rent seeking, severely degraded conservation norms, and 
patterns of conflict between users and authorities, further contribute to 
vulnerability and perturbations within the SES.5 These factors interact to create 
conditions under which commercial illicit exploitation of wildlife has occurred with 
impunity, with severe and negative consequences for the social and ecological 
components of the SES.  Moreover, Tanzania’s response to the current crisis, as 
well as longer term threats, represents a repeat of past patterns and processes, 
challenging the state’s ability to regain resilience.   
SESs are dynamic, ever-changing systems, coevolving through 
interactions between and among actors and institutions “and resources 
constrained and shaped by a given social-ecological setting.”6 In Tanzania, 
movement is occurring towards uncontrolled and potentially irreversible 
                                            
4
 Ibid. Acheson, "Institutional Failure in Resource Management," 129. 
5
 Young et al., "The Globalization of Socio-Ecological Systems for Scientific Research."  
6
 Schlüter et al., "Application of the Ses Framework for Model-Based Analysis of the Dynamics of 
Social-Ecological Systems." Holling and Gunderson, "Resilience and Adaptive Cycles."  
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transformation.7  Failed efforts to reform wildlife management have resulted in 
the degradation of conservation norms to the point that many communities view 
conservation authorities and the conservation process, both government and 
NGOs, with distrust and suspicion; consider protected area (PA) expansion a 
new form of dispossession; and actively engage in defensive techniques to 
prevent the expansion of PAs.8  
The models of conservation adopted in Tanzania, first fortress style 
conservation and later neoliberal conservation, as implemented, ultimately 
reduced local communities’ say in resource use and management rules. 
Communities feel they bear all of the costs of wildlife conservation, while 
enjoying few, if any, benefits. Instead of a source of income, inspiration, or pride, 
wildlife is perceived as a burden and a threat.9 Local communities have come to 
associate Tanzania’s policies of wildlife management with dispossession and 
exploitation. Hence, local communities not only tolerate poaching and 
overharvesting of the SES, but in some cases the loss of livelihood practices 
pushes local communities into actively participating in poaching, trafficking or 
corrupt practices. Under these circumstances the primary objective of creating 
and expanding protected areas, the conservation and protection of wildlife, is 
paradoxically undermined.10 At the same time, the largest elephant populations in 
                                            
7
 Walker, "A Handful of Heuristics and Some Propositions for Understanding Resilience in Social-
Ecological Systems."  
8
 Mara J. Goldman, "Strangers in Their Own Land: Maasai and Wildlife Conservation in Northern 
Tanzania," Conservation and Society 9, no. 1 (2011). 
9
 "Partitioned Nature, Privilege Knowledge: Community-Based Conservation in Tanzania," 
Development and Change 34, no. 5 (2003). 
10
 Hassan Sachedina and Fred Nelson, "Protected Areas and Community Incentives in Savannah 
Ecosystems: A Case Study of Tanzania’s Maasai Steppe," Oryx 44, no. 3 (2010). 
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Tanzania have plummeted to the point their recovery, or even survival, is 
questionable.  
Following the SESF, this chapter first describes the resource system and 
units, highlighting the large size of Tanzania’s protected areas and the significant 
perturbations faced by elephant populations in the Selous Game Reserve and 
neighboring systems. The following section examines the governance system in 
Tanzania and key interactions between the state and resource users, which 
have, over time, severely erode conservation norms, leading to significant levels 
of resistance to conservation.  The following section examines the steps the 
governance system has undertaken to address threats to the SES, which are 
largely dependent on outside donors and track fairly closely with current policies 
and practices.  The conclusion illustrates how the SESF, applied to Tanzania, 
links local processes and cross-level, cross-scale interactions to ecological and 
social outcomes in the SES, defined in Tanzania by exploitation and, potentially, 
resource collapse.  
 
Resource System and Resource Units 
 
Tanzania sets aside a larger percentage of its territory for wildlife than 
almost any country in Africa, nearly 39 percent,11 but remains exposed to 
“multiple, interacting perturbations,” some of which are bringing on fast change 
                                            
11
 Soyata Tegegn, "The Impact of Dominant Environmental Policies on Indigenous Peoples in 
Africa," in Indigenous People in Africa: Contestations, Empowerment and Group Rights, ed. 
Ridwan Laher and Korir SingiOei (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2014), 57. 
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within the system.12Threats included large-scale commercial poaching; habitat 
fragmentation due to increased human settlement near parks and in wildlife 
corridors; human-wildlife conflict; and “rapid agricultural expansion, unplanned 
land use, and road construction.”13  Increased population density around parks 
corresponds to the greatest threats to wildlife, in particular in terms of poaching.  
In the vicinity of Western Serengeti alone, there are thought to be between 
52,000-60,000 illegal bush-meat hunters.14 Despite the expansion of PAs since 
2000, elephant range has shrunk by ten percent during that same period.15 
Increasing the amount of territory under protection, from less than ten percent in 
2000 to about forty percent currently, is not enough to imbue the system with 
resiliency.16  
Protected areas can be broken into six categories, based on how land and 
wildlife is protected or utilized. The country boasts 16 National Parks, 38 
Game Reserves, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA), 44 Game 
Controlled Areas, 38 Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and several Forest 
Reserves.17 The PAs fall within six eco-systems including the Tarangire-
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 Gallopin, "Linkages between Vulnerability, Resilience, and Adaptive Capacity." 
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 S. Mduma et al., Tanzania National Elephant Management Plan 2010-2015, (Arusha: Tanzania 
Wildlife Research Institute, 2011), http://www.tawiri.or.tz/images/Conference/elephant_plan.pdf. 
Tanzania National Parks Corporate Plan: Optimization of Tanapa Potential 2008/09-2012/13, 
(Tanzania National Parks, 2008), http://tanzaniaparks.com/useful_docs/Corporate_Plan.pdf. 
CITES, "United Republic of Tanzania." 
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  E. J. Knapp, "Why Poaching Pays: A Summary of Risks and Benefits Illegal Hunters Face in 
Western Serengeti, Tanzania," Tropical Conservation Science 5, no. 4 (2012). 
15
 "Tanzania National Parks Corporate Plan: Optimization of Tanapa Potential 2008/09-2012/13". 
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 J. R. Kideghesho et al., "Emerging Issues and Challenges in Conservation of Biodiversity in the 
Rangelands of Tanzania," Nature Conservation 6 (2013); Ndalahwa F. Madulu, Population 
Dynamics and Sustainable Conservation of Protected Areas in Tanzania: The Case of 
Swagaswaga Game Reserve in Kondoa District, (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2001), 
http://www.env-impact.geo.uu.se/Read2TOTAL.pdf. 
17
 Colin Bonnington, Dan Weaver, and Eibleis Fanning, "Livestock and Large Wild Mammals in 
the Kilombero Valley in Southern Tanzania," African Journal of Ecology 45 (2007). 
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Manyara, Serengeti, Selous-Mikumi, Ruaha-Rungwa, Katavi-Rukwa and 
Moyowosi-Kigosi.18  In the national parks, game reserves, and NCA, the largest 
percentage of protected area, human settlement and usage of resources is 
strictly prohibited.19 Game controlled areas, wildlife management areas (WMAs), 
partial game reserves, and forest reserves receive less protections, and can be 
utilized by both human populations and wildlife.20 New protected areas are being 
created both on land and within maritime areas, through evictions and the 
restrictions of use rights of inhabitants.21 
In terms of geography, around 74 percent of Tanzania is considered semi-
arid rangelands, while the rest of the country outside of coastal areas is 
dominated by savannah and bushlands, as well as tropical and subtropical forest 
ecosystems.22  
Elephants are found throughout Tanzania’s PAs and in unprotected 
dispersal areas.23 Around twenty percent live primarily in unprotected areas.24  
Large populations of elephants still exist in the Selous-Mikumi, the Ruaha 
Rungwa, and Moyowosi-Kigosi Game Reserve, though they all face intensive 
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 CITES, "United Republic of Tanzania." 
19
 Mduma et al. Dan Brockington, "Preserving the New Tanzania: Conservation and Land Use 
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 Tor A. Benjaminsen and Ian Bryceson, "Conservation, Green/Blue Grabbing, and Accumulation 
by Dispassion in Tanzania," Journal of Peasant Studies 39, no. 2 (2012). 
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poaching pressures.25 Important trans-boundary populations of elephants exist in 
both the north and south of the country. The Selous-Niassa ecosystem, 
extending across southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique, is one of the 
largest trans-boundary wildlife areas in Africa.26  Three important ecosystems 
operate across the border with Kenya, the Serengeti-Mara, Amboseli-Kilimanjaro, 
and Tsavo-Mkomazi. These areas are world famous for the wildebeest migration 
and for the elephants, as well as being the stronghold for East Africa’s Maasai.27  
The Serengetti, Kilimanjaro, the Selous Game Reserve, and parts of the 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area, are UNESCO World Heritage Sites.28  
 Along with Kenya, Tanzania experienced heavy poaching during the 
1970s and 1980s, losing over 100,000 elephants from 1977-1987. In the Selous 
Game Reserve within three years, from 1986-1989, elephant populations 
plummeted 70%, from 100,000 to 30,000. Black rhinos were largely extirpated.29 
As a result of losses to poaching and the inability of wildlife management 
authorities to bring poaching under control, Tanzania lobbied hard for the ban on 
international ivory sales within CITES in 1989.30 
Under the ban, Tanzania’s elephant populations recovered. Until recently 
Tanzania held 47 percent of East Africa’s elephants, and was considered to be 
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 Elephant Database, "Tanzania, 2012 ("2013 Africa" Analysis),"  
http://www.elephantdatabase.org/preview_report/2013_africa/Loxodonta_africana/2012/Africa/Ea
stern_Africa/Tanzania. 
26
 CITES, "United Republic of Tanzania." 
27
 Maasai Association, "The Maasai People,"  http://www.maasai-association.org/maasai.html. 
28
 "Tanzania National Parks Corporate Plan: Optimization of Tanapa Potential 2008/09-2012/13".  
29
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globally important within the international elephant SES.31  The Selous Game 
Reserve and broader ecosystem alone held half of the elephants in Tanzania, 
and was the second largest population in on the continent.32 In 2006, the year the 
current poaching crisis began in Tanzania, estimates suggest the country held 
over 142,000 elephants. By 2009 that number dropped to 109,022, a decrease of 
33,776 elephants, or over 11,000 per year.33   
The decline occurred primarily within the Selous Game Reserve, broader 
Selous-Mikumi, and cross-border Selous-Niassa ecosystems.34 Between 2009-
2013 populations in the reserve declined by another 66 percent.35 In one large-
scale seizure of 11 tons of ivory, all of the elephants came from the Selous-
Niassa ecosystem, representing over 1,600 elephants.36  Selous ivory is 
considered particularly valuable, according to media reports, “making the gross 
value of Selous’ elephants worth billions and thus attracting illegal 
businesses, organized crime networks, corrupt officials, terrorist 
groups and others to risk poaching.”37 According to the EIA the “trafficking chain 
from the Selous to the main markets in China has emerged as the single largest 
conduit for ivory in the world.”38 Another poaching hotspot developed around the 
Ruaha National Park and surrounding ecosystem. From 2008-2014 the area lost 
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10,000 elephants.39 An unpublished report from the Great Elephant Census 
suggests Ruaha lost 50 percent of its remaining elephants, around 4,000, in 
2014, while as many as 12,000 were killed outside the park.40 Most recent 
estimates suggest Tanzania has lost at least half of its elephants since 2007, 
placing the population around 70,000, though it could be as low as 40,000.41 As 
much as 90% of elephant mortality in Tanzania is related to poaching.42  Under 
acute threat by commercial poachers, without significant shifts in governance and 
usage of resources within the SES, the SES will become progressively less able 
to absorb disturbances or recover.43 
While overall Tanzania has lost a significant percentage of its elephants in 
the last decades, those losses are relatively isolated to southern Tanzania.  
Parks and conservation areas in the north of the country have seen an increase 
in elephant populations.44 For example, a 2014 census revealed elephants in the 
Serengeti-Mara ecosystem increased by 266% since 1986. The population in the 
ecosystem is around 7,500 elephants.45 In northern Tanzania the largest 
populations of elephants exist in the Tarangire–Manyara ecosystem, which 
includes Tarangire National Park.46 Conservationists fear that poachers will move 
across Tanzania to other populations of elephants once those in Southern 
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Tanzania have been depleted, making the seeming security of the northern 
circuit parks illusory.47   
Tanzania is heavily dependent on the elephant SES for foreign revenue 
generation.  Tourism accounts for 17 percent of the country’s GDP, around $2 
billion per year, and employs more than 300,000 people.48  Approximately one 
million tourists visit Tanzania each year, up 80 percent from the early 1990s.49 
The government recognizes tourism as a leading engine of growth and an 
important tool to fight poverty.50 The wildlife sector provides about 40 percent of 
Tanzania’s foreign exchange earnings.51  
Tanzania places a premium on the ability to utilize resources, and does not 
discriminate philosophically against consumptive use.52 The government actively 
promotes hunting of wild animals, and at the international level proposed the sale 
of its stockpiled ivory until international pressure and the revelation of large scale 
losses from poaching forced a retraction in 2013.53 The largest in the world, 
Tanzania’s stockpile contains 34,000 tusks worth $230 million on the Chinese 
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black-market.54 The domestic trade in ivory is proscribed, though large illegal 
domestic markets continue to exist.55  
 
Governance System and Resource Users 
 
The SESF provides several lenses useful for examining Tanzania’s 
complex SES.  The SESF stresses how examinations of past and present 
patterns of interactions within the SES explain the current state of the system.  In 
Tanzania governance authorities and resources users have interacted in the 
system through a pattern of centralization, exclusion, and exploitation developed 
during the colonial era and continued post-Independence.56   
The SESF stresses the importance of cross-level and cross-scale 
interactions, and the role of endogenous and exogenous factors, in shaping the 
SES. Tanzania’s SES cannot be understood without examining interactions 
between exogenous factors, including shifts in the international conservation 
agenda over time, from fortress style conservation to liberalization, devolution, 
and community based conservation, and endogenous factors such as the deep-
seated corruption within Tanzania’s wildlife governing authorities.57 Liberalization 
and devolution, tools to increase the values of wildlife and land and incentivize 
conservation, have actually sped up degradation of the resource system and 
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created perverse incentives for recentralization, further exclusion, and rent 
seeking. Liberalization has created incentives for park and PA expansion and for 
the exploitation of wildlife resources by government officials. Devolution, 
implemented through poorly managed community-based conservation (CBC) 
initiatives across the country, has led to intense conflicts between communities 
and conservation authorities, and between communities and wildlife.  
As the SESF notes, rules, regulations, laws and investments surrounding 
wildlife conservation reflect how governing authorities value wildlife. Despite 
accepting considerable donor aid for conservation, Tanzania continues to pursue 
policies aimed more squarely at centralization of resources, and exploitation of 
resources, and has pursued every effort to capture the increasing value of wildlife 
made possible through liberalization at the central government level. As 
implemented in Tanzania, regulatory mechanisms meant to conserve wildlife 
have imperiled it, creating the impression that exploitation and accumulation, not 
conservation, are the preference.58 
 
Colonial Governance Structures 
 
 Colonial governance of wildlife under both German and British rule 
followed the general model of colonial wildlife management across Africa, which 
emphasized centralization of control over wildlife, state ownership of land and 
wildlife, and exclusion of local peoples from the utilization of land and resources 
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and from the decision-making processes guiding management.59 The strategies 
for managing people and resources within the SES crafted under colonial 
leadership have shaped both how the SES is currently managed by conservation 
authorities, and utilized and valued by resource users.  The emphasis on 
economic gains to wildlife and the capture of revenue by central authorities help 
explain resource depletion in the SES.  
 German colonial authorities developed two major avenues for protection of 
wildlife, mainly restricting utilization by native peoples, and creating a system of 
protected areas. 60  61 They created fourteen PAs before the First World War. 
While communities were still able to live in these areas, their ability to utilize 
wildlife was significantly diminished.62 After WWI ended the British took over 
control of the colony, further centralizing control of wildlife resources. The British 
established first Game Department in 1919, and in 1923 the transferred all land 
and wildlife resources to the Crown.63  By 1930 Tanzania’s most famous 
protected areas had been set aside- the Serengeti, Ngorongoro Crater, the 
Selous, and Mt Kilimanjaro.64  
Under both the Germans and the British the international conservation 
community, at its most nascent stages, emerged as an important force in shaping 
wildlife legislation and priorities in Tanzania.65 The German Frankfort Zoological 
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Society (FZS) was instrumental in creating the Serengeti and the Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area (NCA).66 This work was supported later by a British 
organization, the Society for Preservation of Flora and Fauna of the Empire.67 
Sustained pressure from these and other European conservation organizations 
pushed the colonial authorities to continue to restrict resource use rights of local 
communities and the strengthening of laws, rules and regulations supporting 
PAs.68  They advocated for strict preservationist models of fortress-style 
conservation, which removed all customary land rights from communities within 
the parks.  In 1959 revisions to the Game Ordinance embraced fortress-style 
conservation, and colonial authorities began large-scale removals to establish 
parks.69 Ultimately over 50% of protected areas in Tanzania involved some type 
of evictions.70  
As Independence approached in 1961 colonial conservation officials 
developed two strategies to protect wildlife in the post-independence period. The 
first strategy involved courting international conservation organizations and 
foreign governments to support wildlife conservation, in particular the recently 
formed World Wildlife Fund, African Wildlife Foundation, and the International 
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Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).71  The decision to reach out to 
international NGOs was fueled by two concerns.  One, officials feared for the 
safety of wildlife and habitats under African rule.  Two, they anticipated the 
challenge of funding wildlife conservation faced by African governments faced 
with priorities of development and national consolidation. By including 
international NGOs, officials hoped to develop a funding stream, which would 
support wildlife programs.72 The second strategy involved promoting tourism to 
support conservation through the generation of foreign currency receipts. These 
two strategies, stressing the economic value of wildlife, were meant to ensure 
that wildlife conservation remained a priority for the independent government.  73 
 
Management of the SES Post-Independence  
 
The post-Independence government embraced the strategies for both 
revenue generation and conservation put in place by colonial officials.74  The 
administration followed the colonial model provided, resting on outside support 
through donor funding and tourism to support conservation programs.75  
Tanzania continues to shape its conservation concerns squarely around 
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economic value, whether through photo tourism, hunting, or the sale of its ivory, 
and remains heavily dependent on donor funds to support conservation.76 The 
government allocates less than one percent of the national budget to wildlife, 
despite its importance for revenue generation, meaning governing authorities 
must rely on receipts from tourism and donor funds to operate.77 Conservation 
organizations fund around 90 percent of conservation programs.78  
Tanzania’s first post-independence wildlife legislation, the 1974 Wildlife 
Conservation Act (WCA), continued the colonial policies of restricting resource 
use and gazzettment of large conservation areas in national parks and game 
reserves.79 Wildlife remained under the purview and ownership of the central 
government. The 1974 WCA did not attempt to either reinstate traditional use 
rights to land or wildlife and did not establish a mechanism to guarantee 
community management of wildlife or access to resources.80 It actually restricted 
further the ability of small hunter-gatherer groups to hunt in parks, which had 
been allowed under colonial legislation. Under the WCA, power remained with 
central authorities, giving the president the authority to declare any land in the 
country a game reserve, and the Director of National Parks the power to declare 
partial reserves and game controlled areas, requiring no input from local 
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communities.81  The WCA did, in theory, allow for local communities to use 
resources in game controlled areas and undesignated lands. However, in 
practice the government consistently privileged commercial use of lands 
controlled by central state authorities over those controlled by local communities, 
in particular the provisioning of hunting licenses, rarely allocated to local 
communities, to capture most of the revenue.82   
 
Governing Authorities 
 
Wildlife resources in Tanzania have become increasingly valuable through 
the adoption of neo-liberal conservation.  As such, governance relates directly to 
the commodification of resources and the capture of revenues generated through 
their commodification.  Revenue is generated in two ways: through photo and 
hunting tourism in PAs and through foreign donor support.  As such, authorities 
are driven to both expand PAs to increase opportunities for accumulation, and 
actively seek donor support. The struggle to capture revenues has influenced 
how resources are governed and exploited, in particular the centralization and 
recentralization of control over wildlife, and has shaped the relations between 
communities and conservation authorities.83 
                                            
81
 A. R. Mkumbukwa, "The Evolution of Wildlife Conservation Policies in Tanzania During the 
Colonial and Post-Independence Periods," Development Southern Africa 25, no. 5 (2008). 
82
 Nelson, Nshala, and Rodgers, "The Evolution and Reform of Tanzanian Wildlife Management," 
239. 
83
 Nelson and Agarwal, "Patronage or Participation? Community Based Natural Resource 
Management Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa." 
  
222 
Tanzania’s large resource system is managed through multiple 
government agencies and increasingly through partnerships with NGOs and 
other public-private initiatives. Many areas experience multiple and overlapping 
governance authorities.84 The primary government body overseeing the 
management of wildlife in Tanzania is the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism (MNRT). The MNRT manages wildlife through multiple agencies 
including the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), the Wildlife Division 
(WD), Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority, and the Tanzania Wildlife 
Research Institute (TAWIRI).85  Each agency is responsible for a different aspect 
of Tanzania’s system of PAs.  
TANAPA and the WD are the primary government bodies responsible for 
wildlife conservation and management. TANAPA is a parastatal responsible for 
managing and protecting the country’s national parks, located primarily in the 
north.86 The agency is mandated to expand existing parks, and to create new 
national parks, setting the organization up for conflicts with communities 
surrounding existing parks.87 TANAPA has further responsibility for poverty 
reduction and the management of community-based conservation (CBCs) 
ventures in areas surrounding parks.88 The WD manages the rest of the country’s 
wildlife on private lands, communal lands, wetlands, in game reserves, and in 
game controlled areas. The WD allocates all hunting concessions in Tanzania, 
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and has a significant role in how Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) are 
governed.89  WMAs are areas set aside on village land for wildlife conservation 
and only sustainable use of resources, and are controlled by CBCs.90 The 
purpose of WMAs, according to Ministry documents, is “to enable the local 
communities living in villages to participate in the protection and utilization of 
wildlife resources on village land.”91 The WD also holds responsibility for storing 
the nation’s stockpile of ivory, the largest in the world.92  The Director of the 
Wildlife Division is appointed directly by the president.93  
TAWIRI produces and provides scientific information to the various 
services on the health of wildlife and habitats; conducts community education 
programs; and is the CITES designated Scientific Authority in Tanzania.94 
TAWIRI is responsible for monitoring the country’s wildlife through its 
Conservation Information and Monitoring Unit (CIMU), which collects information 
on the number and distribution of wildlife, trends in illegal killing and animal 
movements, and human activities within PAs. CIMU operates across about a 
third of Tanzania’s landmass.95 TAWIRI is also responsible for producing the 
country’s elephant management plans, first introduced in 1995 and later updated 
in 2010. The plans address “management of elephants in PAs, population 
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numbers and trends, community involvement in elephant conservation, 
utilization, law enforcement and control of ivory, international obligations, and 
monitoring and research.”96  
NGOs, along with some prominent intergovernmental organizations like 
the UNDP, UNESCO and others, have seen their role in conservation in 
Tanzania continue to grow. Since the 1980s conservation NGOs have increased 
from a few dozen to nearly 2,000. Currently the head offices of 31 international 
conservation organizations operate in Tanzania.97 As in Kenya, NGOs are deeply 
involved in every aspect of conservation, from monitoring populations to 
investigating poaching and to running community based conservation programs.  
NGOs are roundly criticized by scholars of the history of conservation in 
Tanzania for supporting the central government agenda, and their own agenda, 
over the interests of communities.98 Many scholars writing on Tanzania note the 
links between the explosion of NGOs in Tanzania, and more broadly across the 
continent, and neo-liberal conservation agendas, which emphasize privatization, 
economic benefits, and the goal of making wildlife pay for itself.99  The result of 
the adoption of this agenda has been “the commodification of environmental and 
conservation processes, the reduction in size and capacity of state 
bureaucracies, the replacement of state functions by civil society (often 
international NGOs), and the liberalization of investment opportunities in the 
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conservation/tourism sector.”100 Others note the influence of international 
conservation NGOs in the romanticizaiton of wild landscapes devoid of people, 
and the naturalization of that landscape in the overall narrative, which can be 
used to push people out of wild areas.101 Goldman argues NGOs have been 
particularly important in shaping local Africans as wildlife villains.102  NGOs 
continue to supported the eviction of locals from parks and shape local peoples 
as a threat to wildlife.103  
NGOs have emerged as key interlocutors shaping Tanzania’s 
conservation and development agenda, in particular in the community-based 
conservation arena, which the international conservation community pushes 
aggressively.104 Donors provide millions of dollars to Tanzania, largely in support 
of CBC efforts, though they are increasingly involved in large scale anti-poaching 
efforts.105 The cross-scalar influence of these organizations shape polices in the 
SES, which may improve SES resilience, or ignore local factors and inadvertently 
degrade SES resilience, depending on the area of influence.106   
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Decentralization and Devolution 
 
Reform within the wildlife management sector occurred within the context 
of broader decentralization and liberalization initiatives taken on by Tanzania 
since the late 1980s and the international movement towards CBCs initiated in 
the 1980s and 1990s.107  After the devastating poaching epidemic of the 1980s, 
and the intense and expensive law enforcement strategy launched to end it, 
Tanzania began to recognize it needed a comprehensive strategy to deal with 
poaching that included community participation in wildlife management.108 The 
poaching epidemic in the late 1970s and 1980s illustrated to the conservation 
community in Tanzania and elsewhere that “fortress conservation” could not 
protect wildlife living outside of protected areas.109 Moreover, policymakers, 
heavily influenced by foreign donors and international NGOs, acknowledged that 
state ownership of wildlife was not conducive to community conservation and in 
fact degraded community incentives to conserve wildlife and habitats.110 As a 
result, the government began to shift focus away from providing protections 
primarily in national parks and game reserves and instead to focus on community 
lands.111 Reforms embraced the notion of devolution and decentralization of 
authority over wildlife, and pushed the development of CBCs as  key components 
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of conservation.112 As in Kenya, the rhetoric of decentralization and local control 
of wildlife resources has not lived up to its promise.113   
 
Devolution 
 
Two very important differences exist in terms of the management of 
wildlife resources on community lands between Tanzania and Kenya. First, 
Tanzania developed a national level land policy in 1995, followed by supporting 
legislation over the next decade.  While under the laws the state retained 
ownership of communal land, the reforms attempted to establish more 
accountable mechanisms to manage land at the community level.114  Tanzania 
recognizes customary land tenure as well as collective management through 
incorporated villages, individual ownership, and private commercial ownership of 
land. By contrast Kenya has only recently embarked on the process of land 
tenure reform and the development of a national land policy. The impacts of 
these policies are as of yet unknown.115 
Second, Tanzania quickly developed the supporting policies necessary to 
allow for the local management of wildlife. The Wildlife Policy of 1998 specifically 
identified the key role community based conservation (CBCs) should play in 
managing wildlife on community lands, and began laying out a framework for 
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implementation.  The legislation provided villages the tools to manage wildlife at 
the local level through a uniform framework. The policy reforms recommended 
detailed local management mechanisms, in the form of Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs) managed through the WD, to include local communities in 
decisions on how to utilize wildlife resources either through hunting, wildlife 
viewing, game cropping, or wild meat harvesting. The legislation devolved 
authority over wildlife to rural communities and private landholders through the 
WMAs, allowing communities to manage the wildlife inhabiting their own lands, 
and take a greater role in tourism, to include a greater role in hunting 
concessions, and in revenue generation and revenue sharing.116   
The Wildlife Policy specifically acknowledged the importance of 
communities benefitting directly from hunting concessions and tourist 
enterprises, and highlighted the intention to create more opportunities for 
communities to manage wildlife on their own lands for their own benefit.117 The 
reforms designated 25 percent of revenues from hunting concessions flow back 
to communities.118  As a result of the policy reforms and the general movement 
towards community based conservation, CBCs sprung up under TANAPA and 
the WD, and “there was a widespread perception in Tanzania that wildlife 
management was on the brink of significant and far-reaching change.”119 
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Recentralization 
 
Despite the rhetoric around devolution and the value of CBCs, Tanzania 
has consistently undermined its own legislation and recentralized wildlife policy 
through rules and regulations from almost the moment the Wildlife Policy of 1998 
took effect.120  Conservation authorities pursue strategies that reap the greatest 
monetary benefit for the central government, and the greatest opportunities for 
rent-seeking.  The way revenues are allocated for certain types of conservation- 
in this instance hunting allocations and later all tourism on community lands- 
make those strategies less desirable for those seeking short term gains from 
wildlife.121 Some failures of governance authorities to conserve natural resources 
can be explained by the behavior of government officials and politicians who act 
in their own interests vice those of the resource system as a whole.122 Within the 
central government, interests exist which push for the centralization of wildlife 
control, including elites who want to protect patronage networks, and those who 
want to protect Treasury flows from hunting concessions.123   
While WMAs were originally meant to be a tool for rural poverty alleviation 
and empowerment, they became a vehicle for elite predation.124  According to 
Baldus, the framework to form WMAs passed by the WD in 2000 was made 
intentionally complex in order to force local communities to seek outside financial 
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and technical assistance to move forward.125  The rules required communities to 
go through a rigorous and bureaucratic process of initiating and financing land 
studies, evaluations, and assessments.126  The regulations also required a three-
year renewal of all ventures, meaning even when communities could attract an 
investor to create a lodge or other tourism venture, they could not guarantee 
renewal.127  Moreover, the WD gave itself authority to revoke agreements, 
essentially removing any ability of communities to manage lands. The WD did not 
devolve any authority over hunting concessions to local communities under the 
rules and regulations, and communities received no legal right to claim revenues 
from hunting, even when it occurred on community lands.128  The WD even 
refused to translate the Wildlife Policy into Swahili for local consumption for 
several years, after which copies were still withheld from circulation. Locals were 
unable to access the policy and exercise their rights under the law.129  
Ultimately the administrative processes were crafted in such a way to 
“increased central control over wildlife and reduce the rights of rural 
communities.”130  As Nelson et al. note, “The result is the perpetuation of the 
basic challenges facing wildlife management in rural areas- namely declining 
wildlife populations as a result of lack of local incentives to conserve the 
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resource- and new conflicts occurring in some rural areas over village land and 
resource rights.”131 
Throughout the 2000s as tourism and tourism revenues steadily increased 
in Tanzania, the WD continued to centralize control of resources to capture the 
most revenue.  In 2007 the WD passed the “Non-Consumptive Utilization of 
Wildlife Regulations,” which revised the Wildlife Policy, dropping the focus on 
community participation altogether.132 The regulations stipulate that all non-
consumptive wildlife use on village lands, in game reserves, and in GCAs must 
be approved by the Wildlife Director. Under the regulations game drives, walking 
safaris, and other photo tourism activities were forbidden without the permission 
of the WD.133 Communities lost the ability to directly negotiate contracts with 
tourism operators, limiting significantly their ability to manage wildlife resources 
or to benefit from them.134 The regulation also shifted revenue-sharing 
mechanisms, requiring tourism operators to turn over fees, set by regulation, for 
all operations directly to the central government for later allocation to 
communities.135 These changes significantly reduced revenue for communities, 
which had directly negotiated with tour companies. Because the legislation did 
not included requirements of transparency, local communities had no way of 
knowing how much revenue they should have been allocated for their full 
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revenue share.136  These regulations contradict the spirit of the 1998 Wildlife 
Policy, which clearly aimed at devolving authority to communities.137   Devolution 
is meant to foster links between communities and wildlife and strengthen SES 
resilience by incentivizing conservation.  Undermining those linkages by placing 
all responsibility for management, and benefits of management, at higher tiers of 
organization within the SES remove incentives for conservation with potentially 
disastrous impacts on wildlife.138 
The process of recentralization continued in 2009 when Tanzania adopted 
a new Wildlife Conservation Act (WCA), which strengthened central control of 
wildlife and increased the Wildlife Division’s authority to intervene in community 
management of wildlife.139 The act made grazing in Game Controlled Area illegal, 
which served to dispossess Maasai of traditional grazing areas.140  The new act 
included “little mention of participation, development and benefits for local 
communities.”141 The Act gives the Wildlife Minister the ability to designate 
wildlife corridors, dispersal areas, buffer zones and migratory routes.142 
The regulations undermine every goal of devolution; limit the potential for 
economic benefit to communities; limit the ability of communities to participate in 
the management of wildlife; decrease transparency; and remove key incentives 
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for community based conservation. Importantly, the regulations threaten the 
ability of communities to benefit economically from tourism.143 While the massive 
loss of elephants Tanzania experienced over the past six years cannot be 
entirely attributed to failures of devolution, by dispossessing local resource users 
the government systematically undermined social actors within the system who, 
under a different governance structure, might have more quickly identified and 
addressed perturbations in the SES.  Disconnected from most benefits, and 
bearing a disproportionate level of the burden, resource users had little incentive 
to address transformation in the system.  
Several scholars argue the government never intended to devolve 
authority over wildlife to local communities.144 The high values of wildlife on 
communal lands ultimately undermined the devolution reforms process because 
actors in the central government worked to recapture revenues.145 The rise in 
values of land and wildlife discincentivize movements towards devolution and 
encourages elites and the central government to tighten control.  Ironically, 
“tourism is a leading source of such incentives to re-centralize and expropriate 
local resources, even as tourism is seen as a means to alleviate rural poverty 
and create positive local incentives for environmental conservation.”146 
Devolution threatened rent-seeking opportunities and the opportunity for 
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accumulation through dispossession. Ultimately, if implemented, devolution 
threatened to result in losses of revenue and control within central authorities. As 
wildlife and land became more valuable, the costs of giving up control 
increased.147  Nelson argues the main driver behind reforms to the Wildlife Policy 
in 1998, which clearly articulated goals of community participation, was to attract 
foreign donor support, not to actually implement a more inclusive and devolved 
policy.148  
 
Weak Laws and Enforcement 
 
The failure of devolution and the recentralization of control over wildlife 
resources occurred within the context of an unmitigated poaching crisis, weak 
laws, low enforcement rates, low seizure rates, failed anti-poaching operations 
and serious mismanagement and corruption within both wildlife governance and 
within the overall political establishment.   
Until 2009, the country relied on the 1974 WCA for protections, under 
which few prosecutions ever occurred.  Only ten people were convicted of 
elephant poaching from 2001-2009, when more than 40,000 elephants were 
poached.  Those convicted received sentences ranging from 18-60 months, and 
fines around $110.149  In one of the largest ivory seizures on record, a 2009 
seizure of 11 tons of ivory, no prosecutions occurred despite significant evidence 
                                            
147
 Nelson, Nshala, and Rodgers, "The Evolution and Reform of Tanzanian Wildlife 
Management." 
148
 Ibid., 239. 
149
 CITES, "United Republic of Tanzania." 
  
235 
of collusion between customs agents and ivory traffickers. The case file was 
eventually lost and no prosecutions occurred.150 According to the EIA “the 
convoluted judicial process rarely leads to a successful prosecution and 
deterrent” for poachers caught in Tanzania.  Fines are small, jail time is minimal, 
and few poachers arrested face any penalty at all.  Less than 10 percent of those 
arrested are successfully prosecuted.  An EIA report notes that from 2009-2014 
only one case involving a major ivory seizure has led to a significant detention.  
Other cases, through more often successful than in the past, continue to lead to 
small fines and short jail terms.151  
The 2009 WCA is significantly stronger, though loopholes exist, and few 
poachers and even fewer traffickers have been prosecuted. A 2012 study 
suggests chronic poachers face a .07 percent chance of arrest over the course of 
their poaching career.  When they are arrested, prison sentences are very short, 
and fines low.152  Judges retain a fine option, which can be levied instead of jail 
time, allowing well connected poachers the opportunity to buy their way out of 
jail.  Placing snares or other traps for wildlife is punishable by as little as two 
years in jail, or payment of a fine.153 While elephant poaching can be prosecuted 
under the Economic and Organized Crime Control Act and can carry sentences 
of up to 15 years, such sentences are almost unheard of.154  Another significant 
loophole exists within Zanzibari wildlife legislation. The primary wildlife law active 
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in Zanzibar, the Forest Resources Management and Conservation Act (FRMCA) 
No.10 of 1996, only protects wildlife naturally occurring on the islands. As such, 
African elephants receive no protections in Zanzibar, contributing to its 
emergence as a major trafficking hub.155  
According to the EIA, between 2002 and 2010 all ivory seizures of 
Tanzanian ivory over one ton occurred after the ivory left the country.  Between 
2009-2014, 22.6 tons of ivory was seized in the country, while over 40 tons was 
intercepted elsewhere.156 This is evidence of weak enforcement. 
Where large-scale enforcement has occurred, it has been problematic.  
Operation Kipepo (Kiswahili for butterfly), an anti-poaching mission launched 
against poachers in the Selous in 2009, resulted in some arrests, though very 
high levels of killing continued in the reserve.  According to CITES, officials within 
the operation were found to be involved with illegal killings, including some highly 
placed WD officials.157  The 2013 Operation Tokomeza Ujangili’ (Eliminate 
Poaching) led to the arrests of 1,030 suspected poachers and the seizure of 
weapons and ivory.158  Originally touted as successful, the operation was 
suspended after concerns over human rights abuses were raised when villagers 
were robbed, beaten, forced from their homes, and in some cases killed by 
security forces.159  While the government claimed the Operation was suspended 
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due to human rights abuse, suspicion emerged among the conservation 
community and within the media that highly placed politicians involved in the 
ivory trade sabotaged the operation.160 After the operation was suspended, 
officials claimed 60 elephants were killed in one month.161 
Institutional challenges within TANAPA and the WD further challenge 
enforcement.  The government does not adequately fund any of its wildlife 
departments, with rippling effects across the enterprise in terms of both 
equipment and staff.162  The impacts in TANAPA and the WD are illustrated by 
the underutilization of modern technology and equipment; poor training; 
inadequate staff; lack of staff services, including lack of HIV/AIDS training 
programs; and poor information sharing about wildlife, including death rates, 
information on human wildlife conflict incidents, and animal behavior.163   Small 
budgets create challenges for attracting tourists. According to TANAPA 
documents, parks are not realizing the full potential of tourism revenues due to 
lack of infrastructure, diversification, weak marketing, weak visitor centers and 
“ineffective management of external pressures.”164 TANAPA’s community 
outreach programs and CBCs face multiple challenges due to weak relationships 
with surrounding communities; the failure to link community development to 
conservation; inadequate benefits sharing mechanisms; lack of a mechanism to 
ensure communities enjoy user-rights to resources; and poor relationships 
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between park staffs and others in the conservation community.165  These 
weaknesses have created challenged for developing resilient management 
systems within the SES.  
Wildlife cannot be protected without an adequate ranger force. According 
to media reports the government employs less than half of the 4,000 rangers 
required to protect the country’s wildlife.166  TANAPA employs an average of one 
ranger per 50 km², while the WD fields one scout per 139 km².167  In the Selous 
Game Reserve, hit the hardest by poaching, the budget allocates $3/km2, a mere 
fraction of the $200-400/ km2 required for anti-poaching.168  The relative security 
of elephant populations under TANAPA authority is increasingly under question, 
as media reports suggest that one park under the agency’s control, the Ruaha 
NP, lost 4,200 elephants in 2014, half its total population.169  Elephant 
populations have plummeted in areas controlled by the WD. 
The corruption within the WD is entrenched to the point the department 
can be considered as criminalized or captured.  Criminalization refers to the 
routinization of criminal acts within a government,170 while capture refers to the 
way in which elites “have been able to manipulate policy formation and even 
shape the emerging rules of the game to their own advantage.”171  In addition to 
crafting rules and regulations recentralizing control over wildlife resources in 
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order to facilitate rent-seeking within the department, WD officials have also been 
accused of selling ivory from the national stockpile, as well as direct involvement 
in poaching and trafficking.172 They divert funds from hunting concessions, and 
engage in rent seeking through their role in overseeing CBNRM programs in 
WMAs. The park services are known to move rangers who too closely investigate 
corruption within the wildlife service in order to silence them.173 
The WD’s management of hunting concessions illustrates their preference 
for shortiterm maximization of rents over any conservation goals, and how the 
capture and criminalization of key agencies can impact resource management.  
In order to increase profits from the sale of hunting concessions, the WD has 
continuously both added hunting concessions and subdivided existing ones.174 
While similar hunting blocks in other African countries were valued in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars Tanzania’s blocks were allocated for $7,500 
each, raising questions over how much money exchanged hands behind the 
scenes.175  In thirty years, from 1967-1997, the WD increased the number of 
hunting blocks by nearly three times, from 47 to over 140. At the same time, the 
WD did not reduce hunting quotas, but instead allocated each subdivided block 
with the same quotas as the original blocks, in affect multiplying by many times 
the amount of wildlife offtake allowed. In addition, game cropping, game capture, 
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and local hunting licences continued to be apportioned in these same areas, 
exacerbating the problem further.176 
Tanzania’s early decision to deeply embed international conservation 
organizations and their respective agendas into national conservation polices, 
first driving fortress-conservation and later neoliberal conservation, and to adopt 
the principle that wildlife must pay for itself, has impacted the attitudes and 
actions of all resource users, from government rent seekers to poachers and 
people living within WMAs.177   
 
Resource Users 
 
Resource users’ interactions with conservation authorities and the 
resource system have been shaped by patterns and processes, which emerged 
during the colonial era, and mirrored in the post-independence era. These 
privilege both government agendas and the international conservation agenda 
over the rights of local resource users.  As resource values have been driven up 
through the adoption of neoliberal conservation and the commodification of 
natural resources, Tanzanian communities have progressively lost authority and 
rights over resources, degrading norms for conservation and undermining 
conservation goals.178 As the SESF literature suggests, by ignoring important 
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interactions between users and the system, in this case the loss of resource 
rights and social marginalization, governing authorities may inadvertently impose 
policies, which exacerbate, instead of address, perturbations with the SES.179   
Community-based conservation was adopted as the primary mechanisms 
to both maintain wildlife and habitats in wildlife dispersal areas and on community 
lands. A central tenet of CBCs is their contribution to the economic and social 
wellbeing of communities living within CBC areas.180 As a model of neo-liberal 
conservation, revenues from wildlife are expected to pay for all the costs 
associated with the programs. Additionally, communities have to be interested 
and willing to participate.181 The government’s deliberate recentralization of 
authority over wildlife, and purposefully onerous demands on local communities 
attempting to benefit from wildlife, made creating the conditions required for 
success impossible, with potentially irreversible impacts on conservation norms, 
relations between communities and governing authorities, and relations between 
communities and wildlife.   
Within the current SES, communities feel they bear all of the costs of 
wildlife conservation, and share in none of the benefits.182 The failure of the 
government to live up to its promise to devolve authority over wildlife to local 
communities, coupled with the inconsistent and generally weak performance of 
CBS and the simultaneous expansion of protected areas onto communal lands, 
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fostered an atmosphere of intense conflicts between communities and 
conservation authorities and wildlife. 
 
Licit Resource Users 
 
As in Kenya, rural communities of agriculturalists and pastoralists in 
Tanzania exist within wildlife dispersal areas and abut national parks and game 
reserves.183 Largely poor and dependent on rain-fed agriculture, these 
communities are in many ways stressing the landscape and degrading wildlife 
habitats through intensive farming, deforestation, fencing, and poaching for bush 
meat. In-migration in response to over-crowding in more productive landscapes 
is increasing the population in the rangelands, and increasing human-wildlife 
conflict.184  In some areas community lands surrounding parks have as much 
wildlife as the parks themselves, creating significant potential for local resource 
users to capture revenues.185 
However, despite the similarities with Kenya, in many ways Tanzania was 
better prepared to protect wildlife and contribute to rural development through 
utilization of its wildlife resources due to the early recognition of the role of 
communities in conservation, the development of legislation to protect communal 
land rights and the supporting policy to enable community wildlife management. 
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The failures of the conservation authorities over the last decade and a half to 
implement these policies, on top of the lingering distrust of conservation 
authorities stemming from colonial era expulsions and centralization of wildlife 
authority, may have transformed attitudes amongst resource users beyond 
repair.  
Whereas in Kenya communities were left out of wildlife conservation almost 
entirely, lacking rights to either land or resources, in Tanzania the very 
association of communities with wildlife management has soured attitudes of 
communities both towards conservation officials and wildlife and conservation 
generally, leading to some of the same outcomes evident in Kenya in terms of 
degradation of the landscape, intensive resistance to conservation, and 
significant loss of biodiversity and habitats. 
 
Pilot Projects and Early Success 
 
Communities experienced significant early successes with liberal 
conservation. Community-based conservation was pioneered in Tanzania as part 
of the Selous Conservation Program (SCP) in 1987, funded and administered in 
part by German NGOs. Initially the project was limited to the Selous with the 
goals of strengthening management of the park, and promoting sustainable use 
of wildlife to drive rural development.  Almost immediately similar programs 
started in the Serengeti, followed later by programs across the country.  
Communities looked to the passage of the 1998 Wildlife Policy and land reforms 
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as a positive step forward in what had been a process of “silent devolution.”186 
The shift in policy in Tanzania was meant to create a more inclusive style of 
community conservation with active participation in the management of the 
landscape in crafting and enforcing wildlife protections by communities.187  By 
2000, 19 wildlife management areas controlled by local CBCs has been 
established.188  
These early CBCs were inclusive, transparent, and directly benefited 
communities through jobs, the provision of game, and a sense of ownership of 
the process and outcomes of conservation.189  Villages began to negotiate 
directly with safari companies as market forces took hold in the wildlife industry 
throughout the 1990s.  Direct negotiations allowed communities to bypass the 
WD and capture all of the negotiated revenues. Villages near the Serengeti 
negotiated agreements for as much as $55,000 per year. Communities were able 
to control the revenues and prioritize community service projects per local 
preferences, gaining a sense of ownership.190  The progress of these CBCs to 
both improve livelihoods and maintain habitats was undermined by the passage 
of rules and regulations recentralizing control over wildlife resources on 
community lands. The rules and regulations took away the right of communities 
to directly negotiate with tour operators, and restricted all tourist activities outside 
of national parks and the NCA not approved through the WD, making all such 
                                            
186
 Didi, "Devolution of Wildlife Management in Kenya to Enhance Community Participation: An 
Assessment of Kenyan Legal Frameworks." 
187
 Goldman, "Partitioned Nature, Privilege Knowledge: Community-Based Conservation in 
Tanzania."  
188
 Baldus, Hahn, and Picard, "Community Based Conservation in Tanzania." 
189
 Ibid. 
190
 Nelson and Makko, "Communities, Conservation, and Conflicts in the Tanzanian Serengeti."  
  
245 
ventures lacking WD approval illegal, and significantly decreasing the revenue 
share for local communities.  
Despite the policies of recentralization the government and the 
conservation community continued to push CBCs on village lands throughout the 
2000s.  However, literature on community-based conservation in Tanzania 
suggests that both CBCs run through the WD and those associated with NGOs 
and other donors suffer significant challenges in achieving the primary objectives 
of CBCs, that is, maintain wildlife and habitats and contributing to economic and 
social wellbeing of communities. They may in fact be undermining conservation 
norms and sewing distrust in communities.  Their performance is uneven; 
management structures are not inclusive; they routinely ignore local knowledge 
and norms of conservation management; and they include steep opportunity 
costs.  
Considerable disparities exist across CBCs in terms of revenue generation 
and benefits sharing.191 For example, between 1992 and 2003, Serengeti 
National Park (SNP) generated US $31 million from tourism but only 1.6% was 
allocated to adjacent villages for socio-economic development projects.192  In 
some areas individuals may receive as little as $2.50 per year as a revenue 
sharing portion.193  Communities in areas where hunting occurs benefit very little 
from hunting revenues.  Most hunting revenues accrue to government officials, 
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government agencies, firms, and elites.  The money, which flows to agencies 
does not trickle down.  Only around three percent of revenues reach local 
communities.194  
The level of community involvement also varies considerably. WMAs in 
particular have not become vehicles for community participation in decision-
making as outlined in the 1998 Wildlife Policy.  Their very creation depended on 
the authority of the central government and a decision by the Minister in charge. 
In practice, most authority resides with the central government as communities 
depended on program staff at higher headquarters for allocation of resources 
and to make basic decisions.195  As a result, control is re-emebedded at the level 
of the central government.196 Councils are often not consulted about land-use 
planning whether it is for conservation or development.197  In some cases the 
community is left out entirely as decisions are made by NGOs or the WD. Where 
“communities” are included that may actually mean the chief or village leaders 
make choices.198  In other instances tour operators have come into areas without 
consulting communities at all. They do not negotiate agreements, and have no 
revenue-sharing mechanism.199  Community members may not even understand 
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that the goal of conservation programs is to conserve resources- they may be far 
more interested in how to access resources.  They may think programs mean 
more access to hunting and legal rights to harvest, not less.200  Resource users 
within WMAs and may not even realize they live in a WMA, may receive no 
benefits from wildlife management and no revenue sharing.201  Benefits schemes 
often lack local input, meaning money flows to projects not considered priorities 
in a community.202 Local communities are ultimately marginalized from the 
conservation process and have had little influence on reforms to the system.203    
Not only are communities generally left out of decision-making, but 
conservation authorities both during the colonial era and in the present, routinely 
ignore traditional and indigenous knowledge of wildlife and landscape 
management systems.204 For example, the strict emphasis on zone-based 
planning pushed by conservation authorities, both the government and NGOs, 
“contradicts the fluid nature of wildlife movements as well as those of pastoral 
herds, and therefore risks further disrupting both pastoral practices and wildlife 
movements.”205 By ignoring local knowledge, preferences, and management 
strategies that can benefit both human and wildlife communities, conservation 
                                            
200
 Songorwa, "Community-Based Wildlife Management (Cwm) in Tanzania: Are the Communities 
Interested?."  
201
 Jones et al., "Vanishing Wildlife Corridors and Options for Restoration: A Case Study from 
Tanzania."  
202
 Kaswamila, "An Analysis of the Contribution of Community Wildlife Management Areas on 
Livelihood in Tanzania." 
203
 Nelson and Agarwal, "Patronage or Participation? Community Based Natural Resource 
Management Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa." 
204
 Mara J. Goldman, "Partitioned Nature, Privilege Knowledge: Community-Based Conservation 
in Tanzania," ibid.34, no. 5 (2003). Jafari R. Kideghesho, "The Potentials of Traditional African 
Cultural Practices in Mitigating Overexploitation of Wildlife Species and Habitat Loss: Experience 
of Tanzania," International Journal of Biodiversity Science & Management 5, no. 2 (2009). 
205
 Goldman, "Partitioned Nature, Privilege Knowledge: Community-Based Conservation in 
Tanzania." 
  
248 
officials ultimately assert their own agendas at the expense of communities.206 
This exclusion has eroded interest in conservation and in participating in 
sustainable land use practices.207  
While the social and economic benefits of CBCs are uneven, costs of 
community participation are often very high. They include “loss of access to 
legitimate and traditional rights, damage to crops and other properties, livestock 
depredation, and risk posed to people’s lives through disease transmission and 
attacks by wild animals.”208 Coercive and often violent operations to protect 
wildlife and habitats meted out onto communities is another significant cost 
associated with conservation.209 In some communities people feel they bear all 
the burden for conservations, including loss of property, rights, harassment by 
game officials, and marginalization, and none of the benefits.210  
Failures to devolve actual authority over wildlife management to local 
communities, along with the poor performance of CBCs generally, has 
implications for the survival of wildlife and the feasibility of community based 
conservation. One failed conservation initiative can create negative perceptions 
of all conservation organizations and initiatives in an area, with rippling effects 
spatially and across time.211  
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Park Expansion 
 
Over the same period that Tanzania introduced and pushed the adoption 
of CBCs, (and simultaneously rolled back most benefits associated with them), 
the country consistently increased the total land area under some form of 
protection in order to capture increases in value accruing to the commodification 
of wildlife.212  As the values of wildlife and landscapes increased on the global 
market, both the Tanzanian government and private investors have an incentive 
to create new PAs and to expand existing ones, that is, to preserve resources for 
the use of tourists at the expense of local communities.213 Because the president 
retains the right to allocate land without consultation with local communities, the 
conversion of communal lands to conservation amounts to “land grabbing” by the 
government.214 Expansion threatens local communities with eviction or 
dispossession. Land available for human use in Tanzania is significantly limited 
by the provision of large amounts of territory for the use of wildlife. As more land 
gains some levels of protection, local peoples are cut off from their ability to 
gather wood, utilize water resources, harvest building materials, farm, or graze 
animals.215 
Evictions have occurred since the colonial era and relate to colonial style 
“fortress conservation.”  Evictions target the economically and politically least 
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advantaged peoples, often pastoralists like the Maasai.216  Among others, the 
Maasai were removed to create the Serengeti and their land use rights were 
restricted in the NCA.  They are currently under threat from the allocation of 
massive hunting concessions on their communal lands.  The 2009 WCA made 
grazing in hunting concessions illegal, meaning the Maasai lose their rights to 
pursue preferred livelihood strategies without consultation or compensation. In 
2015 the government attempted to remove as many as 40,000 people to make 
way for a lion hunting concession. Some groups have been evicted from areas 
multiple times as more and more land gains protected status.217  
Dispossession occurs when community land use rights are restricted on 
community lands through recentralization.218  As Benjaminsen notes, 
dispossession involves the exclusion of some users, primarily local peoples, and 
the capital accumulation of other users, primarily rent seekers within government, 
tourism operators, conservation organizations, and the State Treasury.219 
 
Resistance to Conservation 
 
These interactions have resulted in a loss of trust and erosion of 
conservation norms, pushing communities into intense conflict with conservation 
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authorities and wildlife. Increasingly communities are turning to defensive tactics 
to stop what they consider “land grabbing” by conservation authorities. In this 
way parks and protected areas can become “perilous” to wildlife protections 
when communities feel they threaten their livelihoods, in particular in the context 
of the failure to devolve authority and the recentralization of control currently 
underway in Tanzania.220  As such the social structures designed to conserve 
wildlife ultimately lose resilience to absorb or address perturbations in the 
system, with impacts on the stability of the system as a whole.221 
These policies have created a sense of distrust among Tanzanians 
towards the wildlife establishment and a deep-seated fear of conservationists, 
researchers, and wildlife officials.222  Local people feel often betrayed by the 
conservation process.223  They believe conservation authorities will kick them off 
their land and replace them with animals. For Maasai and others, the term 
“conservation area” equates to “government owned,” and has become 
synonymous with the loss of grazing, farming, and other land use rights.224 
Scholars note the growing perception among resource users that 
conservation infringes on human rights “through the exclusion of local people as 
knowledgeable active participants in management, policy formation, and 
decision-making processes in land that ‘belongs’ to them and on which their 
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livelihoods depend.”225  These policies alienate people from wildlife, as in Kenya, 
removing norms of preservation and the responsibility to protect wildlife. Wildlife 
has shifted from something to be valued to something to be feared.226 
Communities begin to look on wildlife as intruders, or as a burden, or as a threat 
to their livelihood.227  Disputes with conservation authorities can lead to intense 
human wildlife conflict as communities begin to hate wildlife and feel that 
conservation threatens their existence.228  
Resistance to park expansion can include the purposeful killing of 
protected species. Since 2009, elephant poaching inside Taragnier Park, in 
which over 30 elephants were killed, has been attributed to protests by local 
peoples.229  In some areas in dispute between conservation officials and 
communities, wildlife has dropped by as much as 50 percent.  Locals do not 
intercede to stop poaching, and may engage in poaching in an attempt to clear 
their land of wildlife.230 Local resentment of conservator policy can lead to violent 
confrontations between locals and state officials, and locals and wildlife.231 In 
some instances communities have become so resentful of wildlife that they 
intentionally kill animals.  In one particularly egregious incident in 2009, villagers 
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forced six elephants off a cliff.232  Feelings of marginalization or disempowerment 
within the conservation process fuel these reactions.233  Communities that do not 
benefit from wildlife are glad when animals are killed.234  People begin to feel that 
wildlife is more important than people and sometimes retaliate against the 
animals, in particular elephants.235  
Locals are increasingly adopting defensive tactics to halt the growth of 
PAs. Villagers consider loss of land and use rights as a direct threat to their 
livelihoods, which creates an incentive to expand lands under cultivation as a 
strategy to stop PA expansion.236  Maasai, to avoid the reallocation of their land, 
have begun claiming ownership of land and farming it. Farming and “using” land 
has become a strategy to prevent authorities from claiming lands for wildlife. 
“‘Defensive farming’, farming specifically in wildlife inhabited areas, acts as a 
mechanism to keep parks form encroaching on territory.237 Intensive and 
widespread farming can threaten wildlife when it occurs on an intensive scale in 
key wildlife areas through landscape degradation and an increase in human 
wildlife conflict.238   
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Illicit Users 
 
Patterns and processes evident within the global SES, including both 
institutionalized and informal corruption, weak laws and an absence of effective 
enforcement measures, intense distrust of conservation officials and enmity 
towards wildlife, and increasing values to wildlife, facilitate the illicit trade in 
Tanzania.239 These processes help explain why poachers and traffickers have 
operated in the country with impunity for over a decade. 
Because of the volume of ivory exiting Tanzania, a significant amount of 
information has been produced on how the illicit trade operates in Tanzania, from 
the names of corrupt politicians, shippers involved in moving ivory, village 
markets and local poachers involved in killing wildlife, and smuggling routes 
commonly utilized.   
The criminal networks involved in poaching and trafficking are both 
extensive and well connected to the political elite.240 According to the EIA,  
 
“Corruption is a key enabling factor at every stage of the ivory 
trafficking chain: from game rangers who provide information on 
patrol patterns and the location of elephant herds, to police officers 
who rent out weapons and transport ivory, to the Tanzanian 
Revenue Authority (TRA) officers which allow shipping containers 
of ivory to flow out of the country’s ports.”241   
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The ruling political party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), operates 
across the poaching chain. Four CCM members accused of poaching, all from 
the Selous area, were publicly named by the Minister of Natural Resources and 
Tourism, but were never investigated.  Other high ranking officials have been 
found with tusks. The secretary general of the CCM owned one of the shipping 
companies involved in transporting ivory from Tanzania to Vietnam in 2009.242  
Police officers have also been involved in poaching and trafficking.243 High-level 
wildlife officials are known to take the ivory from elephants that died of natural 
causes or that have been poached but their ivory not removed without permits or 
documentation.244  Networks also include middlemen who consolidate shipments 
and arrange for transport out of the country. These networks can involve any 
number of corrupt officials from the wildlife sector, local and national police, 
customs agents, and politicians.245  Even members of the clergy have been 
implicated as significant players.246 Syndicates may be funded by a small group 
of individuals who facilitate the process from behind the scenes.247 
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Unlike in Kenya, mass killing incidents are common in Tanzania, though 
rarely publicized. Entire herds are decimated by large poaching gangs, 
sometimes comprised of as many as 100 people including the poachers, cooks, 
drivers, porters, navigators, and security details. These are typically heavily 
armed gangs who may spend as long as three weeks poaching in a single 
area.248 As has become common across Africa, poachers in Tanzania are known 
to use sub machine guns, AK-47s, shotguns, pistols, poison, spikes, arrows, and 
snares to kill elephants.249 Tanzanian poachers are also known to kill elephants 
in Tsavo and Amboseli in Kenya, and are thought to be deeply implicated in the 
large-scale poaching which has taken place in the Niassa Game Reserve in 
Mozambique since 2009. Poachers are also known to attack and rob tourists.250 
According to local media reports, poachers can make as much as $300 for 
selling a tusk to a middle man who can then make up to $1400 selling to 
traffickers in Dar es Salaam.251   
Ivory is typically moved from harvest points via motorcycle with through 
local villages on the outskirts of reserves, where traffickers and poachers meet 
up to exchange goods and cash. The ivory then moves by personal vehicle or 
bus to Dar es Salaam for consolidation and packing to fill large orders. 
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Traffickers hide ivory in cargo ships mixed with licit goods such as sisal fibers, 
garlic, or wood, for shipment through multiple ports in Asia before reaching its 
final destination. Buyers and sellers from the border region between Mozambique 
and Tanzania, a major poaching hotspot, are known to traffic ivory through a 
famous tourist market in Dar Es Salaam, the Mwengi Carvers Market. Three 
primary ports are used to move ivory out of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, 
and Mombasa. Zanzibar may be the largest single ivory trafficking hub in Africa. 
Another trade route through Malawi to Mozambique was uncovered in 2013.  
Ivory originating in or passing through Tanzania ends up primarily in China, after 
transiting through multiple south Asian ports.252   
The links to China are particularly stark in Tanzania.  The EIA uncovered links 
between wildlife crime syndicates in southern China and ivory trafficking and 
wildlife crime through Zanzibar. These groups are responsible for as many as 20 
shipments of ivory a year averaging between two and three tons each.  The 
Chinese gangs work closely with trusted Tanzanian accomplices, including 
businessmen, members of the government and corrupt customs agents.253  
Chinese diplomatic visits and missions to Tanzania have been linked on 
multiple occasions to increases in the volume of ivory sold. According to the EIA, 
Chinese embassy staff are the primary customers at illegal domestic markets. In 
2013, a Chinese naval vessel visiting Dar es Salaam, set off a buying frenzy of 
ivory in local markets. On multiple occasions it is believed Chinese diplomats and 
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embassy staff have smuggle larger amounts of ivory out of the country in 
diplomatic bags.254 
 
Adaptation and Mitigation 
 
Pressure from the international community, culminating in the declaration 
of Tanzania as a member of the CITES “gang of eight” most culpable for the illicit 
ivory trade, pushed the country to address the threats to wildlife.255   
Crisis can create an opportunity for positive change and controlled 
transformation of governance authorities and management practices to enable all 
components of an SES to better absorb perturbations.256  Tanzania’s response to 
the current poaching crisis, as well as the longer term threats related to HWC 
and severely degraded conservation norms, represents less a controlled 
transformation than it does a continuation of past strategies, with slight 
alterations.  The strategies Tanzanian authorities have adopted to address the 
current crisis relies on the generation of revenue through donor support and 
tourism.  These strategies include increased enforcement and reforms to wildlife 
legislation with a renewed emphasis on decentralization of wildlife authority. The 
strategy more closely binds governing authorities to donors with increased 
responsibility and opportunity for the latter to fund all aspects of conservation.  
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Tanzania’s public request of $50 million to improve conservation has been 
met with overwhelming support.  Commitments poured in to support every aspect 
of conservation from state sponsors, IGOs, NGOs, private industry, and 
individuals.257 In 2014 donors pledged to support a UNDP administered “Wildlife 
Conservation Basket Fund” and corresponding anti-poaching and anti-trafficking 
task force to address issues of conservation in Tanzania.258 The task force 
partners, including United States, China, Germany, European Union, World Bank 
and the UNDP, promised to provide the necessary resources to impact 
conservation, both through material donations and training and capacity 
building.259 Through donor support Tanzania gained access to weapons; 
vehicles, including trucks, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles; training; 
and infrastructure improvements, in addition to being able to take part in and co-
host multiple international events focused on anti-poaching and wildlife crime.260   
 
Improvements across Enforcement 
 
Both through state governing authorities and in partnerships with 
conservation organizations, the government is increasing protections in PAs 
across the country; increasing cross-border collaboration; improving wildlife 
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monitoring; has increased the number of arrest and prosecutions for traffickers 
and poachers; and has improved seizure rates. 
The government is credited with leading a successful operation dubbed 
Operation Spider Net, which led to the arrests of traffickers, pressuring the 
syndicates operating in southern Tanzania.261  The operation focused on 
traffickers, and according to media reports resulted in 40 cases pending in the 
court system involving financiers.262  TANAPA is experimenting with drones in a 
public private partnership with the AWF as part of a nascent Private Sector Anti-
Poaching Initiative (PSAPI).263 Through assistance provided by USAID and the 
WCS, Tanzania is implementing a law enforcement monitoring system using 
SMART (Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool) software in Ruaha, Katavi and 
Tarangire National Parks.264 In addition, TANAPA established a Rapid Response 
Team (RRT) to quickly address poaching hotspots.265 TANAPA plans to 
implement intensive anti-poaching training to include crime scene investigation, 
so that teams can deploy quickly to hot-spots, with support from NGOs.266  
Anti-poaching programs run through NGOs and public-private 
partnerships have sprung up across the country, increasing the number of patrols 
in WMAs significantly.  A well know example is a UNDP program, called 
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SPANSET (Strengthening Protected Area Network in Southern Tanzania), which 
provides equipment to ranger forces and trains them in anti-poaching methods, 
as well as providing infrastructure support.  SPANSET focuses on the Great 
Ruaha Landscape (GRL) and Great Kitulo-Kipengere Landscape (GKKL). Other 
partnerships through PAMS and the Ruvumbu Elephant Project implement 
intelligence-driven anti-poaching operations to include expansion of intelligence 
networks and information collection, increased patrols, and interagency 
collaboration.267 With assistance from USAID, Tanzania launched the Southern 
Highlands and Ruaha-Katavi Protection Program (SHARPP).  The Ruaha is 
currently one of the most threatened areas in Tanzania. The program focuses on 
improving livelihoods in WMAs, habitat management, and elephant monitoring 
and protection. Where NGOs and PPPs have developed and deployed anti-
poaching operations, poaching appears to be decreasing.268 The government 
claims in some areas to have decreased poaching by as much as 56 percent.269  
The government has also announced it will collaborate through the EAC 
and with Mozambique to combat cross-border poaching.270 The EU announced in 
2015 it would provide funds to strengthen cross-border wildlife management. The 
funds would support both conservation initiatives and CBCs.271 Monitoring 
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improvements have been made possible through aerial surveys as part of a 
continent wide elephant census funded by American billionaire Paul Allen.272  
Arrests and prosecutions have improved. In 2013, a smuggling ring was 
uncovered through extensive police investigation.  In this case, Chinese 
diplomats employed at the consulate in Dar es Salaam led a syndicate 
responsible for moving tons of ivory from Tanzania to China.  While arrests of 
important players occurred, the diplomats fled to China and did not face 
prosecution.273 Some shifts in prosecutions, jail sentences, and fines began 
emerging in 2014 in which repeat offenders received longer sentences, between 
three and ten years.274 In one well-known example, a Chinese national found 
with over 700 tusks in his home received a twenty-year sentence.275  
Seizure rates have also improved significantly in Tanzania. With donor 
support, the government installed special scanners to identify ivory and other 
trafficked wildlife at the ports facility in Dar es Salaam.276 In 2013, for the first 
time Tanzania seized more ivory within its borders than was seized outside of the 
country, indicating some effort to address the massive trade. That year 80% of 
large scale ivory seizures occurred in East Africa.277 Large seizures of ivory 
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continued both within Tanzania and in Asian ports throughout 2014, indicating a 
continuing high level of trade.278 
In 2014 the MNRT announced the development of a new National Wildlife 
Strategy, created in coordination with the UNDP.279 The strategy mandates 
further improvements to intelligence led anti -poaching operations, cross-
border and interagency coordination, CBC management, awareness raising 
in destination countries, and law enforcement capacity.280  
If sustained, these shifts in management practice and strategy have 
the potential to mitigate perturbations across the SES and possibly slow or 
halt the over-exploitation of the SES, allowing populations to recover and 
regain lost resilience. 
 
Reforms to Wildlife Legislation 
 
The potential for longer term shifts in SES management rest on recent 
changes to wildlife legislation, which again attempt to decentralize wildlife 
management.  In 2012, the MNRT released new rules and regulations for WMAs, 
which began unwinding the past decade-long effort at recentralization. The 2012 
regulations address some of the primary issues with previous rules and 
regulations, including the issues of benefit sharing and control over the allocation 
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of hunting concessions. Under the new regulations, CBCs in WMAs can enter 
into agreements with tour operators and other investors, including hunting 
concerns, to utilize wildlife resources in WMAs.   Though still subject to approval 
by the WD, the changes represent a significant shift because CBCs are allowed 
under the law to advertise for investors, and to be part of the selection process.  
The regulations also extend out the period for contracts from three to five years, 
making investments in operations more attractive. The regulations significantly 
shift the revenue sharing between the central state and local communities, 
allocating 75 percent of block fees to the WMAs, with the WD receiving 25 
percent. For other fees associated with the hunting blocks, the WMAs receive 45 
percent, with the remainder shared between the Wildlife Division, Treasury, and 
District government. The regulations also allow for CBCs to charge rates higher 
than those set by the government, if they can find investors willing to pay.281  
In 2013, the government moved to strengthen laws and address 
corruption and mismanagement within the WD when it passed the Tanzania 
Wildlife Management Authority Act. The Act replaced the WD with a new body, 
the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority (TAWA). TAWA will manage game 
reserves, wildlife management areas, and hunting blocks in addition to 
performing anti-poaching functions.282  According to public statements the 
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agency will be fully funded and autonomous, mirroring TANAPA and the NCA, 
and will benefit from the hiring of hundreds of additional rangers.283  
 
Transformation of the SES 
 
Despite some significant advances it remains difficult to determine to what 
extent these efforts will impact long-term conservation efforts. Current policies 
largely mirror past policies, with slight upgrades and additional donor support. 
The government remains invested in revenue generation as a solution to 
conservation concerns, and has increased the role of NGOs in conservation.  
These facts suggest continued stress on the SES as economics trumps 
conservation. 
It is unclear if Tanzania can break with past patterns and processes to 
reform and transform governing authorities.  In practice it appears that the 
strategy to combat wildlife crime does not differ significantly from previous 
practices and rules. 
The state remains wedded to neo-liberal conservation and the 
commodification of its wildlife resources as a method for conservation through 
CBCs, despite little evidence market approaches achieve either goals of 
improving social and economic well-being or conserving wildlife and habitats. 
The MNRT publicly stated the goal of increasing revenue generation by 
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around 30 percent by 2015.284  This would occur through increased tourism, 
including hunting tourism, and presumably take place in continually expanding 
PAs.285  The violent expansion of PAs continued in 2015 with mass evictions of 
communities to increase the number of hunting blocks available for sale on the 
international market. This further undermines trusts and conservation norms. 
Incentives clearly remain for authorities to pursue rent seeking activities.  
Transferring power to local communities is akin to transferring wealth and control 
of resources, a difficult prospect when state institutions are not transparent and 
when resources are highly valued. As Benjaminsen et al. note, “The 
decentralization of natural resource management demands solid policies, 
functioning laws, accountable governments, and an engaged and informed 
citizenry.”286  These are all lacking in Tanzania.287 Structural mechanisms to 
continue rent-seeking activities, though altered through the 2012 legislation, 
remain in place.  The new TAWA, similar to the WD, has the authority to change 
policies in WMAs and to alter use practices in game reserves and other PAs 
without consultation.288  NGOs and IGOs have also doubled down on CBCs and 
the role income generating initiatives can play in conserving wildlife, without 
addressing the role park and PA expansion have in fomenting intense conflicts 
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between communities and conservation authorities and wildlife.289 Past patterns 
and processes suggest that the government and corrupt officials throughout 
conservation agencies will continue to craft rules and regulations to serve rent 
seekers.  
At the national level Tanzania has not discounted the possibility of future 
ivory sales.290 The government continues to research ways to preserve its 
stockpile in order to reevaluate the feasibility of sales at a later date, a move that 
could, if implemented, trigger another poaching crisis by stoking demand.291 
The state’s commitment to increased enforcement has not been 
demonstrated. Poaching rates remain high in the south, in particular in the Ruaha 
National Park, and are increasing in the north of the country and in cross-border 
locations in Mozambique.292 While arrests of low-level traffickers increased, ring 
leaders continue to operate with impunity in Tanzania.293 As EIA investigations 
uncovered, most of the primary players in the poaching crisis in Tanzania remain 
at large, and many active poaching syndicates remain unaffected by these 
increased enforcement efforts.294 Lack of arrests of king-pins or higher level 
operators within poaching rings reinforces the belief in many that corrupt officials 
are covering up the involvement of politicians.295  The government continues to 
suppress information about poaching levels or complicity of government officials 
                                            
289
 Guardian, "Undp: Community Involvement Crucial in Fight against Poaching," ibid. (12 May 
2014), http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=67750. 
290
 EIA, "Open Season: The Burgeoning Illegal Ivory Trade in Tanzania and Zambia". 
291
 "Uk to Help Preserve Tanzania's 137 Tonnes of Stockpiled Ivory,"  in IPPmedia.com (11 July 
2014), http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=69824. 
292
 Mtambalike.  
293
 Tanzania Daily News, "Tanzania: Four Nabbed in Dar over Government Trophies," in 
AllAfrica.com (28 January 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201401280746.html. 
294
 EIA, "Vanishing Point: Criminality, Corruption and the Devastation of Tanzania’s Elephants". 
295
 Guardian, "Special Report: Why Anti-Poaching Campaign Ineffective". 
  
268 
and Chinese diplomats in poaching and trafficking rings.296  It also continues to 
cover up poaching incidents, threatening to retaliate against NGOs reporting 
increases.297 In 2015 Tanzania passed a cybercrimes act aimed at NGOs and 
media outlets that makes it illegal to share information online the government 
considers false.  Another controversial law makes it illegal to publish statistics the 
government does not agree with, challenging the ability of NGOs or others to 
publish accurate numbers on wildlife populations or criminal acts occurring in 
wildlife habitats.298 
It is unclear how the increased role of non-government actors across the 
conservation spectrum will impact resource governance structurally.  In the past, 
government authorities have used the involvement of donors as an avenue for 
revenue accumulation.  Despite the embedded nature of NGOs and the influence 
they have over policy in Tanzania, they have been unable to force long-lasting 
institutional change, as evidence by Tanzania’s quick reversal on long-negotiated 
devolution. Considerable incentives remain for authorities to seek rents, in 
particular as the value of wildlife continues to increase on the global market.  
Nelson and Agarwal note the ability of governing officials to implement reform 
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strategies just to the point required to gain access to financial resources, and no 
more.299 
Relationships between communities and wildlife, as well as between 
communities and wildlife authorities, remain strained and are defined by conflict 
and distrust.  Harsh enforcement tactics threaten local communities and degrade 
relations between conservation authorities and communities, and between 
wildlife in communities. Continued evictions send powerful messages to 
communities that the government values the commodification of wildlife over 
community needs. People are afraid of conservation, afraid of conservation 
authorities, and view wildlife and the expansion of PAS as a direct threat to lives 
and livelihoods.300  
 
Conclusion 
 
Application of the SESF to the Tanzanian case reveal cross-level and 
cross-scale interactions which are leading to the uncontrolled transformation of 
the SES.  Single factor explanations such as ‘corruption’ or ‘mismanagement’ are 
inadequate to explain the complex interactions across the SES.301  Both 
endogenous and exogenous forces simultaneously pressure both the social and 
ecological components of the system, with negative impacts for resilience of 
both.   
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While Tanzania should have been well suited for the application of neo-liberal 
conservation- a large and seemingly resilient SES, adequate legislative 
framework, ample funding and support- conditions within the governing 
authorities, and within the application of reforms, instead imperiled the resource 
system.    
The colonial history of centralization of resource control, eviction and 
exclusion of resource users, deference to international conservation agendas at 
the expense of local resource users, endemic corruption, and the purposive 
pursuit of economic gains to wildlife interact within an overheated global market 
for ivory to facilitate the near destruction of Tanzania’s elephant resources. 
Neoliberal conservation has lead to the displacement of communities and their 
dispossession of resource rights because the land and resources gain value as a 
global commodity, incentivizing conservation authorities to increase the area of 
land under protection and officials to structure rules and regulations to benefit 
rent seeking.302  Under the current governing system NGOs have been able to 
develop and control large-scale conservation programs on community lands, with 
nominal input and participation from local communities.303  
Folke et al. explain adaptability as the ability of an SES to learn and adjust 
to both internal and external factors and processes, and to continue developing 
within the stability domain.304  The system in Tanzania is not adapting, and 
proposed solutions to the challenges facing wildlife have not evolved in any way- 
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they continue to grow PAs, rely heavily on foreign donors for technical and 
financial aid, exclude local peoples from decision-making, and commodity wildlife 
and habitats.   
Tanzania stands in contrast to Botswana, the last case examined for this 
project, where the elephant population has exploded to over 200,000, with 
poaching rates at less than .05% of the population, and little evidence of any 
large scale organized wildlife crime.305 Botswana has emerged as a champion for 
elephant conservation and a driving force behind efforts to halt the illegal traffic of 
ivory from Africa to Asia. The threats facing Botswana’s SES, deforestation, 
desertification, and water shortages do, however, similar to those facing 
Tanzania, relate to global markets and changing valuations to land. In 
Botswana’s case, the values accruing to cattle, and elite motivations to protect 
those values, create competition for resources within the SES.  Though this 
competition has not yet impacted elephant populations, both human communities 
and other wildlife populations have been transformed by these interactions.  
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CHAPTER 7 
BOTSWANA 
 
Problem Statement 
 
Botswana’s social-ecological system stands in stark contrast to those of 
Kenya and Tanzania.  Elephant populations have exploded in Botswana, spilling 
over into neighboring countries, with an impact on the region’s SES. Poaching 
rarely occurs.  Communities generally support conservation and express positive 
views on wildlife.    
Several factors in play at the national level have impacted the positive 
ecological outcomes evident in Botswana’s SES including high-level support for 
conservation; effective policing and enforcement; a unified strategy for 
commercial tourism development; positive conservation norms; and rules and 
regulations which facilitate local decision-making about resource usage.  
Botswana’s challenge moving ahead is to maintain its level of resilience in the 
face of growing threats to regional populations, evidenced by increasing 
poaching rates in most of its neighbors, as well as the broader threats facing the 
entire resource system.  
At one time Botswana believed the country’s elephants, and its ivory 
trade, could be sustained even in the context of a global ivory trade. Increasingly 
governance authorities in Botswana recognize their elephants as part and parcel 
of the global SES, and that in order to safeguard local wildlife, the entire system 
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must be shored up. Adapting to changing realities across the continent, President 
Ian Khama has linked the safety of Botswana’s elephants with that of the entire 
African elephant SES. Botswana has framed the safety of their national herd as 
inextricably linked to the patterns and processes at work, including mass killings 
and hyper consumption, severely impacting other sections of the SES. As such, 
the country is working to both buttress protections within the local SES and to 
strengthen simultaneously enforcement and conservation of the international 
SES.  
However, some adaptations of governance strategies, meant to decrease 
vulnerabilities within the system, may prove to degrade SES resilience.  
Management of the SES continues to be impacted by a pre-colonial history of 
racism and exploitation of the minority San peoples by the majority Tswana, in 
addition to the acute competition between cattle-grazing users and local users of 
the SES.1 Botswana’s early and continuous emphasis on commercial cattle 
ranching, and the pursuit of diamond deposits as the primary pathways to 
development, have shaped interactions between resource users in the system, 
with damaging consequences for social and, in some instances, ecological 
components of the system.  
Following the SESF, this chapter first provides a description of Botswana’s 
resource system and units, highlighting the large areas devoted to conservation, 
the large size of Botswana’s elephant herds, and its importance regionally and 
globally. The next section examines the governance system in Botswana and key 
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interactions between the state and resource users which link the local SES to 
global markets, ultimately contributing to a resilient conservation system, which 
economically benefits the entire country. The chapter then examines the steps 
the governance system has undertaken to address threats to the SES, which link 
the health of local populations to that of the entire continental SES, while also 
bolstering local protections through proactive and adaptive measures.  The 
conclusion highlights the utility of the SESF in illustrating how interactions at the 
domestic level, such as legislation and the actions of resource users, can impact 
the international system in a positive fashion. 
 
Resource System and Resource Units 
 
While Botswana has largely escaped the current elephant poaching 
epidemic, significant perturbations are creating vulnerabilities in the SES, most of 
which relate to the degradation of the landscape resulting from commercial cattle 
herding, which competes with conservation as the key rural development 
mechanism, and cross-border poaching threats.2   
Like Tanzania, Botswana devotes a significant portion of its landmass to 
conservation.  Around 39 percent of the country is under some form of 
conservation, in the country’s three national parks, seven game reserves, forest 
reserves and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs).3 The total land-area under 
                                            
2
 Michael Chase and Kelly Landen, "View from the Top," Africa Geographic 19, no. 7 (2011). 
3
 Lesley P. Boggs, "Community Power, Participation, Conflict and Development Choice: 
Community Wildlife Conservation in the Okavango Region of Northern Botswana," Evaluating 
Eden Series Discussion Paper No.17 (2000). 
  
275 
protection stands at 170,850km2.4 In addition the government has divided the 
entire country into 163 controlled hunting areas (CHAs) for the apportionment of 
hunting quotas and guided development.5 
Botswana’s SES is tightly interlinked with neighboring systems through its 
northern conservation regions which connect to a larger conservation system, the 
Kavango Zambezi Conservation Area.  This area spans northern Botswana, 
Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola. As a complex system incorporating 
multiple states and varying governance systems and local SESs, it is unclear 
whether promoting the interconnections of the system will increase resilience, or 
introduce vulnerability, across as the poaching crisis moves out of east Africa to 
the southern portions of the continent.6 The system includes three dozen national 
parks, game reserves, forest reserves, game/wildlife management areas, and 
other protected concessions.7 The conservation area encompasses both the 
Chobe National Park and much of the Okavango Delta.8   
Botswana’s physical landscape consists of both wetlands and woodland 
area with permanent water and seasonal flooding in the north and semi-arid 
desert in the south of the country.  The country’s most famous wildlife area, the 
Okavango Delta, is recognized as a World Heritage Site for the abundance of 
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wildlife, and is listed under the 1996 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands as a 
wetland of international importance. The southern 70 to 80 percent of the country 
consists of the Kalahari Desert, characterized by recurring and prolonged 
droughts, poor soils, and few permanent water sources.9   
Unlike Tanzania and Kenya, Botswana is sparsely populated, limiting 
negative human-wildlife interactions within the SES. Less than 37 percent of 
Batswana10 live in rural areas, leaving much of the SES free from people.11 
Encroachment and competition within the SES relate to the country’s three 
million cattle. Domesticated livestock threatens wildlife through fencing; 
increased pressure on water resources; expansion into wildlife territory; 
overgrazing; desertification; and through increased incidence of human-wildlife 
conflict.12  Fences erected to keep wild animals separate from cattle to stop the 
spread of disease impede wildlife movements and stop animals reaching 
seasonal water sources, which can trigger mass die-offs. During a drought in the 
1980s 50,0000 animals died when fences impeded their movement towards 
water.13  Wildlife declines related to fencing continue to be a challenge. In 
Ngamiland, 11 of 14 species declined by an average of 61 percent from 1999 to 
the present. Some animals, such as wildebeest, have declined by 90 percent. In 
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the same area tsessebe and warthog populations fell by over 80 percent. In 
addition to expansive fencing, a twenty-year drought that began in the 1980s is a 
major factor in these declines.14   
Lack of water due to climate change, drought, and depletion of natural 
water sources threaten wildlife in the SES. Conservationists are particularly 
concerned about a large population of elephants that migrate between 
Zimbabwe’s Hwange Naitonal Park and Botswana’s Chobe National Park. 
Boreholes are drying up along the animals’ migration route, threatening as many 
as 30,000 elephants with death from lack of water.15 Deforestation, habitat 
fragmentation, desertification, wild fires, and encroachment into wildlife territories 
also threaten the SES.16     
 
Resource Units 
 
Botswana hosts the continent’s largest population of elephants, as well as 
endangered wild dogs, lions, cheetahs, and numerous species of antelope. The 
most bio diverse region of the country is the north where permanent water 
sources exist.17 Africa’s largest concentration of wildlife occurs in the Chobe 
National Park, also home to the largest elephant population in Africa.18  
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Like most of the rest of Africa, Botswana experienced mass poaching in 
the 1980s, closely associated with conflict across the region. Organized poaching 
syndicates with connections to the South African military, various insurgencies, 
and warring factions across the region engaged in poaching to raise funds and 
purchase weapons.19  Poachers targeted the Okavango Delta for its large 
population of elephants and relative inaccessibility to authorities.20  
Elephant range changes seasonally depending on the availability and 
location of water year to year from around 120,000 km2 to about 93,000 km2.   As 
in Kenya and Tanzania, most elephant range exists beyond park and protected 
area boundaries. Only between 23 to 32 percent of Botswana’s elephants live in 
protected areas, fluctuating between wet and dry seasons.21   
Botswana’s elephant population is critically important for the health of the 
regional population, and has proven resilient to cross-border threats. Botswana 
essentially became a refuge for elephants fleeing violence and insecurity in 
neighboring states.  In recent years those same elephants began repopulating 
neighboring countries, at one point expanding their range across 250,000 km2, 
over multiple international borders.22 As poaching rates have again risen across 
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borders, the elephant dispersal to neighboring Namibia, Zambia and Angola has 
largely stopped.23 
Since the last poaching epidemic, illegal killing of elephants in Botswana 
has been rare. According to MIKE analysis, Botswana lost less than 120 
elephants per year during much of the recent poaching crisis.24 Botswana likely 
houses more than a third of all elephants in Africa.25  Elephant populations in the 
Okavango Delta and Chobe stand at around 130,000, based on aerial estimates 
between 2010 and 2012. Another 70,000 live in other parks, protected areas, and 
unprotected areas across the SES. Some herds contain as many as 500 
elephants.26 Most of the country’s elephants live in the north, with smaller 
populations in the eastern tip of the country.27  
Utilizing wildlife has been a key component of Botswana’s governance 
system until recently. Hunting of all but a few protected animals was allowed 
under a licensing and quota system. Botswana generally issued licenses to kill 
around four hundred elephants per year. Botswana’s elephants are listed under 
CITES Appendix II. The country participated in both the 1999 and 2007 sale of 
ivory.28  
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Botswana is heavily dependent on the health of the SES for both the 
tourism industry and cattle production.  Tourism in Botswana has increased on 
average over eight percent per year since 1994.  Numbers increased by 50 
percent between 2000 and 2009. The over one million visitors per year account 
for over 12 percent of the country’s GDP.29  According to the USDA, 85 percent 
of Botswana’s agricultural output is derived from livestock, primarily cattle 
production, though the cattle industry accounts for less than three percent of 
Botswana’s GDP.30 
 
Governance System and Resource Users 
 
Per the SESF literature, an examination of social and ecological 
processes and the linkages between them within a specific SES can answer 
questions about how the system developed into its present state, how it operates 
currently, and how it might change in the future.31  Exogenous forces, including 
liberalization, privatization, and globalization emerged early on as important 
factors influencing early land-use decisions and the development of the SES in 
Botswana.  As Young et al. note, globalization is a key factor in exposing an SES 
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to both resilience and vulnerability.32  Globalization has had a clear impact on 
Botswana’s SES in terms of both the system’s resilience- funded in large part 
through the country’s diamond reserves- and its vulnerabilities, which correspond 
primarily to degradation caused by the commercial cattle industry and threats 
associated with the massive expansion of the global ivory market.  The 
globalization of the cattle industry in Botswana has resulted in large-scale 
fencing, degradation of communal lands, increased pressure on water sources, 
and an overall decline in most large mammal species, as well as multiple 
deleterious impacts on human communities.33  
Similar, and linked, endogenous forces driving the development of the 
economy and the production of a national identity, including heavily centralized 
resource control and de-racialization of resource allocation, have impacted how 
governance over wildlife resources developed over time.34  Botswana early on 
addressed issues of land tenure and privatization to spur the growth of the 
economy and aid in the development of a national identity.  These imperatives 
have shaped the decisions on resource use and governance within the SES.   
The highly centralized management system, which developed has also 
introduced both resilience and vulnerability into the system.  Botswana’s 
resilience is evidenced by its strong legislation addressing wildlife crime and 
effective enforcement mechanisms, and is reinforced by its focus on utilization 
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programs that foster positive conservation norms for most Batswana. Unlike 
Tanzania and Kenya, Botswana has managed the development of its wildlife 
resources as a means to pursue national development goals. The government 
has invested heavily in the protection of wildlife assets, and is less reliant on 
NGOs for key conservation services.35 As such, the elephant population has 
exploded in the country, and wildlife industries have become a key driver of 
economic development in rural communities. However, vulnerabilities emerge in 
contested political and geographic spaces because the government continues to 
support land uses which are incompatible with wildlife conservation, favoring elite 
concerns over national priorities. Moreover, some adaptations of governance 
strategies meant to decrease vulnerabilities within the system, such as the ban 
on hunting and shifts to rules and regulations, which recentralized control over 
community-based conservation programs, may prove to degrade SES resilience.   
Despite their significant damage to the SES, both within social and 
ecological components of the system, Botswana continues to support large-scale 
globalized cattle production and diamond mining through subsidies and 
preferential land-use policies at the expense of wildlife and local resource 
users.36 Other challenges relate to the decision to treat wildlife resources in the 
same manner as other national assets, meaning central management and 
national allocation of benefits.   
These challenges, though significant, do not diminish Botswana’s 
achievements in protecting its elephant herds and increasing the relevancy of its 
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wildlife assets for the country.  Moreover, Botswana’s dual strategy for 
addressing wildlife crime, consisting of an emphasis on the local/global nature of 
the SES while simultaneously strengthening local mechanisms for protection, has 
proven effective to date at both raising the profile of wildlife crime at the 
international level and increasing protections locally. 
 
Park Development under the British Protectorate 
 
Unlike in Kenya and Tanzania, it was not immediately obvious that 
conservation was desirable or feasible in Botswana, then called Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. Early explorers and adventurers over-exploited Botswana’s wildlife, 
resulting in the mass depletion of wild animals, in particular elephants, by the turn 
of the nineteenth century. European settlement and grazing began changing the 
landscape from the 1890s when Afrikaners from Transvaal moved into what 
would become Botswana, foreshadowing current challenges to the SES. Large-
scale cattle ranching degraded the landscape through overuse of scarce water 
resources, overgrazing, and depletion of veld products.37  By 1890 animal 
populations were at an all-time low, before being further decimated by an 
outbreak of rinderpest.38   
These early usage patterns and the reality of a degraded SES devoid of 
wildlife led colonial administrators to ignore international trends in conservation 
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emerging at the time.  Instead colonial administrators chose to promote the 
protectorate’s capacity as a cattle producer, supporting policies incompatible with 
wildlife conservation from the turn of the 20th century.39 Authorities argued wildlife 
management was a waste of time, considering the degradation of the SES in the 
early part of the century. As a result, the British Protectorate did not establish the 
first game reserve in the Okavango Delta until 1940. In the 1960s the park 
system was expanded to include the Central Kalahari Gam Reserve (CKGR) and 
the Moremi Game Reserve.40   
As elsewhere, under the colonial authorities and after independence, the 
government centralized land and wildlife management and claimed ownership of 
all wildlife.41 Evictions occurred to make way for gazzettment of parks and 
protected areas. In some instances the colonial authorities consulted local 
peoples, while in other instances, such as in the creation of the CKGR, 
particularly important to hunter-gatherer communities, consultations did not 
occur.42 Chobe, long recognized as an important area for biodiversity, did not 
receive protections until the late 1960s.43 In 1966 a formal conservation policy 
was devised.44  Usage patterns which developed in the protectorate era- 
centralizing control over wildlife resources and favoring cattle interests over 
wildlife- continue to inform governance of the SES. 
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Governing Post-Independence 
 
Wildlife policy in Botswana post-independence continued to be top-down 
and highly centralized.45  The state remained focused on commercial cattle 
production in much of the SES, impacting the patterns of resource use, which 
emerged, including fencing to facilitate the expansion of the cattle industry.  After 
the discovery of diamonds, mineral extraction drove GDP growth. Wildlife 
conservation did not emerge as an economic driver of development until the late 
1980s. At that time Botswana embraced community based conservation and 
developed a national marketing strategy to raise the value of wildlife resources 
on the global market. With rising values to wildlife, conservation has become 
entangled in a national debate over resource allocation and national identity.  
 
Governance Authorities 
 
The Ministry of Environment, Wildlife, and Tourism, (MEWT) manages the 
country’s wildlife assets through the department of environmental Affairs (DEA). 
MEWT consists of eight departments, one parastatal (the Botswana Tourism 
Organization), and one not-for-profit company (Forest Conservation Botswana). 
Under MEWT, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) is the 
primary organization responsible for overseeing wildlife conservation and 
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managing utilization. The DWNP account for 92 percent of MEWT’s revenues.46 
As in Kenya and Tanzania, the managing authorities have a wide range of 
responsibilities. The department conducts research on wildlife; enforces wildlife 
laws; develops managing plans; conducts the building of infrastructure; is 
responsible for community outreach and education programs; manages the 
country’s fisheries; and runs the Botswana Wildlife Training Institute.47   
Botswana’s approach to wildlife control is community-based and allows 
communities to utilize wildlife on their land and in the Wildlife Management Areas 
(WMAs), recognizing traditional user rights.48 The laws and policies in Botswana 
allow the local communities to hunt in Wildlife Management Areas without a 
permit, for food.49 
Though not to the same extent as in Kenya and Tanzania, IGOs and 
NGOs play a role in the management of wildlife in Botswana, particularly in 
influencing the reform process and the adoption of community based 
management since the 1980s. NGOs produce research on wildlife populations in 
the country, assist in monitoring wildlife movements, and promote and facilitate 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programs. USAID 
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in particular was instrumental in the development and adoption of CBNRM as a 
conservation strategy in Botswana.   
In the late 1980s when Botswana began focusing heavily on its wildlife 
sector as an engine of rural growth, authorities developed a national use strategy 
focused on attracting high-end, low-volume tourism.  This decision was made in 
recognition of a weak tourism infrastructure and the desire to limit environmental 
impacts related to mass tourism.50   
 
Legislation 
 
Effective, and enforced, legislation in Botswana increases the resilience of 
the SES. The primary legislation on wildlife in Botswana is the Wildlife 
Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 (WCNPA) and supporting 
legislation including the Tourism Policy of 1990, the National Conservation 
Strategy of 1990, and the Tourism Act of 1992.51  The WCNPA implements 
Botswana’s obligations under CITES in addition to regulating the domestic trade 
in wild animal meat, trophies and other wildlife products.52 The CBNRM policy of 
2007 governs local management of wildlife.53 
Unlike in Kenya and Tanzania, laws against illegally killing and trafficking 
wildlife in Botswana were strong before the current poaching epidemic. 
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Moreover, penalties for poaching and illegal hunting practices under the WCNPA 
are much higher than in most African countries. Hunting any animal without a 
license can result in two years in jail  and a fine. Illegally killing a protected game 
animal carries harsher punishments, starting with seven-year terms for animals 
like cheetahs, ten years for an elephant, and increasing to a fifteen years for a 
rhinoceros. Repeat offenders face fines and sentences fifty percent greater.54 
Laws are written to facilitate prosecution and law enforcement, so an individual 
does not have to be caught in the act or with a trophy to be prosecuted.  For 
example, trespassing onto private land or unauthorized entry into a park with a 
weapon is a punishable offence, as is travelling along a road with a loaded 
weapon other than a pistol.55 Wildlife enforcement officers have broad powers to 
enforce wildlife laws, including warrantless searches and seizures if they can 
establish reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime under the WCNPA. 
For instance, a wildlife or police officer may “stop, seize and search any vehicle, 
boat or aircraft which he believes to have been used in the commission of the 
offence, or to contain anything which might provide evidence of the offence.”56 
Authorities retain the right to seize trophies, meat, animals, and weapons as 
evidence, in addition to holding some prosecutorial powers to charge suspect 
and convey summons.57  The law also addresses the need for compensation for 
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victims of wildlife crime, and provides a provision for property owners to kill 
wildlife in order to protect property or lives from damage or death.58  
To further support law enforcement and limit opportunities to kill wildlife 
illegally, the government issued a temporary hunting ban in 2014. The ban 
impacts all commercial hunting, and all hunting in public areas, turning 
designated hunting zones into photographic areas.59 The move was in response 
to the significant declines in wildlife populations. The ban impacts all CHAs and 
WMAs in Botswana. Quotas for those areas were suspended. The ban did not 
affect hunting in private game ranches. 60 
 
Militarized Anti-Poaching 
 
Bolstering Botswana’s strong legal mechanisms to address perturbations 
in the SES is its robust anti-poaching force, which is led by the country’s military 
force, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF). Botswana initially turned to the BDF 
to support anti-poaching operations to address militarized cross-border poaching 
in the late 1980s. The BDF was immediately successful, after which the anti-
poaching mission was extended to the rest of the force.61   
The unit works closely with the DWNP and the police to enforce anti-
poaching laws and protect wild animals. The BDF’s anti-poaching operations 
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focus primarily on cross-border poaching, while the DWNP focuses on local meat 
poachers.  At any one time, as many as ten percent of the BDF may be deployed 
fighting poachers. The BDF patrols in all border areas of the country on anti-
poaching patrols.  Anti-poaching training exposes troops to wild animals at its 
headquarters, allowing soldiers to learn about animals, how to handle them, and 
to gain an appreciation for their value.62  The BDF and DWNP also coordinate 
through a regional Joint Military Commission to share intelligence on poaching 
and coordinate operations.63 
The success of anti-poaching operations in Botswana is attributed to 
multiple factors including superior training and professionalism evident in the 
BDF; support from the local population; and high-level political support.  
Botswana’s current president, Ian Khama, was intimately involved with the 
decision to deploy the BDF to fight poaching in the late 1980s.64  A self-described 
conservationist, Khama specifically sought out personnel with the right skills to 
track and interdict poachers. The force remains successful after over two 
decades on the mission due to high standards of discipline and good leadership; 
high levels of education among recruits; relationships with foreign militaries and 
foreign military training; ability to maintain resources; and regular and generous 
pay.65   
Despite significant success, the BDF’s anti-poaching mission presents 
multiple challenges including the requirement to patrol large and remote areas; 
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the harsh climate; danger of wild animals;66 small number of troops dedicated to 
the anti-poaching mission; exclusion of the local populace from anti-poaching 
operations lenient penalties in neighboring countries; and regional political 
instability.67  
 
Community Based Management and Competition within the SES 
 
Two factors drove the emergence of community based conservation in 
Botswana.  First, similarly to Kenya and Tanzania, the government realized after 
the poaching epidemic of the 1980s that protecting wildlife required community 
involvement and some devolution of authority to community members. Second, 
community based conservation arose in response to the government sanctioned 
expansion of the cattle industry further into wildlife territories through the Tribal 
Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP), and the subsequent declines in wildlife 
populations that followed.68  The DWNP considered the TGLP a threat to 
conservation as a rural development tool, and supported the 1986 Wildlife 
Conservation Policy laying the groundwork for later community based 
conservation efforts.69    
The TGLP, sponsored and funded by the World Bank, was meant to raise 
the standards of cattle production to meet European standards in addition to 
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addressing issues of land degradation.70  The TGLP developed in part as a 
response to the Beef Protocol Agreement between Botswana and the European 
Economic Community (EEC), meant to promote economic development in 
several southern African nations.71  The TGLP essentially enclosed and 
privatized communal lands under the guise of protecting wild areas, and to avoid 
a ‘tragedy of the commons.’72  The policy aimed to provide a more efficient way 
to deliver services, control diseases, and monitor cattle breeding.73  The TGLP 
expanded privatization, already well under way in Botswana from the late 1960s, 
by rezoning rangeland to include areas for communal use, commercial ranches, 
and reserved areas.  The policy essentially divided the land in terms of current 
and future livestock production, ignoring the needs or role of wildlife, favoring 
commercial enterprise over subsistence and other non-commercial uses of the 
land. 74    
Instead of slowing degradation, the TGLP divided and damaged the SES, 
irrevocably transforming parts of the SES. Under the subsidies, land has become 
more valuable for livestock purposes than for wildlife.75   The policy was 
ultimately meant to strengthen beef standards in Botswana in order to meet 
European import requirements, receive subsidies and other development 
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assistance. The EEC required strict animal health measures, in particular the 
separation of livestock form wild animal populations. To meet these requirements 
Botswana built hundreds of miles of veterinary fences, with disastrous 
consequences for wildlife.76 Fencing divides the country into disease control 
areas and quarantine areas.  The fences interrupt major wildlife migrations, 
prevent animals from reaching water sources, and become targets for poachers 
searching for trapped wildlife.77 Fencing policies have not stopped the spread of 
disease and have had a deleterious effect on migrating wildlife.78 The subsidies 
created incentives for ranchers to push into areas inappropriate for commercial 
cattle production, prone to erosion, with salty soil, poor vegetation, inadequate 
groundwater resources, and low rain, degrading an already marginal landscape 
unsuited to agro-pastoral enterprises.79  Fencing and expansion onto communal 
lands has the additional impact of preventing the hunter-gatherer communities 
from accessing veld products and pursuing traditional livelihood practices.80  
Moreover, because rights to graze in communal lands were not rescinded, 
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wealthy cattle owners graze their animals first in common areas, then on their 
own lands, leading to a “tragedy of the commons.”81  
Despite significant wildlife declines, fencing to support cattle grazers was 
bolstered by the 1997 the Diseases of Animals Act (1997), which promoted 
further veterinary fencing across the country.82  This policy led directly to massive 
declines in wildlife over the past decade and a half, radically shifting the SES 
from a resilient system to one experiencing unplanned transformation. 
 
Devolution and the Development of CBNRM 
 
Community based natural resource management programs were 
implemented differently in Botswana than in Tanzania and Kenya, emphasizing 
to a greater degree transparency, inclusion, and more completely devolved 
authority over revenues.  However, some of the same criticisms of CBNRM 
ultimately emerged and the government very quickly recentralized programs.   
CBNRM developed in Botswana through a close partnership with USAID. 
The program ran for one decade, from 1989-1999, after which NGOs took up the 
mantle of assisting communities in developing and managing CBNRM 
                                            
81
 Swatuk, "From "Project" to "Context": Community Based Natural Resource Management in 
Botswana." Poteete, "Defining Political Community and Rights to Natural Resources in 
Botswana." 
82
 Mulale et al., "Formal Institutions and Their Role in Promoting Sustainable Land Management 
in Boteti, Botswana." 
  
295 
programs.83 CBNRM was shaped to align with the government’s overall strategy 
to focus the tourism industry on high-value/low-volume tourists.84   
CBNRM programs operate across the SES in areas outside of national 
parks in WMAs and CHAs.85  Communities within CHAs can apply to manage 
wildlife in their area, run photo safaris or cultural tourism ventures, or for the 
commercial harvest of veld products.  CHAs are zoned for multiple use, so 
grazing and agriculture are also allowed, though with restrictions.  More 
restrictions apply on CHAs that fall within WMAs.  These areas are reserved for 
primarily wildlife centered enterprises.86  Two types of CBOs emerged, those 
engaged in wildlife management through joint venture agreements (JVAs) with 
hunting outfits or photo safaris, and those partnering with NGOs or private 
companies to exploit veld products.87 
Significant differences exist between how CBNRM programs developed in 
Botswana compared to Kenya and Tanzania.  First, CBNRM programs in 
Botswana adopted a “sustainable use” model in which local people can both sell 
the rights to wildlife but also utilize wildlife for their own needs through a quota 
system.88  Utilization also includes the commercial gathering of “veld products,” 
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such as thatching grass or medicinal plants.89  Second, under CBNRM 
communities gained the ability to negotiate directly with tour operators and 
hunting outfitters through JVAs, or run concerns themselves.90  Leases begin 
with one-year renewals, followed by a three-year contract, and then sets of five-
year contracts.91  Third, CBNRM programs were designed taking local knowledge 
on animal behavior and ecosystem attributes into account to determine hunting 
quotas, camping spots, and other land use decisions.92 Locals directly take part 
in the management of wildlife by monitoring wildlife populations, movements, and 
death and renewal rates, and in increasing knowledge on wildlife behaviors and 
characteristics.93  Fourth, communities keep 100 percent of the proceeds 
generated through ventures under the initial CBNRM framework,94 and make 
decisions on how to allocate or utilize revenues gained through the utilization of 
resources.95 Some successful programs were earning hundreds of thousands of 
dollars annually.96 By 2003 communities collectively earned more than $4 million 
annually.97 Access to funds and participation in management decisions allowed 
communities to gain a sense of ownership over wildlife resources and craft 
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locally relevant plans for development.98 According to government documents, 
the CBNRM Policy raised the value of wildlife concessions by over 100% from 
2002-2012.99 Unlike in Kenya and Tanzania where resistance to CBNRM is 
acute, in Botswana communities seek out opportunities to participate in 
WMAs.100  
However, despite the relative success of CBNRM, significant challenges 
exist, many of them corresponding to those already discussed for Kenya and 
Tanzania. Rules to establish a CBNRM program are complex and onerous, 
creating barriers to local management.101 Because finding and retaining local 
skilled workers to manage a CBNRM is a challenge, communities are forced to 
rely on venture partner, aid organizations, or government officials,102 shifting 
authority away from communities to boards and other governance structures. In 
practice communities are often times totally left out of the management 
process.103 Wage benefits are not evenly spread through communities, creating a 
disconnect for a large number of those living in WMAs who do not directly 
benefit, and who may only very slightly indirectly benefit.104 Other challenges 
relate to unequal benefits among the community, and the attendant conflicts, 
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which ensue from that inequality.105 Overhyped promises of development; 
requirements to relinquish use of land or limitations on usage; lack of inclusion 
within management mechanisms once JVAs are established; lack of knowledge 
on the goals of CBNRM; and a general feeling of disconnect between 
communities and conservation operations characterize CBNRM in Botswana.106 
These challenges were exacerbated by the lack of a legal framework to 
govern CBNRM programs. As in Kenya, Botswana did not draft legislation or a 
policy framework to support CBNRM until long after programs were established.  
The community organizations operated on a draft of the policy for at least fifteen 
years, opening up the organizations to manipulations by authorities in various 
agencies.107 Thakadu argues the system was really designed for co-
management of resources as opposed to the actual devolution of authority.108  
The DWNP retained ownership of wildlife and land and exercised approval 
authority over local decisions in terms of wildlife management and quotas and 
revenue allocation and investment.109   
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Recentralization 
 
Despite initial success and widespread acceptance of the programs, 
throughout the 2000s the government recentralized wildlife authority and 
reversed key aspects of its devolution initiative through its 2007 CBNRM policy 
and later ban on hunting.110 The policy backtracked on the original tenets of 
CBNRM, which indicate communities should gain the most from conservation 
revenues. This occurred in Botswana for a number of reasons related less to 
critiques over the management of resources and more to conflicts and contest 
between the allocation of revenues accruing to conservation.  As Rihoy argues, 
CBNRM became “socially and politically contested in Botswana, with resource 
rights and benefits subjected to struggles amongst local communities and 
political economic elites.”111  
Shifts in the CBNRM policy were justified on two primary grounds. First, 
under Botswana’s constitution, all natural resources are national assets to be 
managed centrally for equitable allocation. Local management of wildlife 
resources seemed to run counter to the constitutional requirement, in particular 
because local communities received 100 percent of revenues accruing to 
conservation ventures.112 CBNRM seemed to disproportionality benefit San.113 
The development of local control of resources and revenues also set a 
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dangerous precedent for communities living in diamond-rich areas.  Those 
communities began agitating for local control of diamond resources.114  As 
Poteete argues, “calls for mineral royalties to be paid to mining communities just 
as wildlife revenues are paid to wildlife communities challenge the government’s 
main source of revenues.”115  
Second, and related, the shift was justified as a mechanism to promote 
national identity.  In Botswana, rights accrue to national citizens, not as a result 
of membership in a certain racial, ethnic, or tribal group.  Some communities 
wished to define membership in their CBNRM by ethnicity, which the government 
considered to be threatening to national unity.116  The government began 
portraying CBNRM as divisive, interfering with “collective ownership” of wildlife, 
and as negating the intent of shared resources.117  
The policy reneged on some of the key aspects of CBNRM, including local 
ownership, resources access, and benefits sharing.  Under the new policy the 
government took control of the processes to select companies and award JVAs 
to allocate revenues away from local communities. Tour operators now pay fees 
to the National Environmental Fund, managed by the central government, 
instead of directly paying local communities. Funneled through the central 
government, communities now receive 35 percent of funds, to be used on 
approved development projects. The MEWT allocates the rest of the money, per 
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its priorities, to CBNRM programs and ecotourism projects across the country.118  
The new policy increases the oversight role of the central government and district 
councils, and limits community representation to a board chairperson and a 
secretary. Hoon argues that the 2007 legislation has resulted in a punitive, as 
opposed to enabling, system.119   
Moreover, policy shifts, which equate wildlife resources to mineral 
resources fail to acknowledge the special challenges communities rich in wildlife 
face with which communities rich in mineral wealth do not have to contend. 
These include human-wildlife conflict, crop raiding, predation, and loss of access 
to resources, among other challenges. Minerals do not pose the same 
challenges or costs to locals.120 
Rihoy argues the devolution of resource management was more about 
managing people than resources.  As she argues, the policy aims of the 
government did not correspond to community goals. The government sought to 
bring rural communities into a modern wage economy, which is not a goal for 
many in rural areas, in particular of those of older generations.121 According to 
Twyman, “implicit in the policy implementation process are mechanisms which 
constrain empowerment and dictate the forms of participatory conservation which 
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can emerge.”122 Local communities become “rentiers with no opportunity for 
widening livelihood options and associated skills.”123  
 
Resource Users: Emerging Challenges to Conservation Norms 
 
As the SES literature indicates, the history of interactions between 
resource user groups, the resource system, and governing authorities shape 
current patterns and processes of utilization within the SES. Patterns of 
degradation in parts of the Botswana SES reflect interactions within the system 
focused on economic objectives not tied to conservation, primarily cattle 
ranching, and elite privilege. At the same time, the lack of commercial poaching 
or intentional overexploitation of the system reflects positive conservation norms 
that developed partly based on cultural affinity and partly from effective and 
inclusive governance policies.   
Most Batswana view wildlife and conservation positively, and consider 
conservation an important mechanism for economic development. These positive 
attitudes relate to several factors, the first of which is Botswana’s governance 
practice of allowing utilization of wildlife resources.  By allowing local resource 
use, authorities not only encouraged local responsibility, but also created a 
connection between wildlife and communities and a sense of ownership.  
Positive attitudes also relate to the fact that interactions within the SES between 
human and wildlife are not as common as in Tanzania and Kenya, where 
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communities push into wildlife areas. The SES in Botswana is sparsely 
populated, limiting human-wildlife conflict and competition. Most Batswana live in 
the east of the country, while the densest populations of wildlife are in the north, 
where communities are smaller and more spread out. The communities living 
closest to wildlife, San, have a long history of close association with the resource 
system, and deeply held conservation norms, which take center stage in their 
cultural practices.  
The challenge for the governance authorities in Botswana is to preserve 
these positive conservation norms as the country proactively adapts to 
international threats to the SES. Steps taken to safeguard wildlife at the national 
level, including alterations to CBNRM, and the ban on hunting, coupled with rural 
development policies such as the TGLP which favor elite cattle ranchers over 
rural communities, may feed some long simmering resentment among San 
communities, long subjugated by the Tswana.  
San have generally been marginalized in land use decisions, both in the 
pre-colonial era and under the Protectorate, and presently. Around 45,000 to 
60,000 San live in Botswana.124 They typically live in extreme poverty and 
depend on access to land and natural resources for their livelihood.125 Their 
interactions within the resource system are ‘managed,’ as Potteete notes.126 
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Increasingly development, whether through CBNRM or other programs, is 
perceived as threat to their tradition and culture. 127  
As wildlife conservation has become more important at the national level, 
the impact on San has been, paradoxically, to create a disconnect between local 
users and the system as neo-liberal conservation development requires 
significant shifts in livelihood practices that threaten the survival of these cultures.  
Since the pre-colonial era, when San were subjugated under the Tswana, they 
have progressively experienced dispossession and marginalization by 
authorities. In some instances, as in Tanzania, indigenous people have been 
subject to eviction to create protected areas. Evictions occurred in Central 
Kalahari Game Reserve over three waves, between 1997 and 2005.128 These 
Bushmen were the last in Botswana to live primarily off of the land through 
traditional means.129 Removals were carried out under the banner of 
conservation, though after removing the San, diamond and oil prospecting 
began, raising questions over the underlying reasons for the evictions.130 The 
government argues the evictions are about protecting wildlife and providing the 
San with access to services, and were not about accessing diamond 
resources.131  
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San have also been evicted in some areas of the Okavango delta.  Other 
communities, in addition to San, were removed to create both the Chobi National 
Park and the Moremi game reserve.132 Evictions continue in Botswana, more 
recently as the government is trying to create wildlife corridors, most notably in 
areas surrounding the CKGR which have been deemed as key wildlife corridors 
connecting the reserve with the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park.  In many cases 
these evictions have been carried out with violence. In 2002 the government 
evicted one community and in the process destroyed water boreholes, removed 
remaining stocks of water, and forbade hunting and gathering.133 The displaced 
often end up in settlement camps where they are unable to obtain employment 
and experience high rates of alcoholism, depression, and HIV/AIDS.134 Those 
caught trying to re-enter parks and other restricted areas face violence by park 
officials, and allegations of torture and severe abuse have emerged.135 
Patterns of marginalization and dispossession also emerge in the 
development of the TGLP and, to a lesser extent, CBNRM, in particular as 
implemented under recentralization. The TGLP enclosed and/or degraded 
communal areas, limiting their potential for subsistence utilization.136 The TGLP 
relegated San peoples to the reserve areas, which would later morph into WMAs, 
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the primary geographies for CBNRM programs. San, forced out of traditional 
livelihoods, are increasingly dependent on the CBNRM ventures.  However, as 
they have developed and become more centralized, these are perceived as elite 
and reflective of international, not local norms and goals. Programs are referred 
to colloquially as Dilo tsa Makgoa, or “something for the white people.”137  
The recent hunting bans, imposed to safeguard wildlife in the face of 
international, rather than local, threats, are experienced by the San as a 
dispossession138 and as an infringement on their traditional livelihoods.139 The 
hunting ban, in their view, treats them as common poachers, without 
acknowledging their long relationship with and sustainable use of wildlife and 
landscape resources.140  San increasingly resent the central government, 
blaming them for shifts in the SES including wildlife declines, land degradation, 
and water depletion, which they have witnessed over the past 150 years.141  
Removing hunting rights and forcing San out of traditional communal 
lands threaten the survival of a culture dating back tens of thousands of years. 
San culture is deeply rooted in the landscape and in practices only possible 
through active utilization of wildlife resources.142  By removing the San and 
limiting their opportunities to fully develop and access their traditional knowledge 
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and skills, the government is also removing a valuable resource from the 
landscape, given the deep knowledge and understanding of all parts of the SES 
innate in San communities.  Advocates for the San note that in areas where they 
have been removed, poaching and degradation increase.143 
At the same time, because land use rules and regulations continue to 
support large-scale cattle ranching, elite resource users continue to adopt and 
enact practices, which damage portions of the SES. Tswana elites own most of 
the cattle concerns in Botswana.144 The national cattle herd, over three million 
strong, depletes water and grazing with impacts for local resource users and the 
viability of the system.  Instead of adapting to depletion of resources by reducing 
herd sizes, elites have responded by pushing cattle further into remote areas, 
previously used primarily by wildlife and rural dwellers. According to Swatuk “the 
dominant philosophy among this group of cattle keepers is more borehole 
development, not fewer head of cattle.”145 Elites pursue their economic goals 
both in reaction to exogenous forces, primarily subsidies, and in relation to social 
relationships that have developed over centuries in which the Tswana majority 
feel entitled to subjugate San minority groups.  These actions are not conducive 
to the health of either social or ecological components in the SES, and may 
prove, over time, to create vulnerabilities. 
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Illicit Users 
 
The strength and resilience of Botswana’s SES is evidenced by the almost 
complete lack of organized elephant poaching, even in the face of some local 
resistance to conservation and degradation of conservation norms. However both 
scholars and the governing authorities in Botswana are clearly concerned that 
organized poaching will move into the country as elephant populations in central 
and east Africa are poached to extirpation. Poaching of other high valued wildlife 
is increasing in Botswana.146  
In fact, some signs of the development of organized poaching in Botswana 
are beginning to emerge. Recent wildlife trafficking arrests have linked the 
Chinese immigrant business community to the trade in big cats and, to a lesser 
extent, ivory. Media reports suggest that Chinese construction crews are working 
with organized poachers to traffic ivory out of Botswana, launching poaching 
operations from construction sites. 147 However no evidence suggests Botswana 
is experiencing levels of illegal killing on par with east Africa.148  
Most of the poaching in Botswana, according to media reports, is cross-
border poaching committed by small poaching gangs, sometimes including 
former guerrillas or militiamen, which use military style tactics and high caliber 
weapons.149 Poaching militias operate in units of about seven people, with every 
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member of the group highly skilled in their area of specialization including 
providing surveillance intelligence, logistical support, or overall security. 
Poachers move into Botswana from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Zambia, using 
local informants, sometimes subsistence hunters, to gather intelligence on 
wildlife.150 Some reports indicate complicity with civil servants, law enforcement 
agencies, and security services. Poachers traffic ivory from Botswana through 
Zambia by truck for export, typically hidden with licit products.151   
Despite these perturbations the SES remains resilient to these low-level 
threats.  
  
Adaptation and Mitigation 
 
Botswana’s response to the poaching crisis has been two-fold.  First, they 
have linked their local SES more closely to the international SES, framing the 
larger threats of uncontrolled transformation as locally relevant, in recognition of 
the interactions between levels and scales in the SES. Authorities in Botswana 
recognize the multi-level and multi-scalar nature of the SES.152 Second, 
Botswana is adapting policies and practices to strengthen local enforcement and 
management mechanisms to be pro-active and responsive to the increased 
threat form organized wildlife crime.   
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On the international stage this has occurred through massive international 
public awareness raising campaigns in which Botswana has cast itself as a 
leader in conservation.153  Botswana hosted two major conferences in 2013 and 
in 2015 to elevate the issue of wildlife trafficking within the international 
community. Both events brought leaders from across Africa and global leaders 
interested in combatting wildlife crime in an effort to develop a comprehensive 
approach to address the crisis.154 These events laid the groundwork for follow-on 
international level meetings, symposiums, and conferences including large 
events in London, Tanzania, and South Africa. Through these venues and in 
separate initiatives, Botswana is actively developing partnerships with neighbors 
to address cross-border poaching and trafficking. Botswana joined the Wildlife 
Enforcement Network for Southern Africa (WENSA) to coordinate with regional 
neighbors on anti-poaching strategies for elephants, big cats, and other cross-
border populations under threat.155 Botswana is working with fellow African 
countries through regional initiatives such as the Southern African Development 
Community, and the Wildlife Protection and Law Enforcement Protocol to expand 
the scope of regional cooperation in the fight against wildlife poaching and 
trafficking.156 Collaboration stretches to East Africa where Botswana signed an 
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memorandum of understanding with Kenya to increase training opportunities for 
Kenyan rangers.157 
At the 2014 Wildlife Crime Symposium in London, Botswana pledged to 
put its ivory beyond economic use in recognition of the role a legal trade plays in 
covering for illegal trade. Botswana reversed its long-held stance on the 
feasibility and viability of an international ivory trade and dual-listing system for 
elephants. The country also agreed to support a ten year ban on all ivory sales 
through CITES.158 
Botswana took several proactive measures to protect wildlife within the 
local SES. Through a partnership with the AWF and the Kalahari Conservation 
Society, Botswana is drilling extra boreholes in the Makgadigadi National Park so 
elephants do not have to travel outside the park to obtain water, reducing 
poaching incidents and HWC.159 Botswana also continues to track and interdict 
poachers. As cross-border poaching has increased, Botswana has adopted a 
“shoot to kill” policy, resulting in violent clashes with poachers.160 The BDF 
continues to augment the park ranger force, working with intelligence services to 
track and interdict poachers.161  To stop rhino poaching, which could prove to be 
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a precursor to mass elephant poaching, the government created a special unit, 
the Rhino Squad, with dedicated funding for equipment and training.162   
Botswana is attempting to address some of the challenges wildlife face 
due to fencing, though large-scale removal or discontinuation of the practice has 
not been seriously considered. More recently constructed fences have, however, 
been developed to be friendlier towards wildlife. The Makgadikgadi/Boteti fence, 
for example, was designed to zig-zag over a water course to allow cattle on one 
side of the fence, and migrating zebra and wildebeest on the other side of the 
fence, to both access water.  In other cases the government has left gaps across 
critical wildlife corridors to allow the movement of migrating animals. In most 
cases, the government continues to erect fences as a first line of defense against 
the spread of disease, despite impacts on wildlife and lack of evidence that the 
fences actually control disease spread.163   
Other shifts in policy may, however, have unintended consequences and 
potentially perverse outcomes.  One of the most popular aspects of the 
government’s stance on wildlife conservation in Botswana has been the 
emphasis on utilization, both through local use and through the sale of resource 
rights to safari companies and hunting outfitters.  Able to use wildlife under a 
quota system, Batswana have enjoyed a sense of responsibility for wildlife 
management. The hunting ban, implemented in 2014, has had the impact of 
further alienating and dispossessing local resource users. As skilled hunters and 
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trackers, these groups could become susceptible to the lure of poachers, as 
similar groups have in Gabon.164 The same fear exists for professional hunters 
who could be attracted to illegal hunting, as has happened repeatedly in South 
Africa. The ban on hunting also costs jobs and money to communities.165  
Removing the ability to utilize wildlife, placing it as a commodity for wealthy 
Westerners to enjoy, may strain the positive conservation norms in Botswana, in 
particular as elephant populations expand with increasing impacts on human-
wildlife conflict. 
The government also continues to support the evictions of San and other 
communities from wildlife areas. In 2006 Botswana’s High Court ruled the 
evictions were unlawful and unconstitutional, however the displaced peoples 
regained only limited access to the land and resources.166  The government has 
not granted promised special exception licenses for hunter-gatherers wishing to 
access the CKGR. Specially designated enforcement authorities assigned to the 
GCKR, the Special Support Group, have targeted Bushmen communities and 
intimidated, threatened, and beaten the Bushmen. As noted by prominent 
advocates, “there is no evidence that the Bushmen of the CKGR hunt in any 
systematic way for sale, or use guns or vehicles, or hunt endangered species, or 
that their hunting is unsustainable. In the name of conservation they have had to 
pay a price out of all proportion to any threat that their subsistence hunting might 
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pose.”167  The government’s attitude is that moving the San people out of “the 
dark ages” is about development and spreading mineral wealth.168  
Botswana continues to refine its CBNRM strategy in order to balance 
needs of local communities living near wildlife and the desire of the country to 
share the nation’s assets collectively. Reforms were under way at the time of 
publication.169 However, reforms to the CBNRM process, while politically 
expedient, may prove to increase vulnerabilities in the SES. The centralized 
management of concessions and reallocation of assets fundamentally go against 
the principle of CBNRM and weakens the connections between local 
communities and the wildlife they live among.  Communities lose their ability to 
prioritize development goals and are subject to state development priorities.  
Before the policy passed, communities retained the right to decide whether 
schools, hospitals, or other projects were the most important.  Under the new 
policy they lose that authority and are the receivers of development projects 
determined by the central government. As Poteete notes, recentralization polices 
in Botswana did more to “transform wildlife into a national resource then it does 
to solve problems of local management and capacity.”170 The shift in CBNRM 
programs also impacted NGO funding, much of which was withdrawn as the 
government increasingly recentralized control through the 2000s.  Without 
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external support, CBNRM programs in most of Botswana struggle to recover 
costs and stay afloat. 171 
 
Conclusion 
 
Applying the SESF to the Botswana case study illustrates how governing 
authorities understand linkages within the system, and the necessity to link local 
protections to international level actions, whether exploitive, consumptive, 
constructive, or preventative. 
Botswana enjoys significant advantages over Kenya and Tanzania in 
terms of the small number of resource users living in and dependent upon the 
resource system, and the apparent lack of organize poaching, both of which, at 
the time of publication, contribute to the resilience of the SES.  While Botswana 
has enjoyed these generally lucky circumstances, authorities are not relying on 
them to replace strategies to contend with perturbations to the system.  And in 
fact Gabon, a country with similar attributes to Botswana- middle income status, 
a small number of people living near wildlife, and abundant elephant populations- 
has not  developed resilient systems precisely for this reason.  Gabon’s SES is 
second only to Tanzania’s in terms of over-exploitation and potential 
transformation, having lost two-thirds of its elephants in the past decade as a 
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result of weak laws, lack of enforcement, and estrangement and dispossession of 
local peoples.172 
The SESF illustrates how Botswana’s strong laws, strict enforcement, 
essentially universal conservation norms, and transparent system of community 
based conservation initiatives increase resilience within its SES. By focusing both 
on domestic level actions and on the international level, governing authorities in 
Botswana are seeking a more permanent solution to the challenges associated 
with transnational organized crime to forestall the inevitable poaching onslaught 
which will occur if the system cannot adapt. 
Botswana is attempting to adjust and adapt wildlife conservation strategies 
to meet the new realities of transnational criminal poaching before the resilience 
of its system is tested.  By linking the local SES to the international SES, 
Botswana has raised the alarm within the international community, emerging as a 
global leader in and addressing preventing wildlife crime, and helped shape an 
understanding of local SESs as inextricably linked to the continental and global 
system. 
At the time of publication Botswana is far better suited than Tanzania or Kenya to 
meet the onslaught and quickly identify and address perturbations in the system.  
But Botswana has not been challenged by transnational organized wildlife crime 
to any great extent. If ivory prices remain high, poachers will move into 
Botswana, and target the largest remaining herds of elephants in the world, 
testing the resilience of the system to absorb perturbations. 
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The concluding chapter illustrates how the SESF, applied to this project, 
explains outcomes in the international SES and in the three case studies, Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Botswana through the lens of Cash’s scale and level challenges to 
understanding SES dynamics.173   Second, the chapter will focus on the three 
broad questions Ostrom argued the SESF can answer, as well as briefly address 
the hypotheses identified in the research design.174  Next the chapter identifies 
areas for further research, and, finally, the chapter concludes with a synthesis of 
key insights.    
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
Multiple goals informed this research including, first, to explicate and 
describe the potential causal factors degrading or improving SES resilience 
related to poaching; second, to identify and explain cross scale and cross level 
challenges to SES performance; third, to describe and compare specific case 
studies utilizing the SESF; and fourth, to contribute to a critique of present 
conservation strategies related to social components of the SES.1  The research 
essentially focused on three primary questions: What conditions exist which allow 
some states to better protect their wildlife than other states? How can states in 
the developing world withstand the pressures of rising global demand for limited 
wildlife resources?  And, what group of factors operate together to protect wildlife 
and maintain sustainability? 
The research was motivated largely by a concern over the exponential 
growth of wildlife crime, and its serious and negative impacts on wildlife and 
human communities. Transnational organized crime (TOC), taking advantage of 
global connectivity and complex interconnections which link remote wildlife areas 
with urban markets, coupled with climate change, habitat loss, and other man-
made threats, is contributing to what scientists are calling the sixth mass 
extinction.  Recent estimates suggest that 75 percent of all species will disappear 
within the next three generations. Wildlife ranging from coral reefs, Venus 
flytraps, and leeches to rhinoceros, elephants, sharks, and seahorses will be 
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impacted. Solutions to these environmental challenges must acknowledge the 
kind of scale dynamics the social ecological framework, applied throughout this 
project, can identify.  Monocausal factors can provide some insights, but without 
contextualizing the information analysis becomes reductive and oversimplified, 
and worse, leads to inappropriate, ineffective, and damaging policies. 
This final chapter will first illustrates how the SESF explained outcomes in 
the international SES and the three case studies, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Botswana through the lens of Cash’s scale and level challenges to understanding 
SES dynamics. 2   Second, the chapter will focus on the three broad questions 
Ostrom argued the SESF can answer, as well as briefly address the hypotheses 
identified in the research design.3  The subsequent section identifies areas for 
further research.  And, finally, the chapter concludes with a synthesis of key 
insights.    
 
Outcomes: Applying the SESF 
 
Specific characteristics of the SESF, including its inclusion of variables as 
nested and tiered; acknowledgement of scale and level dynamics; and ability to 
disaggregate the features of globalization allow the framework to identify Cash’s 
three scale and level challenges.4 These include not recognizing or ignoring 
scale dynamics entirely; the “persistent mismatch between levels and scales;” 
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and “the failure to recognize heterogeneity in the way that scales are perceived 
and valued by different actors.”5  This section will provide examples from the 
case studies to illustrate how applying the SESF, specifically these features, 
provided greater insights into outcomes than simple mono-causal explanations 
that focus on the role of poverty; conservation norms; state level factors like 
weak governance and weak enforcement; land management strategies; the trade 
ban; and neo-liberal conservation reforms as largely separate explanations for 
current outcomes.  A broad brush approach to poaching “in Africa,” does not take 
into account heterogeneity in problem sets; in interactions between the governing 
authorities and resource users; does not address specific challenges to 
governance which arise in a specific context and operate in a specific way. 
Ignoring heterogeneity ignores scale dynamics all together.   
By applying the SESF to these three cases studies, linkages emerge 
across levels and scales of the SES, illustrating how interactions at the domestic 
level- such as legislation and the actions of resource users- can impact the 
international system, while international level factors such as increased illicit ivory 
use and CITES’ enforcement actions can shift outcomes in the domestic SES. 
No one factors, or small combination of factors can explain how the system 
developed either at the international level, or at national levels.  At each level, 
SESs are complex non-linear systems. 
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Scale Dynamics 
 
As Cash notes, the primary challenge occurs when policymakers fail to 
recognize or ignore entirely scale and level dynamics.6  Because the SESF 
acknowledges variables within nested tiers in the system, and their relationship 
across levels and scales of analysis- spatial, temporal, jurisdictional, institutional, 
management, networks, and knowledge- multiple perspectives of an SES can be 
studied simultaneously, if those portions impact ecological or social outcomes.  
Simply stated, how individual resource users operate in the system, and how the 
system impels or compels them to interact- in particular considering scale 
dynamics related to global trade- can reduce resilience in the system, or bolster 
it. 
Because anthropogenic forces affecting ecosystems occur at all levels of 
social organization, any comprehensive account of the institutional dimensions of 
global environmental change must deal with processes at work at each of these 
levels.7 All of the case studies illustrate the importance of scale dynamics in 
explaining SES outcomes. Chapter 4 describes how interactions between parts 
of the international level SES- resources, users, governance systems, and the 
system, have largely occurred in the context of an open-access system, leading 
to local extirpation of elephant resources and the transformation of the SES over 
time.  The outcomes of the international level SES, fragmentation, 
transformation, and shrinkage, relate to jurisdictional/geographic, institutional, 
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temporal, and knowledge challenges. Mechanisms at the international level lack 
enforcement capabilities; these deficiencies are mirrored at the tiers nested 
below in state enforcement systems. Laws restricting trade are essentially 
unenforced at all levels. Neither the governance systems involved nor non-
consumptive resource users adequately fund measures to protect wildlife from 
the current scale of exploitation. CITES as an international governance authority 
is limited in its ability to protect species by lack of consensus amongst parties on 
the political, economic, and cultural valuations of endangered species.  Ignoring 
these scale dynamics leads to inaccurate assessments of the challenges facing 
the SES at any level. 
In Kenya linkages emerge across levels and scales of the SES, illustrating 
how interactions at the domestic level, such as legislation and the actions of 
resource users, can impact the international system, while international level 
factors such as increased illicit ivory use and CITES’ pronouncements can shift 
outcomes in the domestic SES.  Kenya’s weak laws and lack of enforcement 
enable international ivory traffickers to penetrate its porous borders and move 
massive quantities of ivory to international markets, with impacts rippling across 
the international SES as elephant populations throughout Central Africa are 
poached to extirpation. By centralizing wildlife policies, the government has 
marginalized stakeholder participation in efforts to manage the SES and combat 
poaching, damaging indigenous conservation norms and removing the 
responsibility to conserve and protect from local communities. Similarly, the lack 
of a speedy response at the domestic level to changes in the global resource 
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system driven by shifting resource utilization strategies has impacted the health 
of the system, and its ability to absorb perturbations and disturbances.   
In Tanzania resource users resist conservation and participate in 
commercial poaching, feeding global ivory markets and introducing vulnerability 
in the local system with impacts across scales.  Application of the SESF to the 
Tanzanian case reveal cross-level and cross-scale interactions which are leading 
to the uncontrolled transformation of the SES.  Single factor explanations such as 
“corruption” or “mismanagement” are inadequate to explain the complex 
interactions across the SES.8  This is because both endogenous and exogenous 
forces simultaneously pressure both the social and ecological components of the 
system, with negative impacts for resilience of both.  The interplay of globalizing 
forces, including the hyper consumption of Asian consumers; connectivity of 
global markets; and application of perverse forms of neoliberal conservation, 
combined with processes occurring at the domestic level including corruption, 
and rent seeking, have severely degraded conservation norms.  These patterns 
of conflict between users and authorities together explain SES outcomes.9 
Similarly, in Botswana an examination of nested tiers of the SES reveals 
how forces can positively impact the local and international SES. Scale dynamics 
are specifically acknowledged through Botswana’s domestic policies meant to 
increase safety of local populations within the context of a global threat. 
Governance authorities in Botswana recognize their elephants as part and parcel 
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of the global SES, and that in order to safeguard local wildlife, the entire system 
must be shored up.   
Understanding cross-scale and cross-systems interactions helps explain 
why resource usage changes in an area.  With the advent of globalization, 
decisions at one level of organization in one geographical location impact people 
and resources elsewhere.10  Global change is linked to a complex set of local 
processes, and vice versa.11  Hyper-consumption in Asia, global trade, neo-
liberal conservations trends, and privatization have played important roles in 
shaping the SESs examined, with specific impacts on outcomes, both positive 
and negative. In all three case studies, indigenous people with deep knowledge 
and understanding of resource dynamics were largely excluded from governance 
of the resource system, constructed as environmental villains or as backward 
and anti-modern. The antidote, community-based conservation, was meant to 
address the outcomes of fortress based conservation, namely over-exploitation; 
human wildlife conflict; weak conservations norms; and resentment towards 
wildlife.  As the case studies illustrate, through globalization and market 
processes, some of the most marginalized people in the world are now “at the 
center of global environment and development discourse and practice.”12 Their 
interactions within the resource system have become the object of interest of 
national governments and international conservations organizations and IGOs 
expressly because their interactions with the resource system not only impact 
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local SESs, but also trickle up and across the system to affect broader 
outcomes.13   
The SESF allows for the examination of temporal shifts in patterns and 
processes, and takes into account how past patterns and processes shape a 
system in order to, when appropriate, examine scale dynamics operating across 
time to help explain outcomes. By closely examining historical interactions, 
policymakers can better shape locally appropriate solutions, which acknowledge 
past challenges.  Temporal scale dynamics proved important in this study for 
each of the cases. As Young argues, because “institutions that yield acceptable 
results during some stages of their existence may contribute to the occurrence of 
significant environmental problems during other stages,” it is crucial to constantly 
examine the fit between resource users and governance systems, including how 
those organizations and the rules and regulations that shape them came to be.14  
In each of the cases studied, the SESF illustrated how conditions of the modern 
SES relate to policies and practices stretching into the earliest colonial era, and 
in some cases the pre-colonial era, creating a more nuanced understanding of 
the differences in outcomes across systems.  Fortress-style conservation worked 
prior to in-migration to conservation areas and cycles of over-consumption 
proved it untenable.  Colonial policies generally centralized decisions on wildlife 
and land usage, marginalizing and in some cases alienating resource users 
within the system, inculcating a lack of conservation norms and removing any 
sense of responsibility for the health of the resource system. Where that occurred 
                                            
13
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less, in Botswana, the SES has developed to be more resilient. Devolving 
centralized control proved to be a challenge in each case.  CBNRM programs, as 
the case studies illustrate, similarly emerged as elite vehicles which did not 
ultimately strengthen wildlife norms or increase feelings of responsibility towards 
wildlife, and in some cases, actually increased the sense of competition between 
communities and conservation. 
 
Mismatch between Levels and Scales 
 
As Cash notes, the SESF also reveals the “the persistence of mismatches 
between levels and scales.”15  A mismatch can refer to a poor fit between the 
size and range of a resource system and the governing authority overseeing it, or 
refer to “the challenge of matching the scale of knowledge about a problem 
(global climate change models, biodiversity loss), and the scale of jurisdiction for 
solving that problem.”16  
Mismatches in the size of the resource system and the level of 
governance and authority are evident when examining each case study as a 
subset or lower tier of the international SES, and apply broadly to the challenge 
of CITES to provide oversight to the management of the international SES.   The 
countries studied all increasingly link, at least rhetorically, SES outcomes to 
interactions and governance at the supra-state level.  This emphasis overstates 
the role of CITES in protecting species from exploitive trade, while underplaying 
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interactions between other variables in the system, many beyond the ability of 
CITES or other suprastate authorities to influence. Their willingness to address 
sub-state levels, however, will ultimately have the greatest impact on each 
individual system’s ability to absorb perturbations.  
As the case studies illustrate, examining the challenges facing the 
international SES as a mismatch between scales of knowledge about a problem 
and the scale of jurisdiction for solving the problem, also proved informative.  
Issues facing the SES are framed and shaped according to political, cultural, and 
economic expedience by the most voracious resource users, creating a 
disconnect between how the system is valued by local users as opposed to 
distant users.  
As Chapter 4 notes, the groups with the most potential capability to 
immediately disrupt the disturbances in the system- Asian, in particular Chinese, 
governing authorities and Asian consumers- do not recognize poaching in Africa 
as a problem that can be met under their jurisdiction. The lack of conservation 
norms or a deep understanding of SES dynamics, either in terms of elephant 
biology or the weakness within nested tiers of the governance system, partly 
explains Chinese policies to promote utilization over conservation. The governing 
institutions have not been able to halt the over-exploitation of the system or to 
mitigate or control illicit resource users.  By shaping poaching problems as 
related more to African governance and enforcement failures than as a market 
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response to hyper-demand, Chinese leaders and consumers can justify 
continued mass consumption.17   
On the flip side, Botswana governing authorizes note challenges to their 
local SES as specifically related to the global SES, and as under the jurisdiction 
of international authorities which they have repeatedly called upon to act. 
 
Heterogeneity 
 
The last scale challenge Cash identified is the failure to recognize 
heterogeneity in the way that scales are perceived and valued by different actors, 
even at the same level.   Treating actors as homogenous and motivated by the 
same values and goals assumes a universality of norms that does not exist, 
limiting the potential for tailored, culturally relevant and effective solutions.  
Depending on how they perceive perturbations in the system, actors can chose 
to shape a problem as local or global, to either draw attention to the problem or 
to off-set responsibility.18 
While similarities exist, each country studied has had a different 
experience with wildlife management, experienced different outcomes, and 
operates in a different geographic and socio-cultural historic context.  Not all 
actors in the system view the problem the same way.  Ignoring heterogeneity 
also ignores the scale dynamics in the system.   The scale challenges noted 
above can be recast as failures to recognize heterogeneity in the system. 
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In Kenya, factors at tiers nested below the international SES impacting 
outcomes include the small size of the resource system; increasing human 
populations in wildlife buffer zones; inadequate land use and tenure policies; 
corruption within the port administration and police; incompatible land use 
strategies; and weak conservations norms.  In Tanzania, deep distrust of 
conservation authorities; intense human wildlife conflict; degraded conservations 
norms; and rules and regulations favoring short-term exploitation for rent-seeking 
elites provide a backdrop to market-driven overexploitation of the system enabled 
by sophisticated and well connected transnational organized crime syndicates.  
In contrast, in Botswana dedicated leadership; strong enforcement mechanisms; 
a proactive and multi-scalar approach to addressing wildlife crime; a sparsely 
human populated resource system; and deep seeded conservation norms 
contribute to a resilient system. 
 
Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability:  
Ostrom’s Primary Research Questions 
 
This study provides insights into the three primary questions Ostrom’s SESF 
proposes to uncover which feed into determinations of an SES’s resilience, 
adaptability, or transformability. To reiterate from Chapter 3, the questions are:19 
 What patterns of interactions and outcomes such as overuse, conflict, 
collapse, stability, and increasing returns, are likely to result from using a 
particular set of rules for the governance, ownership, and use of a 
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resource system and specific resource units in a specific technological, 
socioeconomic, and political environment? 
 What is the likely endogenous development of different governance 
arrangements, use patterns, and outcomes with or without external 
financial inducements or imposed rules? 
 How robust and sustainable is a particular configuration of users, resource 
system, resource units, and governance system to external and internal 
disturbances? 
Applying these questions to the specific case studies explored in this project, 
one can alter the questions to read: 
1. What patterns of interactions and outcomes (such as overuse, conflict, 
collapse, stability, and increasing returns), are likely to result from the 
implementation of centralized wildlife management coupled with neo-
liberal conservation and community based resource management in 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Botswana?  
2. What is the likely endogenous development of community based 
management, use patterns, and outcomes without external financial 
inducements or imposed rules? 
3. How robust and sustainable is the SES in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Botswana to external and internal disturbances? 
The patterns of interactions and outcomes which emerged through an 
examination of the primary mode of conservation in the three cases studies- are 
conflict, decreasing returns, overuse, and in at least one instance, Tanzania, 
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collapse.  Even in Botswana, which has experienced almost no organized wildlife 
crime, almost all wildlife populations, with the notable exception of elephants, are 
in decline; resource users are increasingly isolated from the process of 
governance of wildlife resources; and competition between wildlife and human 
communities are increasing, to the detriment of the ecological system which is 
suffering from water depletion, desertification, wildfires, and other degradation 
caused primarily by anthropogenic forces.   
These forms of control over wildlife and conservation developed squarely 
in the context of the international conservation discourse, first shaped by notions 
of centralized exclusive control of wildlife and resources; then through fortress-
style conservation and the separation of communities and wildlife; and later 
through the widespread adoption of neoliberal conservation and the broader 
Washington Consensus agenda pushed through the international development 
community.20 As the case studies reveal, despite rhetoric focused on community 
empowerment governments have progressively recentralized control over wildlife 
resources, bolstering existing literature on CBNRM.  CBNRM, absorbed back into 
central governing authorities or as controlled by elites and private companies, 
has become more about managing people and capturing control of resources 
than about conservation. 21 
As evidence form the cases presented illustrate, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Botswana represent varying levels of resilience, adaptability, or transformability. 
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Per Folke, Kenya’s SES can be said to be in an adaptive stage. Adaptability is 
about the human management of resilience in the system. Adaptability refers to 
the ability of an SES to learn; adjust to both internal and external factors and 
processes; and to continue developing within the stability domain.22  Kenya is 
attempting to manage resilience through adaptation of its governing systems and 
relations to and interactions with resource users. Tensions continue to exist 
within Kenya between the centralizing tendencies of the wildlife establishment 
and the ethics and rhetoric of decentralization espoused in public policy. If Kenya 
cannot resolve these tensions resource users will continue to make decisions 
that best benefit their immediate needs, not the longer terms requirements for 
resource conservation.  
When stability domains shift beyond thresholds and ‘new’ systems emerge 
one may consider the SES to have ‘transformed,’ impacting both societies and 
environments.23  While transformation does not have to be uncontrolled or 
unplanned, or result from sudden shifts in the SES, that is what occurred in 
Tanzania. Tanzania has experienced an uncontrolled transformation, with 
portions of its SES in collapse. While Tanzania should have been well suited for 
the application of neo-liberal conservation- a large and seemingly resilient SES, 
adequate legislative framework, and ample funding and support- conditions 
within the governing authorities, and within the application of reforms, instead 
imperiled the resource system.  
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At the other end of the spectrum, Botswana is strengthening its system’s 
resilience in anticipation of emergent threats. The leadership in Botswana 
recognizes that more resilient systems can absorb larger shocks and withstand 
more disturbance. As a resilient system, Botswana has effectively adjusted 
policies, practices, and procedures to adapt to threats emerging at the 
international, and increasingly regional, level of the SES.24 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The dissertation also posed six hypotheses.  These are: 
Hypothesis 1: In SESs where more modes of authority exist, systems will be less 
resilient to perturbations. 
Hypothesis 2: The imposition of rules from external organs increase the 
resilience of an SES. 
Hypothesis 3: When local communities engage in the management of wildlife 
industries the SES will be more resilient to disturbances than in cases where 
communities do not engage in the management of wildlife industries. 
Hypothesis 4:  Resource stress or collapse is more likely to occur in states with 
weak wildlife crime legislation and/or poor enforcement of wildlife crime 
legislation than in states with strong wildlife crime legislation and effective 
enforcement.  
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Hypothesis 5: In areas where human-wildlife conflict is not effectively addressed, 
the SES will be less resilient than in areas where human wildlife crime is 
effectively addressed. 
Hypothesis 6: An SES characterized by geographic fragmentation is less resilient 
to disturbances than a contiguous SES. 
The case studies provided information and analysis on each of these 
hypotheses, affirming hypotheses 1, 4, 5, and 6.   More modes of authority did 
not increase SES resilience in any of the cases.  In Tanzania where multiple 
government agencies and hundreds of NGOS operate to oversee wildlife 
conservation and CBNRM, SES outcomes are the direst.  Multiple and 
overlapping authorities have not provided extra protections.  States with weak 
wildlife legislation do suffer a higher percentage of illegal killings, as evidenced 
by Tanzania and Kenya which both have far higher rates of illegal killings than 
Botswana. SES resilience is challenged by human-wildlife conflict.  In Tanzania, 
where communities express an intense sense of conflict and competition with 
governing authorities and wildlife, the most illegal killings occur.  And lastly, in all 
cases fragmentation of the SES presented challenges both in the short and long 
term, creating threats for wildlife from both illegal killing and lack of access to 
water, forage, breeding grounds, and other essential landscape features required 
for survival.  
The case studies did not affirm hypotheses 2 and 3.  As the case studies 
and Chapter 4 illustrate, the imposition of external rules has not increased the 
resilience of local SESs.  In many cases states have been remiss in 
  
335 
implementing rules and regulations suggested by CITES or pushed by NGOs 
and IGOs.   And lastly, little evidence suggests that community management of 
wildlife achieves any of the goals of community-based conservation, either in 
terms of the social or ecological components of the system, as evidenced 
throughout the cases. 
 
Areas for Further Research 
 
Because of the comprehensive nature of this research, multiple questions 
flow from the findings, in particular about the application of neoliberal principles 
to conservation and related to community-based wildlife management. 
Scholars continue to propose that the sales of endangered species can 
fund conservation efforts.   Both wild-caught and farmed wild animals supply 
products for growing markets. Important questions focused on how marketing, 
product differentiation, constant expansion, and competition among suppliers 
impact endangered species must be explored.   As media reports illustrate, 
products initially marketed as luxury goods inevitably evolve into mainstream 
products.  This phenomenon can be seen in the production of caviar.  Initially 
marketed as an elite food, health and beauty products, including shampoo, now 
contain caviar, marketed for its moisturizing properties and ability to boost "shine" 
in hair.  Similarly, bear bile- once only used sparingly in traditional Chinese 
medicine- is now used in shampoo, throat lozenges, toothpaste, wine, and tea.25    
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While in the case of ivory scale dynamics operating across levels of the 
SES are depleting wildlife, in other cases local consumption of wildlife products, 
increasingly coveted as status symbols, drives resource depletion.   Forests in 
Central Africa are being denuded of animals for the local bush meat trade.  
Studies focused on the drivers of trade can highlight how scale dynamics within 
nested tiers of an SES impact outcomes and exacerbate challenges. 
As governance authorities and conservation organizations continue to 
push CBNRM programs as the best solution to conservation challenges, more in-
depth studies of the power dynamics between groups can help policymakers 
anticipate impediments to implementation. Maasai, Baswara, and Batwa peoples, 
for example, have been treated as threats to wildlife when in reality these groups' 
cultures all evolved within the context of wildlife.  In fact, their continued 
existence as peoples in part depends on maintaining their relationships with 
wildlife to reproduce culture through myths, stories, and key interactions.  At the 
same time, these groups are all marginalized, and have experienced evictions 
and dispossessions to protect wildlife.  Considered backward and anti-modern by 
African governments, programs which devolve authority and control over 
increasingly valuable resources to these groups are unlikely to succeed.   
A common refrain from critics of conservation in Africa focus on the role of 
western NGOs in driving policy. However, local activists, journalists, and political 
leaders across Africa have emerged as important advocates for wildlife. 
Research focused on how local activists successfully drive change can inform 
western NGOs and assist in developing best practices for the transfer of norms. 
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Conclusion 
 
After the last poaching crisis in the 1980s, the international community 
agreed on two approaches to fighting poaching- an ivory trade ban, which 
worked until it was undermined by the two “one-off” sales through CITES; and 
the adoption of community based natural resource management, or community 
based conservation, which was never really accepted or fully implemented by the 
African governments examined in this study. These are the same exact 
strategies now being bandied about as solutions to the crisis facing wildlife, with 
little real discussion over the challenges to both.  The social-ecological systems 
framework was designed by Ostrom to allow researchers and policymakers to 
move beyond panacea approaches to resource crises, such as a sales ban or 
CBNRM, applied without full understanding of the social-ecological dynamics 
operating across levels and scales in the system.  
 Applying the SESF, cross-scale and multilevel challenges help explain 
why the sales ban and CBNRM have failed to safeguard much of the SES. 
Challenges to the ban, explored in Chapter 4, include uneven implementation at 
the sub-state level, meaning a legal domestic trade continued after 1989 in many 
countries; Chinese government policies promotion of ivory sales; the emergence 
of ivory investors and speculators; and the emergence of transnational organized 
crime, operating in the context of vastly increased global trade. Challenges to 
CBNRM, examined in the case studies, include elite capture of revenues; 
government resistance to devolution and loss of authority over communities and 
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resources; deep seeded resistance to conservation authorities; population 
expansion into wildlife buffer zones and dispersal areas; and the global/local 
arbitrage on land values in the international market.  
While the tide is turning against “one-off” sales, with reversals in support 
from Tanzania and Botswana in particular, support remains for the expansion of 
CBNRM.  Yet little evidence exists suggests the two outcomes expected from 
CBNRM programs- the “maintenance of wildlife habitats and preservation of 
species, and improved social and economic well-being of the communities”- have 
been achieved on a large scale.26 As evidenced by the case studies, after about 
two decades of operations across multiple countries, the ability of CBNRM to 
achieve either of these goals is highly questionable. Governments have resisted 
the redistribution of authority to local communities over resource use or the 
revenues generated. As Swatuk points out, typically the blame for project failure 
is pushed onto receiving countries and communities, ignoring power dynamics 
between donors, NGOs, governments, local communities.27  However, as the 
case studies indicate, socio-cultural dynamics and interactions between resource 
users, resource units, and the governance systems, occurring over decades and 
in some cases centuries, has hampered the implementation of these programs.  
Dynamics which have occurred over the last century between resource users, 
units, and governance authorities in the system also impact ecological outcomes, 
not simply the rise in demand in Asia.  Centralization of authority; exclusion of 
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local peoples; distrust of conservation officials; the perception that wildlife and 
conservation are “for the whites;” perceptions of dispossession; weak laws and 
enforcement; and unmet expectations have been factors in the interactions 
between users and the system.  In theory, CBNRM addressed these challenges 
to conservation, though in practice communities are not closely involved with 
management or land-use decisions; revenues flow to elites or, in the case of 
Tanzania and Botswana, back through the central government; and resource 
users express a disconnect with wildlife and feelings of intense completion with 
animals and conservation authorities over their basic rights.  
Solutions must acknowledge scale dynamics and scale challenges. 
Stopping the illegal trade in ivory will not solve the larger problem of wildlife 
crime. Wildlife crime must be rigorously and vigorously pursued.  The market for 
wildlife products is growing, not only in Asia, but in the west. Any approach to 
wildlife crime must acknowledge the scope and scale of the crimes, and look past 
charismatic species.  The global market moves very fast.  By the time regulators 
recognize a new trend, wildlife populations will be depleted.  An ivory only 
approach that seeks to stop one traffic, but continues to ignore others, will result 
in a cycle of crisis as species after species is forced into crisis.  
Applying the SESF to the cases revealed that poaching is not necessarily 
the greatest threat to each system.  In Kenya the SES is bests by challenges due 
to overcrowding, the small size of its system of protected areas, ad hoc 
development, lack of rules and regulations on land use, and the added 
challenges which will likely emerge as CBNRM programs become more 
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widespread.  Similarly, in Tanzania- assuming poaching can be addressed- the 
SES will still struggle with weak conservation norms, distrust of wildlife officials, a 
sense of acute competition between resource users and authorities, deep 
resentment towards wildlife, and a broken governance system. Botswana’s 
primary challenge is reconciling development priorities to align with social and 
economic goals, while staving off encroachment of transnational organized 
crime, now operating in neighboring states. 
Solutions must acknowledge scale dynamics and scale challenges.   
Stopping the illegal trade in ivory will not solve the larger problem of wildlife 
crime.  Wildlife crime must be rigorously and vigorously pursued.  The market for 
wildlife products is growing, not only in Asia, but in the west. Any approach to 
wildlife crime must acknowledge the scope and scale of the crimes, and look past 
charismatic species.  The global market moves fast.  By the time regulators 
recognize a new trend, wildlife populations will be depleted.  An ivory only 
approach that seeks to stop one traffic, but continues to ignore others, will result 
in a cycle of crisis as species after species is forced into distress and possible 
extirpation.
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